

# Writing the Nation: Textbooks of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

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We have struggled and we have fought from the beginning, and on behalf of a message, just as our fathers and grandfathers fought beforehand, in defense of their message, the message of unity, the message of freedom, the message of strength, the message of building, the message of protecting our sacred things and our sacred land, and the message of protecting the land of the Arabs for the unity of the Arabs. (King Hussein, foreword to the 1959 textbook, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*)<sup>1</sup>

Education is truly a mirror unto a people's social being and it is also the means by which that being is reproduced and passed onto the next generation. For that reason education has been the main ideological battlefield between the economic, political, and cultural forces of oppression and the forces of national liberation and unity. The education system was the first fortress to be stormed by the spiritual army of colonialism, clearing and guarding the way for a permanent siege by the entire occupation forces of British imperialism. (Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Writers in Politics*, 1997)<sup>2</sup>

These two quotes illustrate something of the transformative process the writing of history has undergone in the last two centuries. In the past, history has always served to explain peoples' connection to the land on which they lived, to define many of their public and private relationships, and to interpret the spiritual and material phenomena surrounding their lives. Today, the writing of history fulfills much the same function. However, since the nineteenth century, history and historians have been recruited, both wittingly and unwittingly, into national projects all over the world, to delineate and simultaneously legitimate, the existence of new nation-states. The parameters of historical analysis have been "limited" by the lines drawn on maps, whether in Europe or elsewhere, and the discourse of historical writing has been influenced by the national histories defined and disseminated by European historians, civil servants, and governments. Those who were colonized, as in Ngugi's African example, came under the direct control of the purveyors of this new discourse, while others, as in King Hussein's Jordan, found that a freer education system did not obviate the desire to appear as equally "national" as the European powers. To achieve that "national" status, leaders throughout the world had to physically build the infrastructures of their states, and, just as importantly, to provide the narratives connecting the people to the lands bounded by the lines on the map. These narratives appeared as historians themselves wrote about the feats that had taken place within those lines over the centuries and as government leaders commissioned histories to specifically place

their present actions into the linear narrative of their nation's past. Throughout this process, the nation, whether defined as a territorial, linguistic, ethnic, or religious unit, gradually became a primary actor in the evolution of history and the writing of it.

King Hussein's quote above comes from the 1959 Jordanian government textbook, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, and serves as an illustration of how textbooks themselves can shed light on the connection between nationalism and the writing of history. In many ways, a textbook is the most glaring example of how history is manipulated by government leaders, for, as Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith report, textbooks "are conceived, designed, and authored by real people with real interests."<sup>3</sup> Also, "they signify—through their content and form—particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge."<sup>4</sup> In the case of the Hashemites, the leaders constructed a reality they wanted the new Jordanian citizens to accept, namely the legitimacy of Hashemite rule and the state boundaries drawn by the British colonizers. The purpose was to envision a Jordanian "imagined community" radiating out from and dependent upon the Hashemite kings.

Obvious problems are presented by the use of textbooks for any type of historical analysis. One reason has already been discussed above: governments naturally manipulate the message presented in them. This manipulation changes in tone depending on the level of interconnectedness between the governed and the governors, but this does not negate the reality that all states portray a rosier picture of their history than the facts may warrant. The writing of history can then become a tool for propaganda, exploiting the job of the historian for political means. For the purpose of this paper, this problem actually serves as a positive point of departure, for the writing of other kinds of historical analyses have more subtly instituted the changes in discourse that textbooks so glaringly display.

Textbooks in general, and Jordanian textbooks in particular, will serve, in this paper, as an illustration of four key components of the history-writing genre in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.<sup>5</sup> First, the writing and "recovery" of a linear narrative became a primary goal of the new nation-states in this period. The point behind these projects was to show that a primordial nation existed on that land, that regardless of who ruled, or who colonized the area, something intrinsically unique about these people and this land could be identified. Implicit in this process is the idea that the nationalist liberation movement or the new state government served as the inevitable culmination point of that narrative. The Hashemites accepted without questioning the existence of a long-term linear narrative in history, as "[w]e have struggled

and we have fought from the beginning, and on behalf of a message, just as our fathers and grandfathers fought beforehand in defense of their message." At the same time, the Hashemites themselves are the inevitable successors to the "fathers and grandfathers" who spread their message throughout the region in earlier times.

