

Competing, Overlapping, and Contradictory Agendas: Egyptian Education Under British Occupation, 1882-1922

Mona Russell

Education is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, states can utilize education to achieve far-reaching socioeconomic goals and to preserve social order. On the other hand, education is a powerful means of achieving individual needs as well as bringing about an awareness of the need to change the existing order. States, religious hierarchies, social organizations, and individual teachers can all work to foster a particular sense of being in students, who, as graduates, bring their educational baggage into society. Education, be it religious or secular, can serve as a social glue, bonding individuals together by creating a shared cultural belief system.¹ In a country under occupation, the various forces affecting the educational process are quite complex involving colonial officials, local elites, and an indigenous intelligentsia. In the case of Egypt, the story becomes further entangled because it was home to many émigrés from the Levant, some of whom came for business reasons and others for greater intellectual freedom. The context of educational battles between various segments of Egyptian society and the British must be seen in light of overall policies of Egyptian development, Egyptian finances, and British imperial interests. Furthermore, the accommodations that were reached for boys' education did not work as well for female education given the competing, overlapping, and sometimes-contradictory agendas of the factions involved.

For over fifty years prior to the British occupation in 1882, growing numbers of Egyptian students were being trained in new forms of government-sponsored education. To facilitate his plan for economic and military expansion, Muhammad Ali (r. 1805-1848) created a new educational system. Rather than building upon the existing system of religious education or dismantling it, he built a parallel system starting at the top with specialized schools for military science, engineering, and medicine (for men and women). He then worked his way down to the primary level. Initial recruitment for the advanced schools would come from the traditional schools, but later his new primary and preparatory schools would prove more fertile training ground.² Furthermore, he created a Committee of Public Instruction to oversee the educational process, and this committee endorsed the notion of female education, although it did little to advance it.³

Muhammad Ali supplemented his program with the use of foreign advisors, translators, and educational missions to Europe. A paternalistic state sponsored the entire system, covering tuition fees, books, other educational expenses, and even personal expenses. Whether in primary, preparatory, or specialized schools, as well as missions abroad, the state strictly governed Egyptian students with careful supervision, continuous observation, and numerous regulations⁴ The

state was attempting to foster both the student's character and intellect to better serve its needs.

Muhammad Ali's plans for expansion and development contradicted both Ottoman and British aims.⁵ The two powers worked together to remove the Egyptian presence from Syria and the Hejaz, as well as to dismantle his economic monopolies by enacting a new commercial treaty in 1838.⁶ Muhammad Ali was compensated, however, with the hereditary governorship of Egypt in 1840. From this point, Egypt turned to supplying Britain with raw materials, namely cotton, and no longer posed a threat commercially, industrially, or militarily to Anglo-Ottoman aims.

As the fortunes of Muhammad Ali waned after 1840, there was less need for the new educational system because expansion and industrialization were halted. His successors Abbas (r. 1848-1854) and Said (r. 1854-1863) were both unable and unwilling to sponsor education to the same degree.⁷ The economy simply could not sustain extensive educational programs. By the end of Said's rule there was no longer even a Ministry of Public Instruction [*diwan al-madaris*], and only the military and medical schools remained, despite the fact that the economy was improving.⁸

Ismail, who came to power in 1863, benefited from a bustling trade in cotton, heightened by the American Civil War; yet he was also thwarted by the unfavorable conditions of the Suez Canal concession. Western observers initially were optimistic regarding his ascension to power.⁹ Nevertheless, historians and contemporary observers have given mixed reviews of his rule. Those with a positive image of Ismail highlight his efforts to increase the productive and intellectual capacities of the country by investing in bridges, canals, railroads, refineries, telegraph lines, ports, schools, newspapers, and cultural institutions.¹⁰ Indeed his accomplishments in the field of education are so noteworthy that even his biggest critics begrudge him some success.¹¹ Ismail reestablished the *diwan al-madaris*, combining it with the Ministry of Public Works and the *waqf* administration with an eye toward greater government control and seizing upon the relationship between municipal reorganization, education, and finance. In addition to reopening many of the specialized schools, Ismail began to work on the base, spreading primary schools throughout the provinces. He also took measures to regularize testing, curriculum, and instruction.¹² Finally, he took great personal interest in the issue of female education, and during his reign the first government primary school for girls opened.¹³

Despite Ismail's progress on education, his detractors tend to focus upon his personal extravagance, his overly lavish development schemes, and his unwillingness to change these habits in light of changing economic circumstances, namely

the end of the cotton boom.¹⁴ In a move not unlike Louis XVI calling the Estates-General to meet (and raise taxes) in 1789, Ismail created a parliamentary body that would serve a similar function in 1866. Within nine years he was forced to sell Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal Company to the British. The following year, 1876, Egypt was nearly bankrupt, and Ismail allowed Britain and France to control state expenditures through the Public Debt Commission. When he tried to regain control of Egypt's finances, the country's European creditors pressured the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II to depose him in favor of his more malleable son Tawfiq (r. 1879-1892). While Ismail's deposition led to a certain amount of scaling back and school closures, the process he renewed would not evaporate. A class of educated Egyptians that had benefited from the policies of Muhammad Ali and Ismail was now in place in the army and the bureaucracy.¹⁵ Furthermore, over the course of the nineteenth century, a landowning elite had come into existence and sent its sons to the new government schools.¹⁶ It was a coalition of these privileged individuals seeking to increase their power, vis à vis the monarchy and foreign interests that initially came together in the Urabi Revolt of 1881/82.¹⁷ It is against this complicated backdrop that the British arrived in 1882 in a stopgap measure to restore order. Nevertheless, the British presence was anything but temporary. The first consul general in Egypt was Sir Evelyn Baring [Lord Cromer], who had been in Egypt at the end of Ismail's reign as British controller.

Cromer's education policy was governed by the objective of bringing Egypt back to financial solvency and by Britain's experience in India. According to Marsot, the former was of particular concern since Cromer's family owned a sizeable portion of the Egyptian debt.¹⁸ As for the latter, Cromer had seen firsthand in India that it is indeed better "to trade with civilized men" than "to govern savages" but, at the same time, that too much education makes for an unwieldy, critical populace.¹⁹ Thus, he revamped the educational system in Egypt by limiting access to education, increasing fees and the number of people paying them, changing the composition of the student body, and changing the curriculum within the schools.²⁰ His answer was to create a two-tiered educational system in which basic literacy and mathematics would be stressed for the masses and a small, highly educated class created to fill the lower ranks of the civil service and provide for a small urban professional class.²¹ While Egyptian education underwent some changes after Cromer's retirement in 1907, his successors nonetheless followed the outlines of his policies. To implement his educational programs Cromer chose his old tennis partner Douglas Dunlop, an irascible Scotsman who had first come to Egypt as a missionary/teacher. Despite thirty years of service in Egypt, he not only never learned a word of Arabic, but also preferred that his underlings and employees not know Arabic either. Even his British peers viewed him as somewhat of an eccentric who generally dined alone. One colleague, while acknowledging his driving work ethic, pointed out that Dunlop was a man with a limited outlook and "little sympathy for the Egyptians."²²

Much of the historiography on Egyptian education pits Egyptian nationalists, who are seeking widespread educational reform, against the British, who are bent on restricting education.²³ By examining the press, speeches by party leaders, minutes from nationalist congresses, etc. on the one hand,

and the Cromer/Dunlop team, on the other, it is easy to create this Manichaean contrast.²⁴ Nevertheless, this seeming gap between British and Egyptian nationalist positions is not as large as it appears when we examine the various factions composing the Egyptian nationalist position. Landowning, upper class and upper middle class Egyptians in the higher echelons of government service owed their well-being to a relationship with European interests, generally, and British interests, specifically. They were the channel through which foreign companies exported the cotton produced by Egyptian peasants. Thus, it is natural that these Egyptians would work with the British to improve the transportation-communication infrastructure, expand agricultural output, and favor foreign business interests at the expense of social, educational, and welfare services for the masses.²⁵

The two-tiered educational system met the needs of wealthy Egyptians as much as it did the British, particularly with regard to boys' education. The class conscious British sought to restrict education to those individuals who would best assist them in the administration of the country, pulling from the most likely pool—the landowning elite. The best way to attract these individuals and to exclude others was to raise fees in government schools. This policy was a radical departure from that of Muhammad Ali, who sought to attract the best students of all classes by offering the previously discussed incentives. It was through these measures that he broke the power of the old mamluk elite. While Ismail did introduce some fees into the school system, they were intended for those who could pay them, and the proportion of students paying fees remained under thirty percent up until the time of the occupation.²⁶

