

# Globalization and Cultural Studies: Conceptualization, Convergence, and Complication

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To many people, *globalization* means the ubiquitous imposition of a guilty *sameness*—the suppression of difference, the sinister homogenization of the world. According to this view, dominating powers inflict their identity and interests upon distant economies and ways of life and eventually overwhelm them. Moreover, since the nineteenth century, things have supposedly gotten worse. In the bad old days, colonial states extracted labor, wealth, and culture from those they dominated. In the passage from what used to be called neocolonialism to what we now term “globalization,” advanced societies have added an insidious *counterflow* to the longstanding pattern of *extraction* from societies on the periphery. Today, the First World not only steals their labor and raw materials, but also exports to and imposes upon poorer and weaker states its own dominant mode and relations of production, along with the increasingly hegemonic contents and values that are the cultural reflexes of these impositions. In both cases, it is a question of unjustifiably unequal exchanges: of extraction, appropriation, and imposition in the interest of a few at the expense of many.

In this paper, I want to argue for a complication of this view by making two basic points. First, monolithic conceptions of the unidirectional profits that supposedly arise in these flows and counterflows may be too simplistic and reductive. The situation seems to be more complex and multi-layered. Second, the seeming self-evidence of this situation’s unprecedented character, of the *newness* of the pattern projected in the notion of “globalization,” may well not be the most propitious model for understanding these developments. Restoring the pattern to history may give us some conceptual traction that is missing in many discussions of globalization today.

Concerning the first of these points I will be more allusive than extensive. I will summarize a few theses that I believe would frame a more complete presentation of the issue. I will consider the second point by way of an analogy to the situation of another area of intense questioning and contestation in the contemporary world: I mean “Cultural Studies”—a field, and a concept, that is still being fought over in just the same world that is currently suffering—or benefiting—from globalization. I hope this methodological analogy may be helpful.

Let me go to the first of my points. One of the possibilities that our new “globalized” world affords is easy travel—at least for those of us living in hard currency economies and increasingly for those who are only emerging into these conditions of privilege. Though we can conceive of travel as a kind of appropriation by the rich of the experience and culture of the poor, really it’s clear that travel has never worked in such a simple way. Think of the rich history of travel ac-

counts, from the voyages of Europeans like Marco Polo to China or of Montaigne to Italy, of Jean de Léry or Sir Walter Raleigh to the New World, and on to the multiple accounts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and up to our own day.

It would be absurd to think such travel amounted to a simple and unidirectional appropriation. The experiences these travelers narrated have proven more significant for the places from which they came than for the places they visited. *We are transformed by our ability to dominate.* The supposed sovereignty of Western power is subverted by a different sort of power, perhaps we could say by the power of difference itself. Travel today makes it easier than ever to experience not only the creeping imposition of some centripetal First World hegemony, but also the enriching simultaneity of the world’s variability. Despite the tendency to perceive the new in terms of the old, differences remain *different*. Even the English that people claim is becoming the leveled-down globalized lingua franca about which one currently hears so much lamentation turns out to be renewed in the process of its transformation by contact with the cultures and practices of its new interlocutors.

The elements of belief, thought and behavior, body and verbal language, dress and undress that distinguish cultures are assuredly being inflected by globalization. But they are being *deepened* as much as they are being *effaced*. People have pride in their practices, not just a fascination with or a resigned acquiescence to the “McDonaldization” of their world. Difference promotes self-consciousness as much as it does imitation. We need to recover, theorize, and honor the *complications* of the ascendancy of the powerful over the powerless. And because culture cannot easily be bought, because it is so deeply ingrained in daily practice, because it is so remarkably long-lived and refractory, it makes sense to think of culture as one of the most resistant of the aspects of the world under globalizing pressure.

Culture subsists through arduous trials and under most oppressive compulsion. The experience of travel will continue to show what it has always shown: responsiveness to the realities of concrete situation and a fascination with the vividness and distinctiveness of everyone’s practices, projects, and dreams. It’s a reductive fantasy to think that these will simply be globalized away.<sup>1</sup>

Thus some thoughts about *culture*. But what of the nub of the *socioeconomic* argument against globalization? There can be a remarkably ethnocentric and maybe even egocentric side to First World arguments against globalization. In the dominant countries of Europe and North America, the defense of traditional, indigenous, undeveloped socio-economies often simply blanks out the desires of those who live within them.