Second, states around the world used the vocabulary of "modernity" and civic responsibility to describe their nation, as in King Hussein's foreword, when the text stresses that "the message of unity, the message of freedom, the message of strength, the message of building, the message of protecting our sacred things and our sacred land" united the Jordanian citizenry.

Third, the process of compiling and constructing a national history has often proved problematic for new states because of the many different definitions of identity utilized by the people already living within and outside their boundaries. In the case of Jordan, the Hashemites had to find ways to accommodate the larger Arab nationalist narrative that served as the accepted historical, ethnic, and linguistic bond in the region prior to World War I and the subsequent division of the region into Arab nation-states. To avoid a conflict between the existence of the Jordanian nation and "the message of protecting the land of the Arabs for the unity of the Arabs," the Hashemites placed Jordan into the continuum of Arab history, as a logical extension of it, with themselves at the vanguard of the Arab nationalist movement.

Fourth, new leaders, like the Hashemites, could not completely ignore the means by which the people already living within the boundaries of the nation defined their own identity and their own history prior to the state's construction. Andrew Shryock maintains, "despite its persistent concern with modernity, the nationalist discourse in Jordan is actually reproducing and subtly transforming a set of very old, strongly held assumptions about the nature of human communities and their proper formation."<sup>6</sup> The Hashemites have placed themselves into the position of the sheikhs of the Jordanian tribes, as father figures for the nation, and, as such, the focus of allegiance.

#### Textbooks and the Writing of a Nationalist Narrative

Before discussing the Jordanian textbooks at length a couple of examples will serve to provide a context for that analysis. Each of the cases discussed below afford insights into the first three issues posed in this paper about the act of writing history, the new need for a linear national narrative, the use of new terms to analyze the relationship between the government and the governed, and the problem of choosing which particular primordial nation and national narrative fits the new state. As Anthony Smith has theorized, "From the time of the French and American Revolutions, the 'nation-state' became the predominant, and soon almost the only legitimate form of political organisation, as well as the dominant vehicle of collective identity."<sup>7</sup> As a result, he says,

There is no doubt that, historically, the rise of the modern bureaucratic and reflexive state has deeply affected the shape, and to some degree the content of, many nationalisms.... The inclusive, bounded and homogenising state has been the point of departure, and the mould for many national liberation movements in the period of decolonisation from 1945 to the 1970s. The nation that

the leaders of these liberation movements envisaged was equally grounded and defined by a statist ideal inherited from the West and adapted by the immediate post-colonial generation of political leaders.<sup>8</sup>

Textbooks provide a window into this process as they illustrate the new governments' desire, and the need, in the twentieth century, to define a particular kind of national identity patterned on those first devised in Europe. As many new leaders and historians found themselves living inside artificial political boundaries, the problems escalated as they attempted to utilize the new nation-state vocabulary to homogenize heterogeneous communities. In the two following examples, Partha Chatterjee studies the changing modes of historical discourse in Bengal between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and then a number of scholars examine how governments and writers in Egypt confronted competing national narratives while trying to pinpoint Egypt's unique national path.

Partha Chatterjee, in *Nations and Its Fragments*, examines how the act of writing the history of Bengal and India changed as a result of British colonial rule over India. According to Chatterjee, the first history of India in the Bengali language was commissioned by the Fort William College in Calcutta, for use by young British East India Company officials. Written by Mrityunjay Vidlankar, *Rajabali* appeared in 1808:

When he decided to set down in writing the story of 'the Rajas and Badshahs and Nawabs who have occupied the throne in Delhi and Bengal,' he did not need to undertake any fresh 'research' into the subject; he was only writing down an account that was in circulation at the time among the Brahmin literati and their landowning patrons. His book was, we might say, a good example of the historical memory of elite Bengali society as exemplified in contemporary scholarship.<sup>9</sup>

The main actors in this historical narrative are the leaders themselves, but, "In Mrityunjay's schemes of history, the rulers on earth are, as it were, appointed by divine will. They enjoy that position to the extent, and as long as, they acquire and retain the powers of dharma." (78) Thus, prior to the imposition of a nation-state discourse, via British imperialism, "Myth, history, and the contemporary—all become part of the same chronological sequence; one not distinguished from another; the passage from one to another, consequently, is entirely unproblematic." (80) Chatterjee surmises that if Mrityunjay were asked if "the story of the deeds and fortunes of the kings of Delhi might lie [in] the history of a nation, it is doubtful that he would have understood." (83) The discourse of the nation-state had not yet taken hold in India, despite the fact that the British actually commissioned this book, so "*Rajabali* is not a national history because its protagonists are gods and Kings, not peoples. The bonds of 'nation-ness' have not yet been imagined that would justify the identification of the historian with the consciousness of a solidarity that is supposed to act itself out in history." (84) The language of history, in this case, focused on divine actors, and the particular leaders themselves, not on the linear narrative required of any kind of national construct.

