Educational "Subcontracting" and the Spread of Religious Nationalism: Hindu and Muslim Nationalist Schools in Colonial India

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From the point of view of the colonizer, colonial education was provided first and foremost to stabilize and strengthen colonial rule. Studies of nationalism, however, repeatedly demonstrate that education could inadvertently undermine colonial rule by stimulating the formation of nationalist identities. Some analysts focus on the role that educational *content* played in creating anticolonial nationalism, pointing out the irony of teaching colonized students to valorize the high points of the metropole's own fight against oppression or occupation, like the French Revolution or the expulsion of the Spanish from Holland. Some scholars locate the radicalizing tendencies of colonial education in the *structure* of colonial education systems, with Benedict Anderson hypothesizing that as future bureaucrats met peers from across the colony on the higher rungs of the colonial educational ladder they discovered a sense of common identity.[1] Still others discern the seeds of nationalist sentiment at the nexus of the educational and employment markets, noting that colonial education created an expectation of subsequent bureaucratic employment, which was easily transformed into anticolonial sentiment when it went unsatisfied.

While these accounts of the construction of nationalist identities differ in their particulars, they all focus on the same actor: schools run directly by the colonial state. This conception mirrors our understanding of the connection between education and nationalism more generally. Most of our theorizing about this connection focuses on education offered directly by state agencies, in which educational regulations are formulated by the state, and teachers and administrators are state employees. In advanced capitalist societies these state school systems are assumed, in Ernest Gellner's words, to "[organize]… human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units"[2] supportive of nationalism as defined by the state. In colonized societies, by contrast, the schools of the colonial state, as discussed above, are often assumed to produce anticolonial nationalism.

This focus on the state as the educational actor of greatest import for the production of nationalist identities is fitting in the case of advanced capitalist societies, where the lion's share of educational opportunities is provided by state educational institutions. It is also appropriate in most colonial contexts, where, as will be discussed at the conclusion of this article, what I will call "Western-style" education[3] focused primarily on nonreligious subjects was often offered by nonstate actors, but the lack of resources at these actors' disposal often meant that they could only support a few schools too disconnected from one another to effectively disseminate particular visions of the emerging national community. If our focus on colonial state schools as the key educational sources of nationalism is correct, however, it has commonly missed the fact that colonial attempts to build education systems often relied very little on schools directly run by the colonial state. Colonial powers that dedicated any resources to education at all often attempted to build education systems on the cheap through a process of educational "subcontracting," in which schools run by local groups were afforded state subsidies if they met state educational regulations regarding matters such as the age of students, the training of teachers, and the content of curriculum. Building an educational system through "subcontracting" could have powerful implications for the construction of various types of nationalist identities because it provided private groups advocating such identities with unprecedented resources, which could make their construction of extended school systems economically viable.

This article will examine the case of two religious groups whose state-supported schools did just that—a Hindu religious reform movement called the Arya Samaj, founded in 1875 in north India, and a Muslim reform movement, Muhammadiya, started in 1912 in Indonesia. Both groups mustered great support during the colonial period, with the Samaj boasting 1.5 million members by 1947[4] while Muhammadiya had 1,275 branches by 1942.[5] Because the Samaj was and remains active primarily in north India, I will focus here on its activities in the north, particularly in its home base of Punjab and in the United Provinces. Both Muhammadiya and the Samaj diagnosed their societies' decline as the direct result of straying from the correct practice of their faiths. The Samaj argued that corrupt practices such as idol worship, bans on the remarriage of childless widows, and some caste taboos needed to be uprooted before India would prosper. Muhammadiya focused its wrath on "the customs and practices that guide every aspect of indigenous life: social relations, agriculture, treatment of the sick, judicial arrangements, ancestor worship, [and] burial of the dead" (*adat*).[6]

In focusing on the need for religious reform within their communities, the Samaj and Muhammadiya may appear at first to be creating a discourse directed entirely to their own coreligionists, with little implication for the production of nationalist identities in the colony as a whole. In fact, both groups were centrally engaged in the production of particular imaginings of the Indian and Indonesian nations, which were sharply at odds with those of other nationalist movements—such as the Congress Party—within the colony. While nationalist discourses claim to speak for and represent the whole of the community, they almost always prioritize the interests and identity of some parts of

the nation—majority ethnic communities, for example, or men—over those of other subordinate groups. The agendas advanced by the Samaj and Muhammadiya were no exception: their calls for internal reform were part and parcel of their vision of an emerging nation, which would be defined solely in terms of (their movement's conception of) their own faith. Implicit—and in many cases, explicit—in the process of religious reform as the Samaj and Muhammadiya understood it was an attempt to clearly distinguish the "authentic" practices of their coreligionists from those of the other faiths in the country as a first step toward privileging the culture and practices of their group over those of their neighbors. The Samaj chose to draw attention to and mobilize around the behaviors of the Hindu community most fundamentally at odds with those of its Muslim neighbors, a pattern exemplified in its formation of cow protection movements, which prompted considerable interreligious strife. It also played a central role in one of the most communally divisive campaigns in pre-independence India—the drive to adopt Hindi in Devanagari script, primarily used by Hindus, as the national language while portraying the overwhelmingly similar Urdu, written in Persian script by Muslims, as a "foreign" tongue. In Indonesia, where *adat* customs were often derived from Indonesia's polytheistic and atheist traditions, Muhammadiya's attempts to "cleanse" *adat* of its un-Islamic behaviors involved erecting clear distinctions between "authentic" Muslim customs and those of other faiths. Muhammadiya was a central part of a movement for Muslim reform emerging throughout the larger Malay world called the New Faction (*Kaum Moda*) in which Southeast Asian Muslims, traveling in greater numbers to Mecca due to the steamship's arrival in the late 1800s, met and became part of a Malayo-Muslim reform movement centered in Singapore.[7] Despite the fact that—or perhaps in part because—Muhammadiya was based during the colonial period in Java, "the very center and climax of Hindu-Javanese culture,"[8] it strongly encouraged the development of closer ties with this Malay world and worked to develop a national identity that encouraged the adoption of (Islamic) Malay cultural symbols, particularly in the realm of dress,[9] in place of existing Hindu-influenced cultural norms prevalent in much of the archipelago.