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<sup>1</sup> 2002: *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. XXI Nos. 1&2 (2001)

It would take a remarkable romanticization and mythologization of the *sub*-subsistence conditions of real life in most villages in, say, India or Thailand to argue that people *should not* want to work in the globalized factories of Bombay or Bangkok. Or that the multinationals *should not* have put the factories there to seduce the unwary.

In the West, the depiction of these contemporary economies—the benevolently primitive and the globalizedly oppressive—follows a familiar paradigm: that of the development of capitalism in nineteenth-century Europe. I am referring here not so much to Marx's account of primitive accumulation in Part 8 of *Capital*, Volume 1, but rather to the influential model of Ferdinand Tönnies in *Community and Society*, 1887.<sup>2</sup> Tönnies is probably the seminal exponent of the notion of the *village* and the *primitive economy* (*Gemeinschaft*) as the last loci of unalienated sociality in a world of increasing capitalist oppression and isolation. His model—or his myth—was as polemical and contestatory as it was diagnostic. He was motivated (as are many of us) by a kind of visceral repudiation of the cruelties of early capitalism. But before we unthinkingly apply Tönnies' romantic conception to the villages of Asia, we might ask what living in one is really like. To this end, we might look again at the films of Satyajit Ray or Ritwik Ghatak, or (closer to our homes in the West) reread John Berger's *Pig Earth*.

When you compare the globalizing city with the reality of the countryside in Asia, the picture can look quite different from the way we tend to conceive it. Consider Nepal. People die there of what used to be called "starvation" but has now been euphemized as "malnutrition."<sup>3</sup> The average annual income in Nepal is \$210. That's *annual*. Nepal is the sixth-poorest country in the world. Starvation is a fact not only there but also in many countries of the Third World, just the way it was in the First World in the nineteenth century. People regularly *die* of underdevelopment. The Nepalis are dying of starvation; of dysentery from contaminated water; of infections for which antibiotics are not only too expensive, but also because the average Nepali lives a three and a half hour walk from the nearest road where a jeep or bus might pass, so the medicine wouldn't arrive in time anyway.<sup>4</sup> Overall, development increases caloric intake and the other "social indicators" that the World Bank carefully catalogues. In the face of such improvements, it is a bit harder to rail against its coming.

Bernard Berenson, one of the great art historians of the twentieth century, once wrote about art and culture that they had been "saved by poverty." He meant that Venice had been preserved since the glory days of the Renaissance, rather than having been destroyed or despoiled by later development, as so many other places in Europe have been. But Berenson's comment will no doubt seem outrageously paternalistic to many of us. For the Venetians assuredly did not choose their impoverishment to foster the delectation of twentieth- or twenty-first-century tourists or connoisseurs.

When we idealize or romanticize the pre-globalized economies in the Third World, we ought to be alert to a parallel misprision. Development today is globalizing Third World economies, allegedly for the illegitimate benefit of the First World. And of course there is no doubt that often the First World makes out like a bandit in this process. But if we seek to deny to the East and South what we have benefited from so handsomely in the North, we had better have a *better*

idea about how to save the poor Nepalis from destitution and starvation. *Who has a plausible development model to improve on what is now occurring?*

Our condemnation of the evils of globalization is an integral part of what intellectuals *do*, what they have done since the vocation of our social fragment was defined in the nineteenth century. We *criticize*, that is what we are here for. But in this case our criticism, even our castigation of the globalizing process will be best informed by a thoroughgoing understanding of the real socio-economy against which we counterpose it, and which it is inexorably transforming.

Let me turn now to the second of the two points I want to make. It concerns what many represent as the *unprecedented* character of the globalization phenomenon. Such constructions of social reality are almost always misguided or defective. Nothing comes from nowhere. So, by withdrawing it from history, a model that puts emphasis on what is unparalleled in any phenomenon effectively distances the object of its assertion from meaningfulness. Moreover, it is hard to contest what you cannot effectively represent. Here is an early account of globalization:

Through its exploitation of the world market, modern industry has given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.... All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all...nations...in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring the products of distant lands and climes for their satisfaction. In place of the old local and national isolation and self-sufficiency, we have trade in every direction and the universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. [In the area of culture] national chauvinism and provincialism become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. [The process of capitalism]...creates a world after its own image.