Cromer always argued that establishing and/or raising fees was a measure that was both fiscally responsible and one which assured the dedication of the student. In fact, he went as far as to say that this system would help Egyptians get an education "of a truly national and popular character." He further justified these measures by pointing out that the number of students attending government schools continued to increase.²⁷ Despite such rhetoric, it was clear that the British felt more comfortable with the elite at the helm. As for the Egyptians, the following comments by a bureaucrat in a 1905 note to the *majlis al-nuzzar* exemplify the views of the elite. He felt that by raising fees in the upper educational track, there would be a similar "raise [in] the moral standard" by not admitting "children of the class which sends its children to elementary schools" who would "harm their peers." The idea of the mixing of the social classes was always a great fear amongst the upper classes. It was a fine goal to raise the peasant from his current condition, as long as it did not involve spending any time with him. The same bureaucrat goes on to note that in the last twenty years, that is, during the time of the occupation, he had seen a correlation between increased fees and an increase in the "moral level" of government schools.²⁸

The flip side of limiting access to the upper educational tier was the concomitant restriction of access to government service and encouragement of those in the upper tier to continue their education. Egyptians with vested interests argued that diffusion of too much education to too many would create a shortage of manual labor and water down the quality of government schools, echoing the oft-repeated fears of Cro-

mer in his *Annual Report*.²⁹ These concerns countered opinions in the press, which touted education as a panacea to society's many ills. As more and more Egyptians received a primary certificate, the British first phased out the primary certificate as a passport to government service, then created a rigorous civil service examination, and finally eliminated the primary certificate altogether.³⁰ Those who attended private schools were allowed to take the civil service examinations; however, those who were trained in government schools generally were more successful.³¹ The only graduates from all of Egypt's higher and specialized schools that did not seek government employment were those from the law school.³²

Another area of confluence for the British and the Egyptian elite was in the arena of improving Egypt's abysmal literacy rates.³³ Each group worked to carve an educational niche for the masses, although it should be noted that both waited until after Egypt attained financial solvency before embarking upon this aspect of educational reform.³⁴ In Cromer's own words, he wanted to "equip the pupil with sufficient knowledge to care for his own station of life..."³⁵ The easiest way to build up the lower tier of schools without great expenditure was to work through the existing network of *kuttabs* and native elementary schools.³⁶ In 1888 the government removed native elementary schools from the jurisdiction of the *waqf* administration and placed them under the Ministry of Public Instruction.³⁷ In 1898, the British began a program of providing such schools, which adhered to certain standards, with subventions for support. In order to receive these funds, schools had to offer reading, writing, and arithmetic, in addition to religious instruction. While it might seem that the aim of this legislation was to improve education by expanding the curriculum, it also restricted curriculum by disqualifying any *kuttab* that offered a foreign language. Thus, a number Coptic-equivalent *kuttabs* were not eligible for the subventions.³⁸ It is clear that knowledge of a foreign language was necessary for advancing socially, politically, and economically in Egypt.³⁹

The British maintained that if Egyptians were truly concerned about education, then individuals and communities would work together to sponsor more schools. Egyptian elites sponsored such schools through legislation and personal funding, and they benefited from popular support for such efforts. The royal family, nationalists of humbler origins, and Egypt's Syrian community also sponsored these schools through participation in Muslim and non-Muslim charitable associations. The press served as cheerleader and advocate for these organizations.⁴⁰ The government started a land grant program in 1905 for charitable associations seeking to build schools.⁴¹ As well, in keeping with British and elite Egyptian desires to expand basic literacy but to maintain control, provincial councils were created to supervise all forms of vernacular education. Thus, local elites would oversee the dispersion of funds to these schools, of which seventy percent went toward building, maintaining, and improving the standards in *kuttabs* and elementary schools and the remainder of which went toward agricultural and technical education.⁴²

A third area in which the British and Egyptian elites found common ground was the use of curriculum as a form of social control. Examining a subject taught in both educational tracks is useful for understanding this concept. By 1914 hygiene was added to the lower educational track. In

schools for both boys and girls, hygiene filled the function of the more varied curriculum found in the upper educational track. Hygiene filled gaps in morals, civics, and science, as well as home economics for girls. Thus, students in the elementary (or lower) track required an extra year of the subject. Furthermore, the curriculum in elementary schools was far more detailed. While primary students needed only "simple lessons in neatness, cleanliness, attention to hair, nails, teeth, etc.," elementary students necessitated "rules for neatness and cleanliness ... including the use of the sponge, loofah, nail-brush, tooth-brush, comb, and hair-brush." Finally, elementary students covered topics not mentioned at all in the primary school syllabus, for example, discussion of perspiration, vermin, the evils of alcohol, and the proper use of latrines. Additionally, girls in both educational tracks covered topics relating to the care of children and the infirm.⁴³

A comparison of two textbooks bears out the differences in the two types of schools. Dr. Sarubyaq's primer on health, *Hygiene for Elementary Schools*, consisted of two versions, one for boys and one for girls, the latter being fifty pages longer. Both versions begin with three detailed chapters on personal hygiene. The text then moves on to the basic principles of anatomy and physiology as related to nutrition and digestion, including a discussion of the dangers of alcohol. The remaining chapters deal with clothing, sleep, housing, child-care, first aid, and home nursing with greater detail in the girls' version. Sarubyaq employs sketches to reinforce his message of cleanliness and morality, juxtaposing pictures of well and poorly groomed children. He also utilizes sketches to show various implements of washing and grooming. To demonstrate the evils of alcohol, he juxtaposes two depictions of the same man, before and after an alcoholic binge. In the before shot, the man is well groomed, clad in a tie, suit, and *tarbush*, and afterwards, he is dirty, unkempt, has lost his *tarbush*, and his clothing is disheveled. The next sketch is of a man in a straitjacket, who has completely succumbed to the evils of alcohol.⁴⁴

The text's discussion of hygiene and temperance demonstrates the concerns of British and the Egyptian ruling elites for control of the masses. Outside the classroom this process involved public works projects, new public services, and new forms of order.⁴⁵ Inside the classroom the government hoped to extend its sphere of influence into the home by teaching the principles of hygiene, morals, and home economics. The Egyptian elite shared the occupiers' fetishism with cleanliness, which embodied bourgeois values such as monogamy, industrial capital, and class control.⁴⁶ Ironically, Islamic culture is predicated on rituals of cleanliness and ablu-tion, and historically cities contained bathhouses for public use at a time when bathing was only "a cursory activity at best" in Britain.⁴⁷ Soap, bathhouse entrance fees, and laundry expenses were considered such basic necessities that they frequently appeared in *nafaqa* awards, along with staples, e.g. meat, bread, and oil.⁴⁸ With respect to the issue of alcohol abuse, Timothy Mitchell has argued that there was a great fear among the upper classes, who imbibed freely, that this practice would spread to the masses.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, alcoholism remained a vice that only the upper class could afford. Unlike Britain, which had a ready supply of inexpensive alcohol for the working classes, Egypt had mainly expensive imports. Even the more inexpensive locally produced beers and wines

were inaccessible to the masses. Finally, it should be noted that instructive literature on hygiene was neither a nineteenth century nor a European innovation. A genre of *mdʿz* (instructive) literature dating back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and perhaps earlier, details such teachings, usually directed at men to instruct women.