Central to the propagation of the religious nationalist message of the Samaj and Muhammadiya were the extensive school networks they founded during the colonial period. By 1941 the Arya Samaj ran 179 Dayanand Anglo-Vedic (DAV) schools and colleges,[10] which allowed Hindu students to go from elementary school through college in the DAV system, while Muhammadiya had over 800 Western-style schools from the elementary to the secondary level by 1939.[11] A careful reading of Arya Samaj school records and of secondary material on Indonesia suggests that government subsidies were central to the viability of both school systems but that they may have played different roles at different times for each. Muhammadiya was founded in 1912, and it began founding schools soon afterward. By the early 1920s at the latest, the movement was receiving subsidies for those schools. It is clear that in the period in which Muhammadiya began to obtain significantly larger subsidies the number of schools it founded also increased precipitously. It seems likely, then, that Dutch subsidies were important in getting the Muhammadiya school network off the ground in its early years. The Arya Samaj, on the other hand, began founding schools and colleges in the 1870s, but because the records of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic (DAV) College Trust and Management Society, which oversaw DAV education at all levels, are available only for the period between the early 1920s and 1947, it is impossible to know what role, if any, British subsidies played in shaping the early Samaj school network. What the records do demonstrate, however, is that in the last three decades of colonial rule many DAV schools and colleges were centrally sustained by those subsidies. This timing is particularly important because the period from 1920 to 1947 was the key time of communal mobilization in north India, as the battle lines were drawn between Hindu nationalists determined to define India as a Hindu state and Muslims organizing for the creation of Pakistan. What the Trust and Management Society records tell us, then, is that the most high-profile institutional manifestation of one of the most prominent Hindu nationalist movements in north India was crucially underwritten by the British.

In the following pages I will very briefly review the development of British education policy in India and the key role that British subsidies played in supporting Samaj schools and then illustrate the role these schools played in spreading the group's vision of Hindu nationalism. The second part of the article examines the development of Dutch education policy in Indonesia and the role that Dutch-subsidized Muhammadiya schools played in fostering religious imaginings of the nation in the archipelago. I will conclude by arguing that the case of these two school systems and the role that state education subsidies played in supporting their religious nationalist work demonstrates a need to enlarge our definition of "state" education in the colonial period and of the types of nationalism that colonial schools could elicit in their students.

Building an Indian Educational System and Subsidies for Samaj Schools

Large-scale British involvement in Indian education began in 1813, and over the next century the shape of that education had changed enormously, opening up unprecedented opportunities for movements like the Arya Samaj. "In the early 1800's," Nurullah and Naik argue,

> …the indigenous system of education held the field, but…by the end of the 1800's this system had disappeared almost completely…and a new system of education, which aimed at the spread of Western knowledge through the medium of the English language, was firmly established in its place.[12]

This may be an overstatement; Nita Kumar's recent work on colonial Banares, for example, finds that certain types of education continued almost unchanged,[13] and evidence from other areas suggests that more traditional forms of education were not swept away, but only significantly restructured.[14] What is indisputable, however, is that after 1854, British subsidies were widely distributed to private Indian schools and were central to the replacement of more traditional forms of education with Western-style ones.

British education policy in India began in 1813 when the British parliament took the opportunity provided by the East India Company's charter renewal that year to authorize the company to spend 100,000 rupees a year on education and

order it to provide educational facilities to prepare Indians for public service. For the next forty years the company's educational policy was based on what Mukerji termed "the filtration theory"—that education should be directed at elites who would pass their learning on to the masses. By the time of the company's charter renewal in 1853, however, only two of the five provinces under British control had established a system of Western-style elementary education, and less than one percent of company revenue was being directed to government schools. [15] As a result, in 1854 Wood's Despatch was issued, stating the government's intent to focus on providing education from the bottom up through "a properly articulated scheme of education, from the primary school to the university." The Despatch stipulated that nonstate bodies—not the government—were to be the primary agents of educational opportunity and that government grants-in-aid would be distributed accordingly.[16]