The text is from 1848, and despite my discreet transformation of certain elements of its original vocabulary, most readers will have recognized that it is from Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto*.<sup>5</sup> I would like to suggest that the causes and consequences of the globalization process we are now experiencing are already discernible in Marx's analysis a century and a half ago. What should we make of this? I would suggest three points: First, the process we are experiencing as a crisis goes back a very long way. Second, the changes that have characterized *its* development are still largely quantitative rather than qualitative. Third, the holistic character of the analysis already gives us the model, already projects the notion of a "world system," whose functioning is the product, primarily, *not* of individual or corporate will, but rather of a collective adaptation to dynamics inherent in the system itself.

I think one key to better understanding globalization is to see this hidden embeddedness in the *structure* of political economy, in what I call the *system*, rather than moralistically attributing responsibility to some malevolent clique of individual actors. Globalization, in other words, needs not only a

historicization but also a *hermeneutization*—that is, it needs to be subjected to a depth analysis that goes beyond the media images of depredations determined by the process in this or that locus in the Third World, or indeed in the areas of dispossession internal to the First World. What *seems* to be going on is important, but you cannot understand, still less can you fight a system unless you know its real determinants.

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As a way of understanding how ignoring the need for such interpretation can insinuate itself even into the consciousness of quite sophisticated analysts, let me turn now to the area of a parallel battle in the recent academy, the struggle over Cultural Studies. I want to suggest that the structure of the Cultural Studies conflict has significant parallels, that it shares important conceptual determinants, with our current confusion over globalization.

For more than a decade in British and American universities, and now in universities elsewhere in the world, the phrase “Cultural Studies” has been “fighting words.”<sup>6</sup> Partisans of Cultural Studies have ingeniously contested the methods and objects central to established disciplines of the human sciences. On the other side of the Cultural Studies battle is professed allegiance to consecrated tradition, or to the traditional canon. On some campuses, a number of disciplines have been riven by supporters and antagonists of Cultural Studies over what, in each camp, Cultural Studies has been taken to mean symbolically about the critical study of cultural objects. Partisans have seen powerful enrichment of our knowledge and a crucial increase in the social justice of our practice. Antagonists have generally seen disaster and destruction.

Like most battles, the struggle over Cultural Studies has polarized combatants’ positions, and has oversimplified—sometimes even caricatured—the stakes of the conflict. It would be wrong to underestimate the importance of this battle, but it should not be catastrophized either. Concerning Cultural Studies, I want to offer a simple argument. I want to claim that Cultural Studies has developed normally and comprehensibly from dynamics active in critical reflection since the early nineteenth century.

Cultural Studies is neither a revolt that threatens to burn down the house of knowledge, nor, on the other side of the polemic, is it a new style of dwelling that ought to instantaneously replace the inequitable habitations of the past. It is an evolving part of a *tradition*. Rather than the particular objects it has chosen to focus upon, I want to emphasize the connections and continuities of Cultural Studies’ contestatory work. I do so not to deflate its originality or its importance, but to offer an alternative story about the most *critical* of our critical practices and of the vigorous tradition of challenges to the depoliticizing formalism that for a long time has defined literary-critical pedagogy and research in the interpretive disciplines.

Cultural Studies is an umbrella designation. Its varieties include what some view as fiercely independent strains of race-conscious criticism (particularly African-American criticism), postcolonial criticism, popular and mass culture studies, as well as feminist and gay criticism. Work that identifies itself with the Cultural Studies movement has enriched our understanding of human beings and doings in admirable ways. Because of its contributions, we have available to us both archi-

val material and interpretations of human cultural productions and activities over a wider range of time and geography than has probably ever been the case in human history before. At this point, I hope it will become apparent to what degree the phenomenon of Globalization and the paradigm of Cultural Studies are convergent, even isomorphic in their commitment to a universal *inclusiveness*, in their conception of a world defined not by borders and separations but by a complex web of cognizable connections and interdeterminations.

Intellectuals question everything. In light of such a project, we can reexamine Cultural Studies’ critical questioning of one of the foundations of previous aesthetic ideology and practice in the West: the valuation of tradition itself. Proponents of Cultural Studies have argued with great effectiveness that traditional cultural judgments have been guiltily implicated in all manner of insupportable class, race, and gender hierarchies. The canon canonizes work produced by and for social elites, and disparages or ignores cultural productions created in quite different sites in many different cultures. It consecrates domination.