In contrast to the issues of social control demonstrated in Dr. Sarubyaq's primer, texts such as Muhammad Rushdy's *General Management of Health and Illness*, designed for the upper educational track, contained little on cleanliness or hygiene. The focus was more on anatomy and physiology, and the sketches were generally scientific, depicting, for example, the nervous and digestive systems. While there was a section on the dangers of alcohol, it also contained a section discussing the percentage of alcohol in various drinks and the permissibility of alcohol if prescribed by a doctor. Finally, the textbook offered consumer information, discussing name-brand products such as Evian drinking water, Nestle baby formula, and the Burroughs-Wellcome syringe.⁵⁰

In addition to areas in which British and Egyptian aims were congruous, there were also areas in which their aims were overlapping. The subject of religion fits into this category. When the issue of increasing the number of lessons per week in religion in the lower educational track came to Cromer's attention, he first questioned the validity of such a decision but ultimately decided that it might attract further charitable endowments and quiet nationalist concerns.⁵¹ Furthermore, even in the higher educational track, the British could use religion to control students. According to the *Syllabus of the Primary and Secondary Courses of Study*, courses in religion could be used to guard "against evil passions," "strengthen the ties which unite individuals," and set the individual on "the path to righteousness in this world."⁵²

While the Egyptian elite could certainly glean benefits from the issues of control and more charitable endowments for the schools, they too could profit by meeting the call for more study in and of the Arabic language, as well as the study of Islamic history, all of which were inherent in more hours of study in religion. Prior to the British occupation, the study of national history and of the duties of citizenship were extremely important in the minds of Rifaat al-Tahtawi and Ali Mubarak, who had studied in and/or traveled to Europe, and who helped to shape Ismail's educational system. Tahtawi went so far as to say that although he believed that a religious education was the foundation of an individual's studies, political education was necessary for understanding one's role in the nation and that this was to take place before any vocational education.⁵³ Egyptian history/geography played an important role—this subject was even taught in the first government-sponsored primary school for girls. It is also noteworthy that it was an addition to what had been recommended by a French commission charged with studying the issue.⁵⁴ Through classes in religion Egyptians could recover the history that Cromer deemed superfluous for both educational tracks.⁵⁵

The issue of language and religion were intertwined because Arabic is the language of the Quran, which Muslims believe to be the word of God; thus it carries both a divine significance and a connection with a glorious history. Accordingly, the issue of language had been one of heated debate in the nationalist press. Even for Christians, both Egyptian

Copts and Syrian immigrants, the language and history imbedded in religion were sources of unity. Nevertheless, there were large numbers of British teachers, who spoke little or no Arabic, staffing the schools, especially secondary ones. Thus, students were force-fed English in a variety of subjects and contexts. Abdullah Nadim's "National Life" represents the nationalist opposition to this problem. In this article he argues for the importance of teaching the national language.⁵⁶ Additionally, Nadim represents a class of individuals contributing to the dialogue in the press. He had come from an artisanal family that was hurt by changes in the economy and in patterns of consumption over the course of the nineteenth century.⁵⁷

Thus, what might appear as a contest over more religion in the classroom was more an issue of extent rather than existence or nonexistence, and the British and the Egyptian ruling elite actually had overlapping aims. Nevertheless, the issue of education allowed the elites to contest the British without threatening their own interests and indeed meeting the demands of the urban, professional (nonlandowning) class as well as the middle class and émigré intelligentsia. Education and lack of British response was an outlet that elite Egyptians could use to deflect criticism in other areas such as public health.

Another series of these battles took place between 1906-1907, under the guise of a great battle between the nationalist hero Saad Zaghlul, the new Minister of Education, and the evil Douglas Dunlop, special adviser to the ministry, who could supercede Zaghlul on any matter. Interestingly enough, Cromer personally selected Zaghlul as minister when he upgraded education from department to ministry status.⁵⁸ Zaghlul was not from the traditional privileged class. His father was an *'umda*, part of a class of village notables whose fortunes rose over the course of the nineteenth century and who sent their sons to Cairo for their education. Zaghlul's first higher educational experience was a traditional one at al-Azhar, where he became acquainted with Muhammad Abdu. Through Abdu he met Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Abdullah Nadim, and he became involved in the Urabi revolt. After a brief period of imprisonment, he then turned to law. He practiced law before actually studying law in France, which then allowed him to ascend the sociopolitical ladder. After his return to Egypt, he frequented the salon of Princess Nazli Fazil, where he interacted with Egyptian elites, e.g. his future father-in-law Mustafa Fahmy, and British officials, e.g. Lord Cromer. Zaghlul's marriage to Fahmy's daughter Safiya helped complete his climb up the ladder. It was Zaghlul's connection to his father-in-law, who was prime minister for Abbas II from 1895-1908, that got him his position as minister of education in late 1906, as well as the title of *pasha*. In all likelihood, Cromer envisioned Zaghlul as much more of a moderate, like his father-in-law.⁵⁹

The great war in the press against Dunlop and the great push by Zaghlul to amend the curriculum in the schools came at a key point in the sociopolitical history of Egypt. The time between 1906 and 1907 was the era of the Dinshawai incident, which heightened anticolonial sentiment; the rise of Liberal government in Britain, which led Cromer to announce his retirement; the death of nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil, who was founder of the National Party; and a time of financial crisis in Egypt, which usually meant cutbacks in educa-

tion.

The chief complaint against Dunlop, to whom Zaghul referred as “the assassin of education in Egypt,” was his opposition to the use of the Arabic language in Egyptian schools and the resulting consequences for the study of morals, civics, and national history.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Dunlop encouraged only the hiring of British teachers who knew no Arabic, who were then expected to convey subjects such as history, geography, and mathematics entirely in English. Thus, these teachers were forced to use the same pedagogical methods of rote memorization for which the British so heavily criticized traditional Egyptian teachers.⁶¹ A sidebar to the story of language was not only that Dunlop suppressed Arabic, but that he also suppressed French, a language that would encourage “nationalism and independence.”⁶² The British repeatedly claimed that Egyptians were free to select a foreign language in school, although the reality reflected the demands of the occupation.⁶³

The agreements reached between Saad Zaghul and Eldon Gorst, Cromer’s successor in 1907, represent a hegemonic bargain between the British and the Egyptian elite, and between the Egyptian elite and nationalists of more humble origins. The latter wanted more schools and teachers, better teachers, more instruction in and on the Arabic language, and a greater emphasis on Egyptian history. First, there was an attempt to teach more subjects in Arabic. In primary school, all subjects, except English, would be taught in Arabic. In secondary schools, most subjects would be taught in Arabic; however, some instruction would remain in English given the shortage of native teachers.⁶⁴ Finally, for primary students, classroom hours in religion increased by thirty percent. This new allotment not only provided more time for religious and moral instruction, it also reinforced the study of Arabic language and Islamic history. Christians and Jews would be separated from their Muslim classmates for such lessons. To better accommodate the new arrangement, religion class would be held at the end of the day so that non-Muslims could leave if no provision was made for their instruction.⁶⁵ Furthermore, a new class called *al-tarbiyya al-qawmiyya* came into existence, which pulled portions of morals/civics lessons out of religion. Thus, the British were free to teach history and geography classes with their empire as the central narrative, and Egyptians could study their non-ancient history in more intensive courses of religion and turn morals into a national rather than sectarian topic.⁶⁶

The bifurcated educational system and the intellectual bargains reached between the Egyptian elite and the British occupiers worked well for boys’ education. The upper track of the boys’ educational system provided the British with enough qualified civil servants to fill its lower ranks and Egyptian cities with a growing professional class. By teaching submission through religion and reinforcing British hegemony in history and geography classes, the British maintained their rule. By jockeying for more schools and a more “national” curriculum, elites appeared to be opposing the occupiers and bringing needed change to society, while actually they were reinforcing their own privileged position. Nevertheless, girls’ education proved more problematic given its symbolic importance for the British and the Egyptians.

Attempting to reserve the upper track of the educational system for servants of the state meant that the government

would not be able to attract elite women. Furthermore, there would continually be some ambiguity about what the purpose of female education should be. From the start of government-sponsored female education in Egypt, that is, education that was directly or indirectly aimed at filling needs of the state, the first students tended to be girls with few options—girls who needed the perks of a subsidized education and living expenses, as well as income-producing skills. The earliest students at the Muhammad Ali’s school of midwifery were slaves and orphans.⁶⁷ At the Siyufia school, Ismail’s educational planners attempted to attract girls from all classes with a curriculum that would suit all needs: Turkish, French, music, and art for the elite; income-producing skills such as needlework and home economics for the lower classes, as well as Arabic, the history and geography of Egypt, math, and science.⁶⁸ Although it is difficult to assess, it appears that the school did have a wide range of class backgrounds during Ismail’s reign; however, most of those from the elite were likely slaves, prized concubines who were being trained to make refined companions, wives, and mothers. As for the lower class, such families were somewhat suspicious of education making their daughters difficult and/or unmarriageable, and they refrained from sending their daughters despite the monetary benefits.⁶⁹ With the suppression of the slave trade in 1877 and Ismail’s deposition in 1879, the school began functioning essentially as an orphanage.⁷⁰ Since wealthy women did not require income-earning skills and could pursue education in their homes, they avoided government schools and the cross-class mixing that took place in them. Women of the growing middle class, who perhaps could not afford home schooling, could seek education in the steadily increasing numbers of missionary and minority community schools.⁷¹

Both the Egyptian elite and the British occupiers had an overlapping interest in utilizing the condition of women to further their own aims, and hence both had a concern for female education. The British, in general, and Cromer, in particular, used the “lowly” position of women in Egypt as a justification for the occupation. Cromer linked the advancement of women to the advancement of civilization: “the position of women in Egypt ... is ... a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of European civilization, if that civilization is to produce full measure and beneficial effect.” The “obvious remedy” for Cromer was the education of women, which he wrote ought to be undertaken with “vigour.”⁷² Certainly, Cromer’s opinion was buttressed by Western missionaries, who also linked the condition of Egyptian womanhood to Egypt’s current wretched state.⁷³