At this point the key nonstate actors involved in education were Western missionaries, but the onus of private educational provision had already begun to shift to Indians. This trend was further supported by the 1882 Hunter Commission, which reaffirmed the government's focus on private-sector provision of primary education. Of particular importance to groups like the Arya Samaj was the Commission's assertion that it did not consider missionaries to be truly "private sector" entities and that it aimed to create an education system based primarily on (government-subsidized) schools run by Indians.[17] In fact, in the two decades after the Hunter Commission, Indians became "the key agency for spreading Western education."[18] In provinces like the Samaj's Punjab gov ernment subsidies were particularly central in shifting the responsibility for the provision of Western-style education from missionaries to Indians: in 1881, one year before the Hunter Commission, only two of the province's 120 private, English-language secondary schools were run by Indians.[19]

The availability of subsidies played a varied but central role in the maintenance of the DAV educational network. The question of how much financing various DAV schools obtained from government sources is a sensitive one in Arya Samaj hagiography. The idea that the DAV College, the flagship of the DAV system, was built solely on the contributions of the Hindu public is reiterated time and again in Arya publications as a way of demonstrating the college's centrality in the community. It is also used as a way of differentiating the college from other communal institutions whose willingness to accept government aid, it is implied, compromised their nationalist credentials in some way. At a 1914 Founder's Day celebration in London, Arya educational leader Lala Lajpat Rai's recounting of the founding of the college included reference to an "unwritten law" of the institution that created what he called a "moral obligation" not to seek government aid,[20] and in 1920 he recalled that the original prospectus of the college was marked by "an insistence that [its] scheme of national education be absolutely independent of Government patronage and Government help."[21] The Samaj's most prominent scholarly chroniclers have also argued that not only the flagship DAV College founded in 1886, but also the DAV schools that followed were entirely self-financed. Kenneth Jones, for example, traces the innovative methods that the Samaj developed to fund schools and other projects, including rag and *atta* funds in which Aryas collected rags and handfuls of flour from housewives.[22]

While Samaj fundraising and donations from wealthy Hindu businessmen were important in keeping the schools afloat, the image of an extensive DAV schools movement funded entirely by the Hindu community is belied by evidence in the files of the DAV College Trust and Management Society. These files make clear that from at least the 1920s, British subsidies were essential to the functioning of many DAV schools and colleges. By way of example, the DAV Ayurvedic College received grants from the Lahore Municipal Committee and the Punjab Government for practical training in Ayurvedic medicine.[23] The DAV College and high schools in Rawalpindi, the DAV College in Srinagar (Kashmir), and the DAV High School in Batala were all heavy recipients of subsidy funding. In the early 1940s government funds made up half the income of the Dayanand Primary Education Board, which oversaw approximately twenty primary schools.[24] The centrality of subsidy payments is suggested by the fact that when payments came late to a particular school, that school's file at the Trust and Management Company is often filled with urgent requests that the company transfer emergency funds to tide the school over until the grant arrived. When its government grant was delayed, one high school wrote requesting emergency loans from the Managing Committee in order to be able to meet its payroll.[25] While the lack of data prior to the 1920s makes it impossible to assess whether, or to what extent, DAV educational institutions were subsidized in an earlier period, the extant evidence clearly demonstrates the centrality of colonial state subsidies for Samaj schools in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s—the peak decades of communal conflict in pre-independence north India.

Advancing Hindu Nationalism in Arya Samaj Schools

The opening of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic (DAV) High School in Lahore in 1886 signaled the beginning of the educational efforts of the Arya Samaj, founded eleven years earlier in 1875. The high school, which enrolled 550 students in its first month of operation, [26] offered classes from the first grade through the college entrance level. The first DAV College was opened in 1889, and over the next several decades local Samaj chapters in urban Lahore as well as in the smaller and poorer villages in Punjab started their own schools. Jones notes that "education became one of the major preoccupations of the Aryas. During the 1890s [they] would build an educational system throughout the entire province, from the primary grades through college,"[27] a system which spread beyond Punjab to the United Provinces and other parts of North India including Kashmir.

The introduction of Western-style education into colonial settings often laid the groundwork for long-term competition and conflict among various ethnic and religious groups as preferential access to education paved the way for particular groups to dominate the state bureaucracy for generations to come. In a North India increasingly characterized by competition and conflict between Hindus and Muslims, success in English-language higher education meant more than just prosperity for individual students. It was also a central indicator of a community's status in the battle for cov eted bureaucratic posts, and by extension a barometer of the status of the community as a whole. In the words of a memorial from United Provinces Muslim activists to the viceroy,

> …the political importance of a community to a considerable extent gains strength or suffers detriment according to the position that the members of that community occupy in the service of the State. If, as is unfortunately the case with the Mohammedans, (members of a community) are not adequately represented (in state service), they lose in the prestige and influence which are justly their due.[28]

Under the Moghul Empire, Muslims had occupied the lion's share of bureaucratic positions, but under the British, Hindus were quickly moving ahead. The growing gap between Hindu and Muslim representation in the north Indian bureaucracy was particularly pronounced in Punjab, the Samaj's home base. While Hindus in Punjab constituted a minority largely excluded from political power by the larger Muslim and Sikh populations, they obtained eighty percent of the "superior" government appointments in the province.[29] A key reason for growing Hindu dominance in the bureaucracy in general was the disproportionately high rates at which Hindu children were enrolled in English-language schools, a phenomenon clearly at play in Punjab.[30] Fifteen years before the opening of the first DAV school in Punjab, there were more than twice as many Hindu than Muslim children in the province's middle schools and almost three times more Hindus than Muslims in higher education.[31]