In the face of such long-unexamined valuations, Cultural Studies has sought to give voice to depreciated or previously silenced human experiences and cultural representations. It has tried to uncover and make accessible the symbolic practices and productions arising in sites of disadvantage. In this effort, the work in Cultural Studies has quietly incorporated and brought to bear the fundamental Enlightenment principle that *all* lives, *all* social and expressive practices, are worthy of respect and—consequently—thoughtful examination and interpretation. The insights that were formulated as Enlightenment egalitarianism—what we might think of as a *positive* globalization—underlie all liberatory work since the age of revolutions in Europe.

Cultural Studies brought to guilty light a contamination that, more or less silently, had occurred between *social hierarchy* and *cultural merit*. But the critique of *social* elitism, which all forms of egalitarianism since the Enlightenment have emphasized, by no means excludes belief in the pertinence or importance of *aesthetic* value. And in its most widespread forms, Cultural Studies appeared to solve the question of the elitism of social and aesthetic realms by an out-and-out liquidation of the problem, by denying pertinence to *either* hierarchy. Then we are awkwardly caught between two evaluative stools: traditional literary criteria have become offensive because they only privilege the privileged, but there has not been any comparable convergence around a renewed complex of aesthetic criteria, both evaluative and *non*-discriminatory. We need to disengage these two registers without abandoning the ability to judge some cultural objects preferable to others along dimensions of value that are not simply mystified and mystifying translations of the social views and representations of privileged groups.

Cultural Studies depends upon a series of liberation movements, beginning with the great revolutions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, continuing on, more proximately to black liberation movements in many countries; to anticolonialist revolutions in China, India, and most of Africa; to the history of working-class socialism; and to feminist and gay movements since the nineteenth century. Over the past few decades, the implications of these liberatory

campaigns began to be drawn in the various strands of what has come to be called Cultural Studies.

Like the more directly political movements upon which it depended, Cultural Studies work was instantly and intensely resisted in Britain and the U.S. People lost their jobs. In the U.S., the confrontation precipitated a “culture war” that in some places is still being fought over notions like political correctness, over the curriculum, and in many other areas.<sup>7</sup> Schools become battlegrounds when the contents that those in power think are essential to political and cultural socialization become significantly contested. In the U.S. for many decades education has been conducted to inhibit the raising of questions that might unsettle dominant hegemony. But the academy has never been so depoliticized as to forestall intense conflict whenever this selective depoliticization has been disrupted.

So, Cultural Studies was embattled from the beginning. Now, following that first phase of Cultural Studies’ repudiation of the notion of aesthetic value, it is time to reflect on what alternative criteria we might suggest that in a responsible, non-guilty way could restore and deepen the possibility of judgments concerning the socially-analytic and even the aesthetically-satisfying qualities of symbolic texts and artifacts outside the traditional canon, and outside the system of valuation that claimed to sustain the canon itself.

Likewise, it seems important to recognize the socially cohesive importance of shared texts in constituting the imagined community of a group or nation, as long as invidious socially hierarchical values are not smuggled into such designations by the back door. This would mean, in part, valorizing the necessity of reading even canonical texts against the traditional grain, in a contestatory rather than a flat-footedly triumphalist spirit.

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With several decades of Cultural Studies work behind us now, it seems possible to suggest what might be a second-wave understanding of the impulses and dynamics that its practitioners have been trying to bring to bear in their teaching and research. I want to offer some thoughts about how we might recover and reconceive the tradition out of which Cultural Studies work has itself emerged. Then I will suggest one register of the re-conception of aesthetico-social value that we might define for cultural objects and for a renewed effort to understand their differential power.

The formalist understandings of literary and cultural representations that have dominated much of the West until recently sought their meanings *internally*. The formalists claimed that the “work” was all one needed, that it defined itself by and through its own self-adequation, its own repudiation of anything external to itself. Literature was an *antidote* to the refractory and degraded politico-social world. In effect, one went to literature not for *reform* but for *recuperation*.