Elite Egyptian men had for many years been sensitive to European criticisms of Eastern ways, and as early as the time of Ismail had been bent on proving the advancement of their women. For this very reason Ismail had hoped to open the first primary school for girls in time for the Suez Canal festivities so that it would be a showcase for European dignitaries. Nevertheless, the timeframe proved insufficient.⁷⁴ Ismail also arranged monogamous marriages for his sons to wives of equal rank rather than multiple concubines, an image which his successors Tawfiq (1879-92) and Abbas II (1892-1914) tried to cultivate despite the latter’s marriage to a concubine and his polygamy.⁷⁵ It was not enough to have just one wife,

but one who would actively advance the causes of the nation. Even Ismail with his multiple consorts allowed his third wife to sponsor the first school for girls and encouraged her visits to the school.⁷⁶ The social and philanthropic activities of Tawfiq's wife Amina were reported regularly in *al-abram*, again demonstrating an official concern for appearance.⁷⁷ Princess Nazli's aforementioned salon was yet another small venue where the European image of Eastern women could be broken. Another attendee of her salon, Qasim Amin, further tried to break these images internally and externally with the publication of *The Liberation of Women* (1899) and *The New Woman* (1901), both of which Lisa Pollard argues are less about the "new woman" than they are about the "new man" and his desired new political order:⁷⁸

Amin's "new woman" and the order of her home were wholly responsible for the creation of a new man. He, in turn, was subject to a whole litany of new behaviors: Monogamy, partnerships with women, 'scientific' domestic practices, and finally a new relationship with a just ruler were all evoked in Amin's prescriptions for liberated, 'uncovered' women.

Thus, both the British and Egyptian elites maintained certain ideas about Egyptian womanhood and the role it ought to play in Egypt's future. Despite the lip service that Cromer paid to the necessity for girls' education, he did not want to spend the needed funds to meet the growing demand. Justification for lack of progress centered on the need to avoid cultural clashes by taking a slow and orderly approach.⁷⁹ Although the British position seemed contradictory, it fit neatly within the two-tiered system and a prolonged occupation. Despite the demand for primary and higher education, the British developed such schools only to the extent that they were needed to provide for positions in nursing, midwifery, and teaching. As for everyone else, they could pay for private school or attend *kuttabs* and elementary schools alongside boys. The British encouraged female matriculation in the lower tier by counting each girl as two boys when calculating subventions for *kuttabs*, which were done on a per capita basis.⁸⁰ Due to such efforts, girls entered *kuttabs* at a proportionally higher rate than boys did.⁸¹

The British paid little attention to the upper tier of the girls' educational system, particularly with respect to the School for Midwives. While this school never attracted large numbers of students, it did withstand the lean educational years between the tail end of Muhammad Ali's reign and that of Ismail. The British limited the number of free positions and began assessing fees on all other students—formerly all positions had been free. Previously women received a rigorous course of study and attained the same rank as male graduates from the medical school. Now, their classroom hours were cut in half, and all practical training was eliminated. The program became oriented toward producing conventional nurses, with only a small number of candidates continuing their studies to become doctors.⁸²

The other branch of the upper division of girls' education was the Siyufia school, which better represents the problems and confusion that Egyptian elites had with female education. The British were unconcerned with this school since all its positions were filled despite the addition of fees.⁸³ For elites attempting to satisfy nationalist concerns, the only primary school for girls needed to be something other than an

asylum for the indigent. Reform of the home and the family was linked to reform of the nation in the nationalist press, the women's press, and in government circles.⁸⁴ Thus, girls' education was a frequently recurring topic in the mainstream press and the most important topic in the women's press.⁸⁵ In 1889, the aging Ali Mubarak, Ismail's energetic minister of public instruction and public works who was now in the service of Tawfiq, officially changed the name of the school to al-Sania to reflect the extent of his efforts at reorganization. The school would continue to serve its function of providing domestic training for orphans and indigents, but it would also provide girls from the upper class with both domestic and classical instruction.⁸⁶ Furthermore, it introduced a system of fees such that external students would pay, and internal positions would remain free for the orphaned and the indigent.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, parents remained concerned about the mixing of classes.⁸⁸

The following year (1890), Mrs. Yacub Sarruf, wife of the editor of *al-muqtataf* visited the school. Her comments are typical of upper class concerns for female education. Given the reputation that the school had earned by then, she came with low expectations, and thus she was pleasantly surprised by most of what she found: divisions for teaching deaf and blind students, girls learning mathematics, clothing produced by the students themselves, and so on. Nevertheless, she also expressed concern that the daughters of the wealthy were learning certain domestic skills at the expense of more refined skills, ones which properly complete the education of young girls.⁸⁹ Implicit in this criticism, in addition to curricular issues, was the concern of the comingling of the classes and the purpose of girls' education: was it vocational or was it merely to produce better wives and mothers? This issue would continue to plague girls' education throughout this era. How could nationalists create an army of domestic goddesses without a large supply of women working as teachers? How could there be enough female teachers if some portion of the students did not reject the domestic goddess construct?

The mission of female education was so confused that Yacub Artin was charged with studying the situation in 1892, and he hit the nail on the head when he wrote that the Sania school's curriculum, program, and very premises demonstrated a lack of purpose.⁹⁰ Despite Artin's enthusiasm for the subject, reform was of such a small consequence to bureaucrats that seven years after the writing of this report, it was still slowly chugging its way through government channels.⁹¹ Meanwhile, the government did open a second primary school for girls that helped to address some of the class concerns, as the following remarks by a bureaucrat some ten years after the opening of the school would indicate:

Day by day, the Sania School for girls takes the form of a school intended for girls of the highest class among the people. Recently, it has moved to a magnificent building. Applications for admission exceed the number of positions currently available. Consequently, it appears necessary to choose the best students for this school. The [most] effective method [for doing so], without a doubt, would be to increase fees....As for the people who cannot pay the aforementioned fees, they can send their daughters to the girls' division of the Abbas School, which follows the same program as the Sania School, but the fees remain the same.⁹²

The British applauded these changes. Two years after the opening of the Abbas school, Cromer appeared to be bursting at the seams with happiness as he wrote that the Sania school now had 265 students, and “every girl ... a paying pupil.”⁹³

Even after the addition of the Abbas School the thorny issue of curriculum remained. Men and women, Britons and Egyptians, all seemed to believe that home economics should be the centerpiece of girls’ education. Nevertheless, there was a general disagreement over what was meant by home economics, usually referred to as *tadbir al-manzil* or household organization. For women of the upper classes, and especially for those who were contributors to the women’s press, home economics was a theoretical topic encompassing all aspects of family and social life. In fact, one Syrian editor asserted that it should be renamed life administration or world administration, and articles that appeared in her journal with the title *tadbir al-manzil* paid absolutely no attention to the practical aspects of this subject.⁹⁴

For male advocates of female education, including large landowning elites and middle class nationalists of humbler origins, as well as the British occupiers, home economics needed to have a practical aspect at its base. The earliest modern proponent of female education, Tahtawi, argued the importance of female education as a means of creating more harmonious homes, which in turn would lead to reform of the nation [*al-watan*]. While he believed that in primary school boys and girls should have an equal education, it is also clear that the overall purpose of female education was to create better homes.⁹⁵ Male and female advocates of girls’ education advanced few new arguments, rather they recast his arguments with varying degrees of emphasis. Overwhelmingly for men there was a concern for girls learning the “proper” subjects. An 1888 article in *al-lata’if* proclaimed that female education should prepare girls first and foremost in the duties of the home: caring for the ill, household finance, home economics, and cooking.⁹⁶ This basic idea lay behind most of the subsequent male contributions to the discourse on female curriculum, although there would be some debate over the utility of other subjects, especially history and geography, for girls. For others there was concern that girls should trade piano and art lessons for more practical homemaking skills.

While some female contributors to the press, as well as some female educators,⁹⁷ felt that girls needed more practical knowledge, the vast majority of women from the upper classes felt that they did not need too much in the way of practical instruction. Most of these women had at least one servant who took care of the menial tasks of the household. One might summarize the feelings of middle class women as aspiring to do less work than their mothers, not more. Thus, lessons in cooking, laundry, and cleaning seemed senseless.