In an environment of increasingly intense competition for bureaucratic posts, the relative educational levels of each religious community were among the most sensitive barometers of the community's larger position in society. In such a climate, schools—particularly those schools founded solely or primarily for members of a particular religious community—became key institutional bases for communal mobilization. The desire to remedy what he saw as the educationally "backward" condition of north Indian Muslims led Sayyid Ahmad Khan to found the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, known simply as Aligarh, in the United Provinces in 1875. Conversely, a key purpose of the DAV schools and colleges was to ensure continuing high levels of education, and particularly high levels of bureaucratic employment, for the Hindu community, a goal made clear by the domination of the curriculum by subjects necessary for bureaucratic employment such as English, math, geography, and physical science. [32] By 1888 the DAV school had achieved a coveted sign of success in this bureaucratic competition, producing more students successful in the entrance exams of Calcutta University than any other school in Punjab.[33] The Samaj was known for the large percentage of its members who were government bureaucrats; as Kenneth Jones notes, Aryas "recognized and alternately praised or denigrated the fact that their members were mostly clerks, 'pen pushers,' who could only contribute small amounts,"[34] and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab noted in 1897 that "there are many servants of Government in [the Arya Samaj's] ranks."[35]

Sayyid Ahmad Khan's original intent in creating Aligarh was to spread English-language learning among his fellow Muslims, and the founding principle of the DAV schools was initially to spread "secular" learning and Hindu religious reform among Hindus. But in a climate of increasing conflict between Hindus and Muslims Aligarh and the DAV schools, as educational institutions catering primarily to students of a particular religious community in a period in which rates of education and bureaucratic employment were key markers of communal competition, would have become high-profile manifestations of that conflict even if they had shown no overt communal bias in their curricular and extracurricular activities. This framework of competition was precisely the context in which Aryas viewed the foundation of Aligarh, the construction of which was directly cited by the founders of the DAV College and schools as an argument to convince Hindus that creating such Hindu schools was possible.[36] Lala Lajpat Rai, one of the most influential leaders of the DAV College Movement, wrote in 1920:

> Aligarh was a symbol of the new Muslim nationalism…educational in function, but political in scope and effect. The Arya Samaj, representing the new nationalism of the Hindus, followed suit, and the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College….was the fruit of its efforts. Each institution created an atmosphere of its own—national to a certain extent, so far as the cult of love of country was concerned, but otherwise openly sectarian.[37]

Each institution—Aligarh for Muslim nationalists, and the DAV schools and colleges for Aryas—came to be understood in precisely this way—as markers of communal identity, which served to galvanize each community around imaginings of their nation based solely on religion. Francis Robinson, for example, has demonstrated that a substantial proportion of Muslim League leaders were students or trustees of Aligarh.[38] The DAV colleges and schools similarly became institutional representations of and mobilizers for the larger Samaj movement. Jones, for example, describes Arya public events to raise money for the schools as becoming "a regular part of Punjabi Hindu life, not only provid[ing] funds for Arya schools but a social forum for the educated elite."[39] Fundraising, first done solely within the Punjab, soon traveled outside it, with Aryas traveling to the northwestern Provinces, Sind, and Rajasthan to gather funds on the schools' behalf,[40] increasing the visibility of the Samaj and its message in the process. In this way, the college and the schools were inextricably tied to the Arya movement as a whole and played a fundamental role in its efforts to mobilize north Indian Hindus around Hindu nationalist causes. DAV College students played prominent roles in anti-British actions in particular, and in the first decade of the 1900s, when unrest led the British to expel several Samaj leaders from the Punjab, these students were frequently cited by the British as a danger to their rule.

By virtue of their high-profile role in helping to maintain the disproportionately high rates of education and bureaucratic employment of Hindus, as well as by their existence as markers of the Samaj's presence and institutional bases for its activities, the DAV schools and colleges were central representations of Arya Samaj ideology. The schools also served movement goals more directly through their curricula. As was previously noted, much of the curriculum was similar to that of government and other schools, focusing on subjects such as math, geography, and English. Unlike many of their counterparts, however, Arya Samaj schools also taught Hindi, as part and parcel of the larger Hindu nationalist cause of making Hindi the national language of India. The same standard spoken language of north India during the colonial period was variously referred to as Urdu, Hindi, and Hindustani.[41] The Mughals

had written Urdu in the Persian rather than the indigenous Devanagari script, and while both Muslims and Hindus used the Persian script, Hindi in Devanagari became identified over time primarily with Hindus. The fact that Urdu contained many words of Persian and Arabic origin was seized on by Hindu nationalists beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century to argue that the Muslim presence in North India was alien, a remnant of a Muslim invasion of "Hindu" India, and that India's unalterably Hindu nature should be recognized by making Hindi in Devanagari script India's official language. The dominant nationalist movement in colonial India, the Congress Party, vehemently resisted what it saw as an intentionally exclusionary Hindu campaign bound to alienate Muslims at precisely the time that Congress sought to convince them not to cast their lot with a future Pakistan. As Gandhi argued before Congress voted on the official language, "during the crisis the Congress must stand firm like a rock. It dare not give way on the question of the lingua franca for India. It cannot be Persianized Urdu or Sanskritized Hindi. It must be a beautiful blend of the two simple forms written in either script."[42]