With the rise of various strains of *Ideologiekritik* and of hermeneutic interpretation in nineteenth-century Europe, this view of the text or cultural object was already being contested, destabilized and eventually superseded.<sup>8</sup> Indisputably, we had the text before us. The question then became, *what more is there?* What *else* accompanies the text; what frames and enables its meaning without being explicitly stated? What social knowledges, what cultural relationships, what contents mystified by ideology or by simple false consciousness are invoked

and presupposed by an object, even though no label sticks to its surface to announce these covert accompaniments? It began to seem clear that such relations were the necessary forms of existence of any cultural entity. It seems increasingly clear today that through the structured patterns of life experience and culturally enforced association, *all* objects are linked to others that they need not or cannot name, but which we must detect and exhibit to elucidate their meaning. We cannot understand them without invoking these formative absent presences

The paradigm of our discourse upon literary and other cultural texts thus expanded in a fundamental way. These *externalist* models of criticism proceeded under the assumption that no element of culture, beginning with language itself, is ever absolute, neither as a specific mode of usage nor as an institution in general. “Speech,” as Stephen Greenblatt put it, “is not private property.”<sup>9</sup> In their various ways, concepts from Bakhtin’s “dialogism” to Derrida’s “*différance*” stress that no use of language can *ever* isolate itself from references and meanings it does not explicitly articulate, even from ones that it may attempt explicitly to repudiate. Relationality, rather than abstraction or absoluteness, becomes language’s defining trait.

In Cultural Studies’ first phase, attention to devalued or forgotten texts, to the cultural productions of subaltern and marginalized groups, discovery and recovery of the object, defined the fundamental task. Now, in a later phase of work, along the lines of a model that we might find in a number of feminist theories, it has become evident that establishing *relationships* between these recovered objects and the previously sovereign, supposedly stand-alone texts of the traditional canon should become a fundamental element in our analytical agenda.<sup>10</sup> Our efforts can look to models stretching from Marx’s analysis of the hidden character of the commodity, through Nietzsche and Freud, to Derrida’s evocation of the “specters” that flicker around the objects of the visible world on the edge of cultural perception and cognition.

In these paradigms the question of the *accompaniment*, that “what *else* is there?” brings into convergence varieties of critical theory and practice that on other registers might seem to have little to do with each other.<sup>11</sup> What lies hidden, has been rendered inaudible, has been forgotten, or has been mystified that nonetheless *constitutes* any given object? This fundamental *integrative* characteristic of interpretive work has been active in Europe and later in America for as long as a century and a half. Bringing back these connections, determinations, and mediations has been a brilliant effort and defines a powerful alternative to the formalisms that, until recently, dominated established academic criticism. And I would add that the model has evident implications for a world of globalizing connections.

For a long time the opponents of Cultural Studies failed to conceive that their attachment to a supposed humanist universalism concealed quite different class, gender and race hierarchies. Their struggles with the partisans of Cultural Studies brought them into contact with registers of culture that they had somehow neglected to attend to. Some honestly recognized that they had been guilty of a sort of elitist exclusivism or essentialism. Others continued to maintain that the consecrated works of the Western canon expressed the deepest truths about human existence that were available to hu-

manity and denied any necessity of concerning themselves with what one of my own colleagues once termed “sub-literature.”<sup>12</sup>

Despite such retrograde positions on the part of some, in general I think that the Cultural Studies battle is over in American research universities and liberal arts colleges. The anti-Cultural-Studies zealots have lost the struggle to exclude serious interest in minority and other previously ignored cultural groups, objects, and practices. But beyond these content-based advances, we need to project the characteristics of analytical paradigms for a world increasingly interconnected on a dizzying number of levels, for human practices related to each other in ways that even their agents may not fully grasp. One thing is clear: by themselves, formalisms of any stripe simply cannot represent this globalized world very well. My methodological question about the internalist limitations of formalism points in the direction of such an expansion of the analytical field. The question was: “what *more* is there?” Now it is possible to answer it on at least two levels.

First, more cultural material has been collected, archived, described, and analyzed by people in the interpretive disciplines. Moreover this work of collection and compilation has occurred at the opening of the Internet age, the epoch of the World Wide Web, which may turn out to have crucial implications for the cognitive and interpretive dynamic of which Cultural Studies forms a diagnostic part. This is because the Internet’s inherently globalized facility for two-way communication begins to establish the bases for any human study conscious of *bi-directional* exchange. This is a communication in which *each* party has the capacity to *send* as well as to receive messages, to *originate* as well as to accommodate them.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, though it might seem surprising to some who are skeptical about deconstruction’s commitment to the bi-directional, egalitarian position I have been discussing, we could consider a sentence from Derrida’s *Specters of Marx*. There, concerning the ghostly entities that accompany any human artifact—the so-called “specters”—Derrida writes this: “The spectral someone *other* looks at us/concerns us [*nous regarde*]...”<sup>14</sup> (p. 7; translation modified, emphasis added). The structure of relation thus projected looks very much like what Michel de Certeau sought to frame as “heterology”—the discourse *on* and—crucially—*by* the other.