These gender-based differences were humorously captured in a 1912 issue of *al-muqtataf*, in an article entitled “A Dialogue between a Man and a Woman.” This article appeared in the “household organization section” shortly after the entrance of cooking into the curriculum of one of the higher schools for girls.⁹⁸ In the dialogue, a man asks a woman about her sister, who has recently graduated and asks if the sister learned the “science” of cooking. The woman takes offense, assuring him that her sister was not in need of

vocational education nor was cooking necessary for her or any other woman (meaning of her class), any more than shoe-cobbling, masonry, or carpentry was for him. The views represented by the woman in the dialogue were typical of middle and upper class women who viewed the entrance of such subjects in the curriculum with disdain.

Meanwhile, the male elite and the British occupiers pushed domesticity and practicality in schools for girls. They built model kitchens in government schools where girls could really cook, in some cases providing the lunches for the school.⁹⁹ In Cairo, a School of Practical Housewifery was established. At this school religion was the only subject that did not have a direct link to home economics, and household finance was the only subject with a written examination.¹⁰⁰ In 1914 the primary certificate exam was adjusted to address a greater emphasis on home economics—sixty out of 145 total points.¹⁰¹ Two years later, girls in elementary school had cooking, laundry, and ironing added to their curriculum. That same year a new class of schools in between elementary and primary schools was opened in which girls traded lessons in Arabic, drawing, and history—the boys’ curriculum—for domestic science, needlework, and health.¹⁰² At the Sania School, in the teachers’ division, girls could choose between a specialization in general education or in home economics, the latter emphasizing needlework, cookery, laundry, and housewifery over English, translation, math, geography, history and drawing—with equal lessons in both divisions for the all-important subjects of religion, hygiene, and education.

How did Egyptian women respond to these developments? Demand for education continued to outstrip supply; however, it is clear that the overweening push to domesticity was neither popular nor efficient. Practical examinations in domestic subjects were difficult to administer given limited space and appliances. Furthermore, they were difficult to grade and had a high rate of failure.¹⁰³ By 1921, the domestic education division of Sania Teachers’ College existed in name only because students overwhelmingly chose the general education division.¹⁰⁴ Even more significantly Egyptian girls and their parents voted with their feet, opting for private schools offering a more suitable curriculum. While the hope of government employment would always attract male students, this incentive did not work in schools for girls.

While some effort was made to address the most egregious of these problems, the domestic push remained. As Leila Ahmed has persuasively argued, Cromer endorsed the Victorian ideal of mother-educator, a platform that would both rationalize Britain’s position as an occupier, while also keeping British feminists at bay.¹⁰⁵ In Egypt, as in Europe, the creation of the mother-educator ideal gave women a “serious—and quasi-political purpose in life” while simultaneously blocking access to political life.¹⁰⁶ For their part, middle and upper class Egyptian men, while being divided in the role that the British should play, models of development, etc., were in agreement with the occupiers on the highly-charged, symbolic issue of female education in an effort to prove their readiness to rule.

The 1919 Revolution brought to a head those differences that the upper classes had with the British occupation, as well as a generalized lower class discontent. Men and women; Muslims, Copts, and Jews; rural dwellers and city folk; profes-

sionals and workers; students and senior citizens; and people of all classes took part in the demonstrations against the British. This period is useful for examining the struggles of and accommodations to imperialism and patriarchy. During the time of the occupation, the British considered themselves surrogate parents for the Egyptians, thus there are many parallels between the control established by the British over Egyptians, elite male nationalists over the lower classes, the delta over the *sa'id*, and men over women. Nevertheless, in 1919 these boundaries and relationships shifted. The British lost control of their “children” even after the “naughtiest” were sent to their room [exile to Malta]; the nationalist leadership was heartened by the spontaneous and organized demonstrations throughout the country, though nonetheless frightened by the actions of groups such as the tramway workers. Some rural areas in Upper Egypt took the opportunity to break away from the central government and create a rural republic. With their fathers, husbands, and brothers imprisoned and exiled, elite women took major roles in the nationalist movement organizing protests and even a boycott of British goods.¹⁰⁷

Egypt’s partial independence in 1922 was really an opportunity to refix those boundaries and reaffirm spheres of control with minimal change.¹⁰⁸ The British retained four points of control, allowing them entrance into any issue that concerned the British Empire. The monarch, backed by the British, would only agree to a constitution that granted him extensive powers of appointment, the ability to call or dismiss the cabinet, and the right to delay or extend sessions of parliament.¹⁰⁹ Male elites gained greater control and responsibility for internal Egyptian affairs, suppressing workers’ movements and scaling back the ambitious platform set out by the Egyptian Feminist Union.¹¹⁰ Moreover, they had to bring about educational reform. For forty years, they had used education as an outlet for many issues relating to the occupation, and now they were charged with the problem.

A cartoon that came out about six months after Egypt’s partial independence in 1922 sums up the frustration and unmet expectations. A man representing the “administrators of government schools” is about to launch a boat from the shores of ignorance to the shores of knowledge and enlightenment. The boat is filled with male children of the wealthy and sacks of money. The “children of the poor,” including one girl, remain. An *effendi* begs the boatswain to carry these children across for a reasonable fare, to which he responds, “A reasonable fare, [that] was ages ago, as for now, so long [peace be upon you].¹¹¹ Obviously, some felt that the elite were not living up to their promises. Under such pressures, in 1925 the government made primary education compulsory for boys and girls, despite the fact that it lacked the resources, personnel, and facilities to enact this decree. Clearly, Egyptians of all classes viewed education as a path to a brighter future, both for individuals and for the country as a whole. The great irony is that after the 1952 revolution and subsequent legislation ensuring free education at all levels and government employment of graduates, the system became so overloaded such that now Egyptians desire neither government schools nor government employment.

NOTES

¹ According to Clifford Geertz, religion can serve as a powerful cultural

system by both confirming and shaping the surrounding reality. The same can be said of education in general. See Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 87-125.

² For the most comprehensive history of education under Muhammad Ali, see Ahmed ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karim, *tarikih ta’lim fi Misr fi ‘asr Muhammad ‘Ali [Muhammad ‘Ali]* (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Nasr, 1938). See also, James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Cass, 1968). The best general account of his reign can be found in Afaf Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

³ ‘Abd al-Karim, *Muhammad ‘Ali*, 93-101.

⁴ Egypte, Ministre de l’Instruction Publique, *Régulations approuvées par le Ministre de l’Instruction Publique pour l’organisation des écoles sous Muhammad Ali* (Paris, n/d); Ahlam ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, *tarikih al-tarbiya wa nizam al-ta’lim fi Misr* (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa lil-Tiba‘a, 1991/92), 130-131. For a discussion of how methods of surveillance and regulation were applied to the population as a whole, see Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 34-62.

⁵ The Ottomans wanted more direct control over their Arab provinces. See P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 170. Arthur Goldschmidt summarizes British opposition to Muhammad Ali as follows: An Egyptian empire and industrialization could thwart British plans to create a passage to India via the Euphrates River, upset the European balance of power by overthrowing the Ottomans, strengthen France, and take markets away from the British. See his *Modern Egypt* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 20.

⁶ This legislation protected imports at the expense of local industries and, in conjunction with other agreements, encouraged European (esp. Greek and Italian) settlement and investment in Egypt. Additionally, these arrangements empowered Egypt’s native minorities—Christians, Jews, Armenians—who often worked for these foreign interests.

⁷ Nationalist historians, e.g. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Raf‘i, are particularly harsh on the shortcomings of these rulers. See his *asr Ismail*, vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1987 [1932]), 21, 48. Interestingly enough, a British official writing in the same era exhibited the same disdain for them. See James Williams, *Education in Egypt Before British Control* (Birmingham, 1937), 78-79.

⁸ Ahmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karim, *tarikih al-ta’lim fi Misr min nihayat bukm Muhammad ‘Ali ila awa’il bukm Tanfiq [tarikih]* (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Nasr, 1945), vol. 1, 3-27, 169-190; ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, *tarikih al-tarbiya*, 148-151; James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt*, 288-307, 313-330. Regarding the economy, Egypt benefited from the naval blockade that the Union imposed upon the confederacy during the American Civil War. Nevertheless, Egypt was in debt due to Said’s granting the Suez Canal concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps.

⁹ Early estimations of the Viceroy by foreign officials were extremely positive: “considerable administrative talent,” “demonstrates great judgment,” “friend of progress,” etc. See comments in 1863 by W.S. Thayer, U.S. consul; General Princeteau, member of the French military mission, and Le Moyne, former French consul in Georges Guindi Bey and Jacques Tagher, eds., *Ismail D’Après Les Documents Officiels avec Avant-Propos et Introduction Historique* (Cairo, 1946), 14-15.