In stark opposition to the Congress, the Arya Samaj strongly supported the Hindi effort. Shortly before the Samaj's founding in 1875, founder Dayanand Saraswati switched from speaking Sanskrit in public audiences to Hindi, despite a lack of fluency so severe that "hundreds of words and even sentences still came out in Sanskrit."[43] Despite this difficulty he subsequently lectured entirely in Hindi, even in his native Gujarat where he could have much more easily spoken Gujarati.[44] He also exhorted Aryas to use Hindi, resulting in "volumes of …letters [to Dayanand which] show how hard they tried…letters written by Punjabis, Marathas, and Gujaratis [in] a strange mixture of Hindi and their own vernacular."[45] While other Hindu groups also advocated this cause, the Arya Samaj played a particularly central role: Ayesha Jalal notes that the (English-language) Arya Samaj newspaper the Tribune was one of two newspapers which "formed the backbone of the Hindi agitation in the Punjab,"[46] while census reports from 1911 and 1931 single out Aryas as key leaders of campaigns to encourage Hindus to list their language as "Hindi" in the census.[47] Given the centrality of Hindi to the Samaj cause, it is not surprising, then, to find that the DAV schools taught Hindi even as this represented a departure from prevailing educational trends in the area. In 1837 the British replaced Persian with English as the official language of administration, and they subsequently chose particular vernaculars to serve as the language of lower-level administration in each province. In the United Provinces and Punjab, the two provinces in which the Samaj was most active, the British made Urdu the official language of the lower levels of administration, with the result that it soon became the language of instruction in the lower levels of most government schools. Many DAV schools, however, bucked this trend. Lala Hans Raj, the first principal of the original DAV school, argued that the three things necessary for the Hindu community to progress were that its members share a common origin, a common language, and a common religion.[48] Although as late as 1901, there were more Hindus in the Punjab literate in Urdu than in Hindi, [49] Hindi was taught in many Samaj schools while Urdu was made an optional language.

The creation of a DAV school and college network, which began with a single college in 1886 and expanded to 179 schools in India and Burma by 1942, would not have been possible without the creation in colonial India of a "subcontracted" educational system, in which private schools willing to meet government education regulations received subsidies essential to their maintenance. To the extent that DAV schools were an important part of the overall Arya Samaj cause of promoting Hindu nationalism in north India, British education subsidies were central to the dissemination of this particular imagining of the Indian nation. A very similar process occurred in Indonesia, where the Dutch created an educational system similarly reliant on "subcontracting," placing substantial educational resources at the disposal of a movement which placed reformist Islam at the center of its imaginings of the Indonesian nation.

Building an Indonesian Educational System and Subsidies for Muhammadiya Schools

The Dutch established their first key stronghold in Indonesia by establishing their control over Java in the 1830 Java War. Dutch education policy from that time forward would be dictated by two interrelated considerations—the need to inexpensively produce civil servants for the continually expanding bureaucracy, and the periodic rise to power in Holland of liberal governments determined to increase funding for social services to Indonesians. Java's economy was quickly restructured to maximize its profitability through the implementation of the *cultuurstelsel* system, which instituted compulsory cultivation of export crops sold to the state at fixed prices. *Cultuurstelsel* made Indonesia one of the most profitable colonies in the history of imperialism, generating a remarkable thirty-one percent of Holland's aggregate government revenue between 1851-1860.[50] Managing this system necessitated the creation of a local bureaucracy, and royal decrees in 1848 and 1851 called for the "provision in the East-Indies budget for a sum of fls. 25,000 per year for establishing schools among the Javanese, chiefly intended for training native civil servants."[51] By the 1870s a continuing need for local bureaucrats had prompted the repeal of restrictions excluding Javanese from high-ranking posts, and in the Netherlands Liberal governments determined to make state-funded education more accessible captured power. The Fundamental Education Decrees and the General Regulations issued in 1871 and 1872 signaled the government's intent to bind the heretofore independent Western schools scattered across Java into an educational system by setting a standardized curriculum, developing a dramatically expanded teacher training program, and setting strict regulations on the ages of students at various levels of the educational process.

The 1871-1872 regulations also pioneered the extension of Dutch subsidies to private schools run in accordance with government regulations. Private educational providers initially took the government up on its offer in large numbers, with the number of schools receiving government funding more than doubling between 1873 and 1883 while the number of children educated in them almost tripled.[52] However, the Regulations' stipulation of "religious neutrality," which forbade subsidized schools from teaching religion in any form,

severely restricted the number of private schools that could obtain subsidies. As subsidy applications tailed off, the government commissioned a study of education policy in India and Sri Lanka to ascertain where it had gone wrong. The study singled out missionary schools in these colonies for special praise,[53] and when the Dutch Protestant party won the 1888 Netherlands elections, the policy of "religious neutrality" was ended.[54] This policy change definitively shifted the primary burden of educational provision from schools run directly by the state to those managed by missionaries. In 1871, before mission schools became eligible for government subsidies, the government directly educated the overwhelming majority of those receiving Western-style education in Java, with 4,850 students in regency schools, 3,100 students in district or community schools, and only 350 students in mission schools. By 1898, a decade after subsidies were made available to religious schools, mission schools enrolled 57,000 students to the government's 22,400.[55]