This leads to my second speculative point. The relational complexity of *all* cultural objects, their constitutive *haunting* by contents and forms that inflect their meanings but nowhere appear openly within them, has driven reflection in the human sciences beyond the comfortable clarities of formalisms and positivisms, toward a new view of human phenomena. This new view conceives relationality and complexity as fundamental to any artifact. The model thus reflects, on the level of theory, the density and intricacy that everyone experiences in any human contact. Cultural Studies has a propensity to see relations between the practices or artifacts of subaltern groups and a whole series of *other* sites and types of human activity—whether these are relations with the hegemonic elites who dominate the producers of the object at the center of examination, or with durable cultural traditions that live on in the experience of these objects’ producers, or with nearby interconnected groups whose practices diverge but nonetheless influence any practice of making. It thus turns out that

*nothing* is ever absolute; *everything* is related and informed in its meaning by such relation.

The crucial point here is that these two versions of an answer to the fundamental hermeneutic question about “*what more is there?*”—the multiplication of the objects our study cognizes; the paradigmatic reconception of the determinants of these objects—are dialectically connected. Each deeply entails the other. Human existence is constitutively relational. For considerably more than a century, socio-economies have propagated (and profited from) increasingly intense contact with “the others”—often geographically at great distances from us. Both of the two paradigmatic moves I am discussing seek to seize a fundamental *connection* between, on the one hand, valuing the experiences of people who are different, far away from us, and likely less privileged than we are; and on the other devising a principled and thoughtful means of understanding the productions of these others, and even—returning to our own relationally-determined existences—of our selves. You can see that the image of a globalized world here converges with that of the fundamental project of Cultural Studies.

I would like now to add one further point concerning the importance of this cognition of alterity. Heterology incites us to value difference. But this is not simply an altruistic duty, the result of some sense of *noblesse oblige*. Even when viewed on the most self-interested grounds, our need to consider the experiences and knowledge of people different from us, and often hierarchically subordinate to us, remains fundamental. I think we need to deepen understanding of what elsewhere I have called the “advantage of disadvantage” that arises in analyses like Hegel’s in the *Phenomenology* and goes on to the heterology of Michel de Certeau and others.<sup>15</sup>

Hegel’s dialectic of consciousness and recognition (the celebrated “Master/Slave” dialectic) reconceives the *epistemological* link between individuals and redefines their relationship. In Hegel, the subservience of the Slave unexpectedly turns upside-down and reveals itself as a determining condition of *understanding*. This results from the Slave’s opportunity for what we might call “positional insight.” For Hegel this potentiality for epistemological advantage arises in *the Slave’s subordination itself*. It stems from the labor that social inferiority imposes on his existence. However paradoxical it might at first seem, inferiority then becomes the condition of possibility for a special form of comprehension. The Slave turns out to be in more adequate contact with the world and its oppositions than the Master can be.<sup>16</sup>

This allegorical inversion powerfully inflects notions of subordination or subalternity. In saying so I surely do not mean to make an apology for domination, still less to celebrate it. I only suggest that the move that construes oppression or subservience as comporting an opportunity for insight may help us to understand the full set and breadth of human relations determined by the reality of inequality and disadvantage in this globalizing world. Rich tourists, hamburger recipes, raw material, and manufactured goods are not the only things that travel in this world. Nor are the displacements of knowledge and culture simply unidirectional.

If we are to live in a globalizing world tensed between those privileged and those deprived on any number of social dimensions, we *need* the experiences of those different from us, and particularly of those subaltern to us. The world

would be more just if hierarchies diminished or disappeared. But despite hopeful dreams of equality since the late eighteenth century, we still live in hierarchy. It defines us, notwithstanding our own personal ethics of altruism—and indeed many do not share such reflexes of compassion for the less fortunate. Then Cultural Studies' insights, about the necessity of superseding the guilty exclusions of tradition; about the indispensable forms of relationship that give even seemingly sovereign cultural entities their real meaning; about the wisdom and knowledge that can be derived from those different from us and especially those toward whom we might well feel an impulse of xenophobic superiority—these dynamics reconceive the possibilities of our pedagogy, of our understanding, and of our social action.