This mode of history writing changed by the end of the nineteenth century as, Chatterjee says, "Simultaneously, the

modern European principles of social and political organization were now implanted in their minds. The English-educated middle class of Bengal was by the 1870s unanimous in its belief that the old institutions and practices of society needed to be fundamentally changed.” (92) By this point, the writers of history used the language associated with nineteenth-century “modernity” and identity not only to show a linear narrative of the Indian nation throughout history, but also to expropriate the idea that a nation required a starting point, a primordial origin. The general narrative that now appears in such texts as Tarinicharan Chattopadhyay’s *History of India* is:

In the beginning, the history of the nation was glorious; in wealth, power, learning, and religion, it had reached the pinnacle of civilization. This nation was sometimes called Bengali, sometimes Hindu, sometimes Arya, sometimes Indian, but the form of history remained the same. After this came the age of decline. The cause of the decline was Muslim rule, that is to say, the subjection of the nation. (93-94)

Chattopadhyay’s book, probably the most influential textbook used in the Bengali schools in the second half of the nineteenth century, makes the people and the rulers, as individuals, the new actors, for this is now the “history of this country.” (93, 94) In his book, “Ancient glory, present misery: the subject of this entire story is ‘us.’ The mighty heroes of ancient India were ‘our’ ancestors, and the feeble inhabitants of India today are ‘ourselves.’” (97) The message inherent in this narrative is,

His story of ancient glory and subsequent decline has a moral at the end: reform society, remove all of these superstitions that are the marks of decadence, and revive the true ideals of the past. These false beliefs and practices for which Indians are today the objects of contempt did not exist in the past because even Europeans admit that in ancient times ‘we’ were highly civilized. (98)

Throughout this narrative, historians like Chattopadhyay consistently use European benchmarks to gauge the level of “modernity” and “civilization.” The point is now to identify the primordial nation, and, by so doing, find its inherent strengths, its inherent power. The linear path of this “true” history can then be traced. Simultaneously, the goal of social “reform” is to obliterate the sources of weakness, in this case the remnants of Mughal rule, and to regain the position of power Indians once wielded.

The example of the Egyptian textbooks shows how difficult it often is to identify a unique national narrative amidst a series of competing allegiances. Traditional education in Egypt, as in all of the Muslim world, was centered around the *kuttub* system of schools. In them, young boys memorized the Quran orally; if they wished to continue their education, they attended a series of religious universities. The school structure began to change with the rule of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, between 1805 and 1848, when the Egyptian *kuttub* was transformed “from a local circle for the inculcation of sacred text, into a local institution aimed at the cultivation of national political and social objectives.”<sup>10</sup> As seen in the Indian example, the graduates of these new kinds of schools saw themselves as the vanguard of the movement for reform and nationalist unification.

Along with these changes in educational instruction, according to Michael Suleiman, “Egyptian intellectuals engaged in heated debates as to whether Egypt belonged to a Mediterranean, Muslim, Arab, or Pharaonic culture and identity (Safra, 1961).”<sup>11</sup> Initially, the answer will be to tie Egypt to the Pharaonic past, despite the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of that land at the beginning of the twentieth century were descendants of later migrants and had no real biological connection to that history.

In studies on Egyptian textbooks, both Suleiman (1983) and Hegazy (1980) found that references to patriotism and nationalism were few prior to 1952, but that where they did appear, they specified Egyptian nationalism, and emphasized the link to the Pharaonic past, especially in terms of references to structures, such as the pyramids.<sup>12</sup>

Overall, Hoda Hegazy found that “Egypt was seen as a distinct, historically developed community of people with territory, economic life and culture separate from its neighboring Arab countries.”<sup>13</sup> The larger question in this debate was how to utilize the proper narratives to construct that distinctive Egyptian nation-ness, to accept some of the historical events that had taken place within the territory of Egypt and to reject others that did not grant Egypt sufficient uniqueness.