Once the principle of extending educational subsidies to religious groups had been established, all that remained was for the Dutch to increase the subsidy policy's scope. This was achieved in the early decades of the twentieth century with the implementation of the Ethical Policy introduced in 1901. Increasing exposés of the suffering of the Javanese as a result of *cultuurstelsel* and other Dutch practices had created a sense of guilt that the queen attempted to allay by announcing a "moral mission" to uplift Indonesians by creating more schools, building transportation and infrastructure, and increasing access to health care.[56] This expansion of services—Dutch spending on health care alone grew by a factor of almost ten between 1900 and 1930[57]—led to significant growth in the size of the education system in Indonesia, with the 265,940 students in private and government schools across the archipelago in 1900 expanding to 1.7 million by 1930-1931.[58] Subsidies to privately-run schools skyrocketed, with subventions of missionary schools alone increasing 300 percent between 1909-1912.[59]

While Muhammadiya was determined from its earliest days to work for Islamist reform through its schools, its ability to disseminate its message on a large scale depended substantially on its ability to obtain government subsidies. While the movement seems to have faced some initial difficulty in obtaining subsidies due to early problems in meeting government educational standards, by the early 1920's at the latest its schools regularly received significant government aid, and that aid grew substantially in absolute terms throughout Dutch rule. Muhammadiya's 1923 annual report listed the movement's total revenues from all sources that year as 69,356 guilders, 6,461 of which came from government subsidy.[60] By 1929-30, the government subsidy had increased to 83,251 guilders—more than the entire budget of the movement from all sources only six years earlier—in addition to 6,290 guilders from the sultan of Jogjakarta. While precise calculations are not possible due to the unavailability of the movement's total budget for 1929-1930, if we assume that it was no larger than Muhammadiya's 1932 total budget of 579,354 guilders, then it appears that subsidies accounted for about fifteen percent of its total income in this period.[61] Because this is fifteen percent of the budget of the movement as a whole, which sponsored many noneducational activities in addition to the schools, this subsidy may well have covered substantially more than fifteen percent of the budget of the schools themselves.

Muhammadiya Schools and the Struggle for Religious Reform

Although the overwhelming majority of the archipelago had converted to Islam by the end of the sixteenth century, in the eyes of Muhammadiya most Indonesian Muslims were far from the correct practice of their faith. Muhammadiya's assessment of the gap between true Islam and *adat* was almost identical to that of C. Snouck Hurgronje, the primary Dutch colonial expert on Islam, who argued that "the great majority [of Indonesian Muslims] pursue their lives in their half-pagan and wholly superstitious thoughts and practices, only imperfectly clad in a few phrases and other outward ….signs of Mohammedanism."[62] Muhammadiya believed that un-Islamic *adat* was practiced because Muslims, unable to consult the Quran themselves because they did not know Arabic, relied on the incorrect edicts of teachers in Islamic schools, or *pesantren*, to determine proper Islamic behavior. Altering this behavior was first and foremost an educational endeavor, so it is no surprise that the movement's founding statute stipulated "establish[ing] and maintain[ing] good support of educational institutions, where besides common [secular] subjects the principles of Muslim religious teachings would also be given."[63]

Since direct consultation of the Quran and hadith in the original Arabic were assumed to clearly demonstrate the invalidity of most *adat*, a key purpose of Muhammadiya schools was extended teaching of Arabic. In the Sumatran highlands of Takengen, for example, *pesantren* students learned to recite Arabic passages but otherwise studied about Islam entirely in Malay. Students in Muhammadiya schools opened in Takengen in the 1930s studied Arabic grammar and then Islamic topics in Arabic, and reports from the period note students reading the texts themselves and being encouraged to question prevailing interpretations of them.[64] Facility in Arabic was important not only because it allowed consultation of sacred texts, but it also permitted students to read Arabic texts from the Middle East. Muhammadiya schools in the Sumatran highlands, for example, ordered at least some of their books from Cairo,[65] which familiarized students with the Muslim reform movement outside Southeast Asia. Other Islamic modernist schools in Indonesia taught Arabic and used Middle Eastern texts as well, but Muhammadiya's extensive network of Western-style schools throughout much of the archipelago dwarfed that of any other privately organized Muslim initiative, and government subsidies were an important part of its ability to do so.

As the example of the Middle Eastern Arabic texts intimates, Muhammadiya's reform project was not only a struggle for the correct practice of Islam, but also a campaign for an Indonesian national identity that prioritized its Islamic nature at the expense of other religious and cultural traditions. In schools run directly by the Dutch, the history of the archipelago was noticeable by its absence; late nineteenth-century government educational reports note these schools "did not contain a single reference to the teaching of history."[66] While almost all Indonesian-run schools, in keeping with the archipelago's emerging nationalist identity, taught Indonesian history, the battle over whose history, understood in what manner, mattered immensely for the direction Indonesian nationalism would take. In 1925 Muhammadiya aroused sus-

tained protest over the Dutch publication of a Javanese folk history entitled *Serat Dermagandul*, which praised one of the Hinduized empires that had ruled Java before Islam's arrival there. This history earned the movement's wrath by arguing that the coming of Islam had rendered the Javanese half-hearted and suggesting that the path to Javanese renewal was through the resuscitation of the old Hindu Javanism. In sharp contrast, national history as taught in Muhammadiya schools presented Indonesia as part of a larger Muslim (modernist) world the history of which was unintelligible outside of a larger narrative of the rise and relative decline of Islam over the centuries. As in the case of the Javanese folk history, Muhammadiya's reading of the past contained a clear prescription for the future: Indonesia's prosperity was inextricably bound up with the practice of true Islam. In its history curriculum "the glory and perfection of Islam's early period were emphasized and contrasted to the regressions in the subsequent periods of Muslim world history, including that of Indonesia. The upshot of casting Islamic history in that perspective was to hold Muslims themselves responsible for the regression and degenerations, urging Muslims to strive to restore the greatness of Islam in the modern world."[67]