¹⁰ See e.g. Pierre Crabités, *Ismail the Malignant Khedive* (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1933) or James C. McCoan, *Egypt* (New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1898), 217-218.

¹¹ See e.g., Blanchard Jerrold, *Egypt Under Ismail* (London: Samuel Tinsley & Co., 1879), 29 and Theodore Rothstein, *Egypt’s Ruin* (London: A.C. Fifield, 1910), 36.

¹² For more information on this process, see the text of the Law of 10 Rajab 1284 (1867) reprinted in ‘Abd al-Karim, *tarikih*, vol. 3, 34-60.

¹³ Two European governesses who worked for Ismail have left memoirs that are testimony to the care he took of his own male and female children’s education. See Ellen Chennells, *Recollections of an Egyptian Princess By Her English Governess*, two vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1893); Emmeline Lott, *The English Governess in Egypt: Harem Life in Egypt and Constantinople* (Philadelphia: T.B. Peterson and Brothers, 186-?. Microfilm, New Haven, 1975). These works also discuss the opening of the Siyufia school under the auspices of the Third Princess, see vol. 2, 24-25 and 108, resp.

¹⁴ For a clear record of Ismail’s personal extravagance one need only examine a few dossiers from the *Période Ismail* [PI] collection in Dar al-Watha’iq [DW] documenting expenses for housing, gardens, food, beverages, cigars, clothing, pharmaceuticals, furnishings, etc. for himself and his *harim*. For a summary of Ismail’s accomplishments and entanglements, see the extract from the Cave Report entitled “Progress and Indebtedness under

Ismail, 1863-1875" in Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 430-438.

¹⁵ The role of bureaucrats in the creation of modern Egypt has been studied in F. Robert Hunter's *Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805-1879* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984) and Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*. Hunter's study examines the development of a bureaucratic elite, which, in addition to its Western component, drew from four indigenous (Eastern) sources: an "Ottoman" group, with origins dating to the Muhammad Ali period; local notables, a landed elite with regional support; Armenians; and Egyptians with a European-style education. Mitchell's work focuses on a handful of the new intellectual elite, men such as Ali Mubarak, Rifaat Tahtawi, Ibrahim Adham, and Husayn al-Marsafi. He demonstrates how these men adopted European forms of organization, discipline, and structure in reorganizing Egypt's army, educational system, and urban design. He argues that in doing so, they paved the intellectual path toward the occupation.

¹⁶ For an understanding of how this class came into existence, see Amira Sonbol, *The New Mamluks* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 43-45, 93-95.

¹⁷ For an in-depth study of this movement see Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians! The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878-1882* (London: Ithaca Press, 1981). For an understanding of why this coalition fragmented, see Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 91-92.

¹⁸ Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 64. See also her *Egypt and Cromer* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54.

¹⁹ The classic view of Indian education is seen in the quoted words of Lord Macaulay. For the full text of this speech given in House of Commons on July 10, see Lady Trevelyan, ed., *The Works of Lord Macaulay, Complete* (London: Longman, Green, and Co. 1866), 8: 141. Regarding Cromer's concerns in Egypt, see Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 320. In India Cromer had served as secretary for his cousin Lord Northbrook, who was appointed Viceroy in 1872. Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer*, 54-55.

²⁰ According to Peter Mansfield, during the first decade of the occupation the educational budget was even lower than under Ismail, during the worst financial crisis of his administration. Furthermore, he points out that 1.7% of the population received primary education under Ismail, and only 1.5% did by the time that Cromer retired in 1907. Finally, he states that although the allocation for education was allowed to increase to about three percent of the budget in the early twentieth century, it was "totally inadequate for a population of ten millions." Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1971), 139-141.

²¹ See e.g., Parliamentary Papers, *Report by her Majesty's Agent and Consul General on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1901* [*Annual Report*] (London: Harrison & Sons, 1902), 38.

²² Amira Sonbol cites the memoirs of Abbas II regarding the relationship between Dunlop and Cromer as tennis partners. Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 114. Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 143. Nina Nelson, *Shepherd's Hotel* (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1960), 72. J.W.A. Young as cited by Judith Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 123-124.

²³ See e.g., Sa'ïd Ismā'îl 'Alī, *dur al-ta'lim al-misri fi nidāl al-watani* (Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Misriyya al-'amma lil-Kitāb, 1995); Muhammad Abu al-Asad, *siyasat al-ta'lim fi Misr tabi al-ibtihāl al-baritani, 1882-1922* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya, 1983); or Amil Fahmy Shanuda, *Sad Zaghlul: nazir al-ma'arif* (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1978).

²⁴ See for example the two speeches given by Rifaat Wafik at a meeting held by the Nationalist Party to apprise the European press of the consequences of the British occupation. *Oevres du Congrès National Egyptien* (Brussels, 1910).

²⁵ Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 95.

²⁶ Amin Sami, *al-ta'lim fi Misr fi sanatay 1914 wa 1915* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Ma'arif, 1917), 19.

²⁷ *Annual Report 1905*, 83-84.

²⁸ DW, *majlis al-wuz'ara'* [MW], *nizarat al-ma'arif* [NM], box 16, Note from Fakhry to *majlis al-nuz'ar* regarding the increase in fees at government schools 5 June 1905.

²⁹ See, for example, DW, *mubafiz 'Abdin-ta'lim* series [AT], box 236, Father Bizya [teacher at the Ismail Secondary School], "The Crisis of Education," undated but with material from 1913-1916. For a complete discussion of these fears, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 114-122. Cromer was also concerned about the lower tier of schools serving as an asylum for those seeking to avoid work or military service. *Annual Report 1904*, 73-74. Nonetheless,

given that the British limited the size of the Egyptian army, it is likely that Cromer's main concern was young men avoiding work, thus he established age limits for male students.

³⁰ *Annual Report 1898*, 40-41; *Annual Report 1902*, 54-55; *Annual Report 1905*, 86; *Annual Report 1906*, 110; *Annual Report 1909*, 49-50; DW, MW, box B23, Documents relating to the repeal of the primary certificate, 28 December 1915 through 6 January 1916.

³¹ Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule*, 323.

³² Not surprisingly, the law school, with its strong French influence, became the nerve center for anti-British propaganda. Also noteworthy is the fact that in 1899 the school's regulations explicitly forbade the matriculation of students on scholarship or studying for free. Whether this effort was the result of elites bent on exclusivity, the British attempting to narrow vocal opposition, or both is open to question. Philippe Gelat Bey, *Répertoire général annoté de la législation et de l'administration égyptiennes* (Alexandria: J.C. Lagoudakis, 1908), 2:379 as cited in Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 62. See also, Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule*, 348; Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 144; John Marlowe, *Cromer in Egypt* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 292.

³³ The results of the 1897 census indicate an overall illiteracy rate of about ninety-four percent, with less than one percent literacy for women and nine for men. Egypt, *nizarat al-maliyya, tadad sukan al-quṭr al-misri, 1897* (Cairo: al-Matba'at al-Kubra al-Amiriyya bi Bulaq, 1898), 28.

³⁴ According to Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule*, 94-95, Egypt became financially stable in 1888, and after this point Britain could turn its attention back to reform of neglected areas, such as education.

³⁵ *Annual Report 1903*, 61.

³⁶ The quality of both the facilities and instruction varied widely at these schools and even within the same school. The curriculum usually included study of the Quran and *hadith*, and sometimes poetry, mathematics, and Arabic. According to Edward Lane, whose research took place in the 1820s, writing was only taught to those who were destined for occupations that required its knowledge. See his *An Account of the Manners and the Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (London: M.A. Nattali, 1846), vol. 1 88-90. See also, A.L. Tibawi, *Islamic Education Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems* (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1972).

³⁷ DW, MW, NM, box A4, Note from Ali Mubarak to the *majlis al-nuz'ar* regarding the return of boys' and girls' schools from the *waqf* administration to the Ministry of Public Instruction, 5 July 1888 and 12 July 1888; DW, PI, box 195, Adly Pacha, Note sur la création d'un système général d'enseignement primaire en Egypte, 8 Dec. 1889; DW, MW, box 2, Note to the Council of Ministers Regarding the Regulations of the Kuttabs, June 1902.

³⁸ DW, MW, NM, box 2, Fakhry, Règlement Relatif aux Subventions Annuelles aux Kuttabs, Dec. 9, 1897.

³⁹ On the relationship between language, education, and class, see Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 61-63.