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What we term “globalization” focuses principally—though of course not exclusively—upon the realm of political economy. And Cultural Studies concerns itself with the realm of symbolic representations, their reception, and interpretation. But a long tradition of analyses, from Montesquieu, Diderot, and Locke in the incipient period of modernity to Jean-Joseph Goux, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, and many others makes clear that the seemingly stable boundary between these two fields actually turns out to be more than permeable. Rather, the closer we look at their nominal segregation, the boundary between them diffuses like the Cheshire cat. It might well be most propitious to conceive of both under the sign of the universal activity of human beings and doings. Our inquiries into each of these areas thus converge and complicate the conception of the world by which we have sought to understand the dynamics of modernity since it became imaginatively possible to conceive the world as an inter-related system, and envision culture not as the plaything of privilege, but as the constituting inheritance and the effective symbolic practice of every human being in the world.

#### NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> The foregoing is based upon my contribution to an issue devoted to globalization and travel in *Sites* 5:1 (Spring 2001), 225-226.

<sup>2</sup> See Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society* (1887), trans. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

<sup>3</sup> World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region, *Nepal: 2000 Economic Update*, Report No. 20229 NEP (27 March 2000), 13. <[http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&cid=000094946\\_00040502431820](http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&cid=000094946_00040502431820)>. In Nepal for the 1992-97 period the child malnutrition rate (ages one to five) was forty-seven percent. In South Asia as a whole the mortality rate for children under five is 100 per 1000 births; for adults fifteen to fifty-nine it is approximately 215 per 1000. In Nepal, the corresponding rates are approximately 117 and 290. *Nepal 2000 Economic Update*, 11. See also the Dec. 1, 1998 World Bank Sector Report, *Nepal: Poverty in Nepal at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region, report no. 18639. <[http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&cid=000094946\\_99031910543371](http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&cid=000094946_99031910543371)>.

<sup>4</sup> *Nepal 2000 Economic Update*, 11; *Nepal: Poverty in Nepal*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Communist Manifesto* (London: Verso, 1998), 70-71. Translation modified.

<sup>6</sup> I should acknowledge that the term “Cultural Studies” embraces an internally complex, sometimes even conflicted cluster of theoretical and analytic movements, often with diverse or divergent national, class, gender, and race agendas. It appears important to consider what *joins* these different strains of investigation. For general accounts of Cultural Studies in its diversity, see John Storey, *Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture* (Athens,

Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1996). Gayatri Spivak's “Scattered Speculations on the Question of Culture Studies,” in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 255-284, remains an important reflection on this movement.

<sup>7</sup> One serio-comic accompaniment of this complex and multifaceted struggle was the formation of a subsidiary conflict over what some ingenious publicists on the Right dubbed “political correctness”—essentially an accusation by conservatives that the radicals who dominated American campuses had instituted a “thought police” to restrict the expression of any views that did not conform to the radical agenda. See *After Political Correctness: The Humanities and Society in the 1990s*, ed. Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), particularly Richard Terdman, “The Politics of Political Correctness,” 238-252.

<sup>8</sup> One of the most influential formulations of this notion was the concept of “suspicion,” identified by Paul Ricoeur with the interpretive practices of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. See Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 32-34. Very early, Marx put it this way: “Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historiography has not yet won even this trivial insight. It takes every epoch at its word and believes that everything it says and imagines about itself is true.” Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Progress, 1976), 70-71. For Marx, one had to go *beyond* conscious and overt self-representation to find the truth even of the self. Freud then systematized this technology of *going beyond* the conscious text of an analysis to illuminate what we *can't* know about our own “knowledge.”

<sup>9</sup> *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 20.

<sup>10</sup> A brilliant and pertinent model of such relationality can be found in Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

<sup>11</sup> Derrida puts the paradox of this foundational “visibility of the invisible” this way: “The name of the one who disappeared must have gotten inscribed someplace else.” Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 5.

<sup>12</sup> The battle of course continues. As a quite recent example of this pugnaciously unreconstructed position, consider Harold Bloom, *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998).

<sup>13</sup> See *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, ed. James Clifford and George E. Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

<sup>14</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 7; translation modified, emphasis added.

<sup>15</sup> See Richard Terdman, “The Marginality of Michel de Certeau,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* (SAQ), 100: 2 (Spring 2001), 412.

<sup>16</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford, 1977), 118-119. On this point, see Christopher Gosden, *Social Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 65-66.