Conclusion

The stories of the DAV and Muhammadiya school systems and their role in spreading religious imaginings of the Indian and Indonesian nations do not fit into the prevailing scholarly understandings of how education fosters nationalism in colonial contexts. DAV and Muhammadiya schools were part of state school systems in the sense that they followed state regulations and received state subsidies; they also, like Anderson's colonial educational systems, produced large numbers of future colonial bureaucrats. But while Anderson suggests that education at the higher rungs of the colonial education system facilitated the emergence of wider imaginings of the national community by acquainting students from across the colony, DAV and Muhammadiya schools represented and inculcated much narrower, more exclusive imaginings of the community, in which the cultures and experiences of minority religious communities were systematically deprivileged in the national narrative. Because DAV and Muhammadiya schools educated much wider swaths of the population—measured both in absolute numbers of students and in those students' middle class origins—than the upper rungs of colonial education described by Anderson, these religious schools arguably had a much deeper influence on emerging national identities.

If the DAV and Muhammadiya schools do not fit prevailing understandings of colonial school systems, they are equally distant from narratives of anticolonial nationalism produced by schools rooted firmly in the private sector. India and Indonesia were certainly not the only colonies in which locals strove to build their own schools, either to compensate for colonial neglect or to provide more "culturally appropriate" education than was presumed to be the fare in colonial schools. While these efforts were often successful, local self-help efforts were severely constrained by the limited geographic reach and financial resources of the groups that mounted them. The most that these efforts generally accomplished was the creation of a myriad of schools unconnected to one another and set adrift in a sea of institutions providing more traditional forms of education. Operation on such a limited scale, however, was not conducive to the production and dissemination of a new vision of the nation among significant numbers of the colony's youth. The example of the fate of the schools run by another religious nationalist group—the Association of the Ulama in Algeria—is instructive here. Fearful that French schools would corrupt Muslim children, conservative Muslims began founding their own Islamic schools in Algeria in the 1930s. Severely limited by a lack of funds, most of these schools had only one or two classes and very few qualified teachers. When the French developed legislation in 1938 making it more difficult for such schools to comply with colonial educational law, several of them were closed. It was not until the aftermath of World War II that the schools finally overcame some of their earlier difficulties and began to approximate a school system, establishing in 1947 a "uniform curriculum, a contract to bind local founding committees, and an obligatory oath of fidelity for teachers,"[68] and later setting up a higher commission that set hours of study and curricula.[69] As late as 1956 there seem to have been only forty-eight schools affiliated with the association, and because the French began to close them down in 1954, the schools only existed as a system with a relatively unified curricula and goals for less than a decade. When the brief and faltering existence of the Association schools is compared to the three decades of Muhammadiya school activity under the Dutch, represented by over 800 schools by the end of the Dutch period and the five decades of DAV school activity in north India, the severe limitations on advancing religious nationalist imaginings of the community through schools run exclusively by private groups become clear.

In analyzing the w ays in whic h colonial education facil i-tates the spread of nationalism, then, more detailed scrutiny of the "political economy" of these school systems is essential. Discussions of school systems in advanced capitalist and colonial contexts alike rarely dwell on the economics of school building and maintenance, but the type of nationalisms that these systems produce are profoundly affected by them. Gellner's argument that the mass school systems that are the hallmark of modern capitalist societies inculcate students in versions of nationalism defined by the state is true, but it is true in large part because modern capitalist states are able and willing to fund their own school systems and thus to assert more control over their content. Colonial states, which derived much less benefit from their educational investment in human capital and were under strict orders not to unduly deplete the imperial treasury, faced a very different set of incentives which made them much more likely to subcontract educational provision to private parties which could then significantly influence the character of the nationalism being taught. Similarly, the case of the DAV and Muhammadiya schools reminds us of something that research on colonialism has already taught us—that much of what appears to be resistance by local groups to the colonial state is, in fact, inseparable from that state and unattainable without using its resources.

NOTES

[1] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983), 121-2.

[2] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1983), 35.

[3] I define "Western-style education" as occurring in schools in which people who had received formalized, replicable training as teachers taught students, divided into groups on the basis of their age, a set of subjects perceived as being independent of one another and whose truth claims were not based primarily on religious faith. These new schools were a significant departure from earlier forms of education, in which community religious figures usually served as teachers; students of many ages received instruction from the same teacher simultaneously, and the imparting of knowledge of religious ritual was a central purpose of education.

[4] Daniel Gold, "Organized Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation," in *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, ed. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 534.