⁴⁰ As Abbas Kelidar has argued, newspapers came to function as a substitute for political parties in Egypt. See his "The Political Press in Egypt, 1882-1914," in *Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes, Essays in Honor of P.J. Vatikiotis* (London: Routledge, 1993), 1-9. Not surprisingly journalists and editors catalogued the activities of groups with which they were affiliated. For example, Abdullah Nadim chronicled the activities of the "Firm Bond Society" and other Islamic charitable organizations, while the editors of *al-hilal* and *al-muqtataf* recorded the activities of Coptic, Greek, and American organizations, and the official gazette, *al-waqa'i al-misriyya*, covered the charitable activities of the royal family.

⁴¹ Within two years the government received 555 applications of which 457 were granted, eighty-six refused, and twelve still under consideration. *Annual Report 1907*, 34.

⁴² *Annual Report 1908*, 39; *Annual Report 1909*, 40-41; *Annual Report 1910*, 36-37; Sami, *al-ta'lim fi Misr fi sanatay*, 100-102, Shanuda, *Sad Zaghlul*, 147-152.

⁴³ Ministry of Public Instruction, *Syllabuses of Hygiene for Various Schools* as promulgated by Ministerial Order No. 1756, 10 August 1913 in *Regulations 1914* (Cairo: Government Press, 1914).

⁴⁴ Dr. Sarubyaq, *'ilm al-siba lil-makatib* and *'ilm al-siba lil-makatib lil-banat* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Ma'arif, 1918 [fifth printing]).

⁴⁵ This process started with Muhammad Ali, continued under Ismail, and picked up pace during the occupation. It included municipal improvements in the large cities of the delta, ordering and numbering of streets, and the reorganization of the army, police, and fire brigades. See Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*.

⁴⁶ For a full discussion of the colonial context, see Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 207-208.

⁴⁷ According to Ali Mubarak, at the time of the French invasion in 1798, there were over 100 bathhouses in Cairo; and he reports that in the closing decade of the nineteenth century there were only fifty-five. Although Mubarak laments the decreasing number, these figures must be considered in light of the fact that bathrooms and bathtubs were spreading in cities like Cairo among the middle and upper classes. See his *al-khitat al-tanfiqyya al-jadida li-Misr al-Qabira was mudunha wa biladha al-qadima wal-shahira* (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1969 [1887/88]), vol. 1, 238-239. On the infrequency of British bathing, see McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 207-210.

⁴⁸ For an example of such an award, see Judith Tucker, "Muftis and Matrimony: Islamic Law and Gender in Ottoman Syria and Palestine," *Islamic Law and Society* 1,3 (1994), 285.

⁴⁹ Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*, 114-122.

⁵⁰ Muhammad Rushdy, *al-tadbir al-amm fil-siba wal-marad* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Itimad, 1919 [1912]).

⁵¹ *Annual Report 1906*, 89-90.

⁵² Ministry of Public Instruction, *Syllabus of the Primary and Secondary Courses of Study* (Cairo: National Printing Dept., 1897), 14.

⁵³ Rifa'at Rafi' al-Tahtawi, *manabij al-albab al-misriyya fi mabahij al-adab al-asiyya* (Cairo: Matba'at Shirkat al-Ragha'ib 1912 [2nd edition]), 350-351.

⁵⁴ Compare the suggested curriculum in Octave Sachot, *Rapport adressé à Son Excellence Monsieur Durray Ministre de l'Instruction Publique sur l'Etat des Sciences, des Lettres et de l'Instruction Publique en Egypte dans la Population Indigène et dans la Population Européenne* (Paris, 1868), 20-22 with the report of the Inspector General, Dor Bey in DW, PI, box 49, doss. 35/1, "Ecoles Primaires Arabes Inspectées Dans Les Provinces et Gouvernans," undated. Dor Bey highlighted the importance of history, education, and national character in his *L'Instruction Publique en Egypte* (Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven, & Co., 1872), 36-44.

⁵⁵ Lisa Pollard, "Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of the 1919 Revolution," (Ph.D. diss., UC-Berkeley, 1997), 198.

⁵⁶ Abdullah Nadim, "National Life," *al-ustadh* 1, 2 (1892): 25-41.

⁵⁷ There were others from more prominent families, e.g. Muhammad al-Muwaylihi, who contributed to this dialogue. It should also be noted that his family also suffered as a result of changes in patterns of consumption.

⁵⁸ The British had subsumed education into the Ministry of Public Works in 1891.

⁵⁹ For more information on Nazli's salon, see Roger Allen, "Writings of the Members of the Nazli Circle," *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 8 (1969-70): 79-84. Regarding Zaghlul's education and career, see Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 114-117, who relied heavily upon Zaghlul's memoirs. Regarding Cromer's intentions, see Marlowe, *Cromer in Egypt*, 235.

⁶⁰ See for example, al-Sayyid 'Ali, "The Integrity of Education in Egypt," *al-tarbiya* 3,1 (1908): 5-6; Abu Hafs, "Education Policy," *al-tarbiya* 3,3 (1908): 9-11. Zaghlul, *mudbakarati*, 2:638 as cited in Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 114.

⁶¹ Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, 145.

⁶² See al-Sayyid 'Ali, "The Integrity of Education in Egypt."

⁶³ *Annual Report 1898*, 41; *Annual Report 1899*, 35; *Annual Report 1905*, 85; Douglas Dunlop, "Note with Reference to the Linguistic Basis of Instruction in Egyptian Government Schools," 10 Feb. 1907 in *Annual Report 1906*, 108-115.

⁶⁴ By 1909, most European teachers in government schools had to pass an elementary Arabic examination before their appointment could be confirmed or before they could receive an increase in salary. *Annual Report 1907*, 32, 35.

⁶⁵ DW, MW, NM, box A23, *Projet d'extension de l'enseignement religieux dans les écoles primaires*, 2 April 1907; DW, MW, NM, box 16, *Response of the Ministry of Public Instruction to the observations made at the 18 December 1906 session of the majlis al-shura al-qanmiyya* relating to the expansion of religious education, 25 May 1907; DW, MW, NM box 16, *Note to the Finance Committee Concerning the Increase in Budgetary Expenses for 1910*, June 1909; *Annual Report 1909*, 41.

⁶⁶ Pollard, "Nurturing the Nation," 203. In folders with curricular materials, one can find editions of *The Indian Practical Teacher*, detailing how to teach these subjects. See DW, AT, box 230, "The Teaching of Geography," and "The Teaching of History," *The Indian Practical Teacher* 1, 8 and 1, 9 (Dec. 1909 and Jan. 1910), resp., 2. These emphases are also apparent in official syllabi. See for example Egypt, Ministry of Public Instruction, *Syllabus of Primary and Secondary Courses of Study* (Cairo: National Printing Office, 1897);

Syllabus 1901 (Bulaq, 1901); *Syllabus of the Primary and Secondary Courses of Study* (Cairo: National Printing Dept., 1904; idem, *Syllabus of Secondary Courses of Study* (Cairo: National Printing Dept., 1905).

⁶⁷ Antoine Clot, "La Création d'une école d'instruction médicale pour les femmes," *Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne* 1:3 (1948), 245-246.

⁶⁸ Abd al-Karim, *tarikb*, vol. 2, 361-362; DW, PI, box 49, doss. 35/1, Dor Bey, "Ecoles Primaires Arabes Inspectées Dans Les Provinces et Gouvernans," undated.

⁶⁹ McCoan, *Egypt*, 210; *al-waq'at al-misriyya* (20 May 1873 and 5 Aug. 1873), 2 and 1, resp.; Yacub Artin, *L'Instruction Publique en Egypte [L'Instruction]* (Paris, 1890), 134-135; DW, MW, NM, box A4, Yacub Artin, *Mémorandum sur l'Enseignement des Jeunes Filles, Soumis à S.A. le Khédive Abbas Pacha Helmy [Mémorandum]*, 10 June 1892 (Cairo: Imprimerie Centrale).

⁷⁰ Artin, *Mémorandum*, introduction; Artin, *L'Instruction*, 135.

⁷¹ The first missionary school for girls opened in the late 1820s by the Church Missionary Society. A number of Catholic schools for girls opened in the 1840s and 50s. The American Mission, which began in 1854, was by far the largest missionary effort—by 1896 it sponsored 168 schools, of which 35 were for girls. Andrew Watson, *The American Mission in Egypt, 1854-1896* (Pittsburgh: United Presbyterian Board of Publications, 1898), 261, 442-443. The work of the American Mission inspired both other missionary efforts, as well as those by indigenous Christians, Jews, and Muslims.

⁷² For the classic view of this subject see Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, vol. 2, 155-157, 159, 539-542.

⁷³ Charles Watson, *Egypt and the Christian Crusade* (Philadelphia: United Presbyterian Church of North America, 1907), 223-224.

⁷⁴ Sachot, *Rapport adressé*, 20-22; DW, PI, Letter from Ismail to Stanton, box 12; Telegram from Ismail to Nubar, 9 August 1869, box 12; Letter from Ismail to Nubar, 1 Sept. 1869, box 12.

⁷⁵ On the simultaneous marriages of Ismail's sons, see Chennell, *Recollections of an Egyptian Princess*, vol. 1, 222, 241; Ken Cuno, "Ambiguous Modernization: The Transition to Monogamy in the Khedivial House of Egypt," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, San Francisco, Nov. 2001.

⁷⁶ There is some debate as to whether or not Jashm Afet sponsored the school or whether it was a "publicity stunt." Regardless, she did visit the school, which was covered in Arabic and European language papers. See *al-waq'at al-misriyya* (Sept. 23, 1874) and *Le Moniteur Egyptien* (18 Nov. 1878).

⁷⁷ Pollard, "Nurturing the Nation," 129; Cuno, "Ambiguous Modernization"

⁷⁸ Pollard, "Nurturing the Nation," 163-171.

⁷⁹ *Annual Report 1902*, 56; *Annual Report 1904*, 77.

⁸⁰ *Annual Report 1898*, 44; *Annual Report 1899*, 36; *Annual Report 1901*, 40.

⁸¹ Between 1906 and 1913, the rate of increase for girls reached fifty percent, while that for boys was only thirty-one percent. "Egyptian Schools and the Fate of Education," *al-muqtataf* 44, 2 (1914), 114.

⁸² DW, PI, NM, box 195, Mohamed Zeki, *Règlement de l'Ecole de Médecine, de Pharmacie, et de l'Ecole médicale des Filles*, 1892; Sami, *al-talim fi Misr fi sanatay*, App. 3, 15. For more information on this school, see Laverne Kuhnke, *Lives at Risk: Public Health in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) and Amira Sonbol, *The Creation of a Medical Profession in Egypt, 1800-1922* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

⁸³ DW, MW, NM, box M6, Note from the Ministry of Public Instruction to the *majlis al-nuzjar* regarding the request of Yusuf Effendi Kanfan, 19 July 1887;

⁸⁴ See for example, Muhammad Mustafa 'Agizi, "The Nation is Reform Only with the Reform of Families," *anis al-jalis* 7, 4 (1904): 1773-1783; "Quranic Commentary [on the Equality of Men and Women]," *al-manar* 12,5 (1909): 331-332; "The Shame of an Ignorant Mother," *al-tarbiya* 1, 2 (1905): 13; "The Nation is a Fabric of Mothers, So We Must Educate Daughters," *al-bilal* 15,4 (1908): 139-143; al-Zahra, "The Cornerstone," *al-sufur* (Dec. 29, 1916): 7.

⁸⁵ Beth Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 122-123.

⁸⁶ Ali Mubarak, *Cinquième Rapport à S.A. Le Khédive sur l'Enseignement Public en Egypte Année 1889* (Cairo: Imprimerie Nationale, 1890), 20.

⁸⁷ Higher Consultative Committee, minutes of the May 21, 1889 session as cited by Abu al-Asad, *siyasat al-talim fi Misr taht al-ihitlal al-baritani*, 144.

⁸⁸ *al-abram* (Oct. 20, 1890) as cited by Yunan Labib Rizq, "Schools of Prominent, Virtuous Women," *al-abram* (Mar. 30, 1995), 5.

⁸⁹ Mrs. Yacub Sarruf, "The Sania School," *al-muqtataf* 14,12 (1890): 836-838.

⁹⁰ Artin, *Mémorandum*, introduction.

⁹¹ DW, MW, box A4, Note from the Agent of the Ministry of Public Instruction Regarding Girls' Education, 18 July 1899.

⁹² DW, MW, NM, box 16, M. Fakhry, Note from the Ministry of Public Instruction to the *majlis al-nuzjar* Regarding the Increase in Fees at Government Schools, 5 June 1905. By the following year two-thirds of the girls at the Abbas school paid no fees. DW, MW, NM, box 16, Note on What Has Resulted from School Fees in 1906.

⁹³ *Annual Report 1907*, 34. It should also be noted that the Khedive's mother was responsible for establishing the endowment for the school that bore her son's name.

⁹⁴ "Household Administration," *anix al-jalis* 2.3 (1899): 110-112; "Household Administration," *anis al-jalis* 2, 4 (1899): 155-157; "Household Administration: The Interior of the House," *anis al-jalis* 2, 5 (1899): 195-199; "Household Administration: The Conduct of Servants," *anis al-jalis* 2, 7 (1899): 277, 280. See Baron, *The Women's Awakening*, 93-96 for a discussion of the readership of women's journals.

⁹⁵ al-Tahtawi, *mursbid al-amin lil-binat wal banin* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Madaria al-Malakiyya, 1289 [1872]), 6, 32, 48-49, 66-68, 91, 101-106, 120-121, 134, 195-207, 215-256, 273-277, 372-373.

⁹⁶ "Household Duties and Women's Education," *al-lataif* 3, 10 (1888): 432-438; see also, "The Home, Hygiene, and Health," *al-lata'if* 2, 9 (1888): 385-392.

⁹⁷ For example, Regina Awwad, editor of *al-s'ada*, and Rahma Sarruf, lecturer at the short-lived women's section of Cairo University, both pressed for domestic and practical education.

⁹⁸ In contrast to the theoretical home economics advanced in journals such as *anis al-jalis*, the long-running *bab tadbir al-manzil* offered both practical advice on cooking, cleaning, stain removal, etc. as well as articles on female education, famous women, and women's rights.

⁹⁹ *Annual Report 1910*, 55; DW, MW, NM, box A4, Alice (Elise?) Forbes [headmistress], Arabic translation of her Report on the Abbas School's Girls' Division, 20 July 1897.

¹⁰⁰ *Annual Report 1910*, 60; *Annual Report 1911*, 27; Loi de 1913 portant sur la création d'une école d'Economie Domestique et l'agrément de l'exécution de cette loi promulguée par Arrête Ministeriel #1735 du Avril 1913 in *Regulations 1914*.

¹⁰¹ Ahmed Hechmat, "Regulations Relating to Primary Education Certificate for Girls Promulgated by Ministerial Order #1754, August 10, 1913" in *Regulations, 1914*.

¹⁰² DW, MW, NM, box A4, Law #14 for the Creation of Higher Elementary Schools for Girls and Ministerial Decision #1934, 20 June 1916.

¹⁰³ DW, MW, NM, box A23, Adly Yeghen, Note to the President of the Council of Ministers on Discontinuing the Primary Certificate Examination for Girls, 25 May 1914.

¹⁰⁴ DW, MW, NM, box A4, Changes in the Organization of Sania Teachers' College, 20 July 1921; DW, MW, NM, box A4, Letter from Gafar Waly to the President of the Council of Ministers Regarding the Sania Teachers' College, 28 August 1921.

¹⁰⁵ Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 150-153. Ahmed points out "[t]his champion of the unveiling of Egyptian women was, in England, founding member and sometime president of the Men's League for Opposing Women's Suffrage."

¹⁰⁶ Karen Offen, "Liberty, Equality, and Justice for Women: The Theory and Practice of Feminism in 19th Century Europe," in *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, Bridenthal, Koontz, and Stuard, eds. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 346.

¹⁰⁷ For a complete discussion of the 1919 revolution see al-Rafai, *thawrat 1919* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1987). Regarding workers, see Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 83-120. Regarding women's participation, see Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 74-81 and Latifa al-Ziyat, *al-mar'a al-misriyya wal-taghayyur al-ijtimai 1919-1945* (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1984), 31-32.

¹⁰⁸ Borrowing from Gramsci, Sonbol has asserted that the 1919 revolution was conjunctural, a step toward the creation of a new historical bloc that would emerge in 1952. Sonbol, *New Mamluks*, 118.

¹⁰⁹ Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, 82. For a more detailed discussion, see her *Egypt's Liberal Experiment, 1922-1936* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

¹¹⁰ See Beinin & Lockman, *Workers on the Nile* and Badran, *Feminists, Is-*

lam, and Nation, resp. While Badran tends to view the women's issues glass as half empty, Baron tends to see it as half full. She credits legislation and changes that take place in the 1930s to the path laid down by the women's press of the previous three decades. Baron, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation*, 188-193.

¹¹¹ Untitled cartoon, *al-lata'if al-musawwara* (7 August 1922), 16.