[5] James Peacock, *Purifying the Faith*: *The Muhammadijah Movement in Indonesian Islam* (Redwood City, CA: Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978), 52.

[6] Frances Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900-1942* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995), 57-58.

[7] Peacock, *Purifying the Faith*, 52.

[8] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 134.

[9] For example, younger Muhammadiya members usually donned the Malay cap rather than Javanese headdress, which Peacock interprets as "Java nese syncretic culture [being] replaced….by a Malayo-Indian *santri* culture." Peacock, *Purifying the Faith*, 47.

[10] Gold, "Organized Hinduisms," 557. "Dayanand" refers to the name of the founder of the Arya Samaj, Dayananda Saraswati.

[11] Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989).

[12] Syed Nurullah and J.P. Naik, *A History of Education in India, During the British Period*, (Bombay: Macmillan Press, 1951), xiv.

[13] Nita Kumar, *Lessons from Schools: The History of Education in Banares* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000).

[14] See, for example, Kazi Shahidullah, *Pathshalas Into Schools: The Development of Indigenous Elementary Education in Bengal: 1854-1905* (Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Limited, 1987).

[15] S.N. Mukerji, *History of Education in India – Modern Period*, (Baroda: Acharya Book Depot, 1966), 111.

[16] Nurullah and Naik, xvii.

[17] Mukerji, 142-150.

[18] Nurullah and Naik, xix.

[19] Nurullah and Naik, 297.

[20] Lala Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj: An Account of Its Origin, Doctrines and Activities with a Biographical Sketch of Its Founder* (Bombay: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1967), 141.

[21] Lala Lajpat Rai, *The Problem of National Education in India* (London: Geroge Allen & Unwin., Ltd. 1920), 20.

[22] Kenneth Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century Punjab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

[23] DAV College Management Committee (DAVCMC) File No. 33, available at the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Library and Archives, New Delhi, India.

[24] The Primary Education Board received approximately half of its 1940-41 budget of 14,698 rupees from government subsidies. See DAVCMC file no. 40, 209.

[25] See, for example, DAVCMC file no. 184, 123, 125, 127, 137, 243, 297, which include emergency requests from 1926,1931, 1937, and 1938.

[26] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 77.

[27] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 77.

[28] Quoted in Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 145.

[29] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 59-60.

[30] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 60.

[31] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 60. There were 2,200 Muslim children in middle school as compared to 5,433 Hindus, and 1,658 Muslim children enrolled in higher education compared to 4,468 Hindus.

[32] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 322.

[33] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 78.

[34] Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 82.

[35] Home Political Department Proceedings, April 1912, no.4. The Lieutenant-Governor goes on to note that despite the large numbers of Aryas in government service "[the Samaj]'s general tendency is disloyal." Dhanpati Pandey, *The Arya Samaj and Indian Nationalism (1875-1920)*, (New Delhi: S.Chand & Co., Ltd., 1972), 145.

[36] The November 5, 1883 issue of the *Regenerator of Arya Varta* noted that in the effort to found the DAV College, "all difficulties will give way if we have recourse to labor and perseverance. Look at Maulvi Sayyed Ahmed Khan, the great founder of Aligarh College who single-handed, with the aid of perseverance, brought about such wonderful results." Quoted in Jones, *Arya Dharm*, 68.

[37] Rai, *National Education*, 16-17.

[38] Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*, Appendixes 1 and 2.

[39] Rai, *National Education*, 79.

[40] Rai, *National Education*, 79.

[41] Paul Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 129.

[42] *Harijan*, 10 August 1946, quoted in Krishna Kumar, "Hindu Revivalism and Education in North-Central India," in *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 549.

[43] J.T.F. Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati: His Life and Ideas* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978).

[44] Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, 224.

[45] Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, 224.

[46] Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 119.

[47] See the 1911 *Census of Punjab*, 348, and the 1931 *Census of Punjab and Delhi*, 271.

[48] Lala Hans Raj, Mahatma Hansraj Granthavali, Volume 4, quoted in Kumar, "Hindu Revivalism in North-Central India," 540.

[49] Kumar, "Hindu Revivalism," 303.

[50] Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas*, 24.

[51] H. Kroeskamp, *Early Schoolmasters in a Developing Country: A History of Experiments in School Education in Nineteenth-Century Indonesia* (Assen: Van Gorcum and Comp, 1974), 451

[52] Kroeskamp, *Early Schoolmasters*, 391.

[53] Jan Aritonang, *Mission Schools in Batakland (Indonesia) 1861-1940* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1994), 13.

[54] Aritonang, *Mission Schools*, 14.

[55] Kroeskamp, *Early Schoolmasters*, 414.

[56] Gouda, *Dutch Culture Overseas*, 24

[57] M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 147.

[58] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 151.

[59] Fred von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia: Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 179.

[60] Peacock, *Purifying the Faith*, 46.

[61] Alfian, *Muhammadiyah,* 197.

[62] Alfian, *Muhammadiyah,* 19.

[63] Alfian, *Muhammadiyah,* 154.

[64] Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises*, 88.

[65] John Bowen, *Sumatran Politics and Poetics: Gayo History, 1900-1989* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 99.

[66] Kroeskamp, *Early Schoolmasters*, 398.

[67] Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises*, 89.

[68] Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises*, 447.

[69] Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises*, 447.