After 1952 the tone of the textbooks changes, as seen in the *al-Tarbiyya al-Wataniyya* series. As before, the existence of the Egyptian nation is never negated, regardless of who ruled the country at any given time. For example, as Gabriel Piterberg has shown,

the basic narrative is a familiar one: the Ottoman ‘subordination’ of Egypt was a sorry—but external and insignificant—stage in the nation’s history. The only consequence of the Ottoman conquest to which the textbooks allude, indeed stress and formulate identically, is that ‘Egypt lost its independence and became a subordinate Ottoman province.’<sup>14</sup>

This narrative parallels that of the Indian example, as the glories of the classical period in Egyptian history are extolled while an outside force, in this case the Ottoman Empire, brought stagnation to the region. When Egypt gained complete independence in the 1950s and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the new president of the country, began to extend his influence throughout the Arab region, Suleiman found that,

the post-revolutionary texts definitely played down the Pharaonic connections and only infrequently mentioned Egyptian patriotism. The main focus was on Arab nationalism, the fact that Egypt was an Arab country and its people part of the Arab nation (‘Awad, 1971; Hegazy, 1980; 122-25).<sup>15</sup>

Gregory Starrett uncovered a similar phenomenon when he said, “Teachers were charged with instilling pride in the greater Arab nation and preparing the child for life in ‘a cooperative democratic, socialist, society.’”<sup>16</sup> As Nasser came to lead the Arab nationalist movement in the 1950s and 1960s, politics intruded on the nationalist narrative thus far constructed. Egypt was no longer a unique nation, separated from other histories in the region, but now had become the logical extension of Arab nationalist history. Nasser took on the self-appointed role of not only leading the newly defined Egyptian-Arab nation, but also the Arab world as a whole. Simultaneously, the terms of reference for political debate

throughout the world, including “democracy,” “reform,” “loyalty,” and “modernity” became firmly entrenched in the Egyptian nationalist lexicon.

### Arab Textbooks

Just as in the Egyptian example, the new Arab states of the twentieth century had to grapple with the legacy of Arab-Islamic history, as well as the artificiality of the boundaries dividing their region. As such, there remained in the interwar years an inherent conflict between the narrative presented by the new kind of territorial nationalism (*wataniyah*) and those of pan-nationalism (*qawmiyah*) because, before the establishment of the European Mandate system, burgeoning national identity in the Fertile Crescent had focused on the historical, geographical, religious, and linguistic bonds connecting the Arab world as a whole. The new states had to find ways to fit their own territorial histories into the larger Arab one, as extensions of the accepted narrative. Throughout the interwar period this process was slow as the inhabitants questioned the legitimacy of each state and as the bonds between the people of the Arab regions remained strong. In many ways, the Arab nationalist narrative extolled the virtues of the Arab people, ethnically, culturally, and linguistically through history, while the new nation-state narratives exalted the new leaderships and state structures. The educational systems, built and expanded in each country, served as one of the battlegrounds for the debate over nationhood. Thus, the realities of the Arab world actually inculcated two national identities in the students prior to the end of World War II; they each divided the students into European-drawn units, but the information these students received highlighted a more extensive pan-national narrative.

Historical textbooks published in cities such as Beirut, Jerusalem, and Damascus in the interwar period exacerbated this conflict in national identity. Included in these texts is an unquestioned recognition of the Arab unit as a whole. The “world history” texts follow the path of history from the birth of civilizations in the Middle East, and then to the Greeks, the Romans, the Chinese, and finally to the Europeans, from the Crusades forward. Arab history is intermingled with this narrative as the region grows strong in the Middle Ages and then weakens as sections come under colonial rule and economic influence in the nineteenth century. However, the vocabulary of nationalism, political awakening, and state structures presented in these texts clearly originate within a European discourse and point in the direction of the formation of separate nation-states. As such, a common theme identifies the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 as a pivotal moment in the awakening of the Arabs to the sciences and ideas of Europe.<sup>17</sup> The common narrative follows that a *wataniyah* [nationalist] sensibility, resulted from, for example, the reforms of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, the overall neglect of the Arabs by the Ottoman Empire, the Turkification policies of the Young Turks, and the Arab Revolt of World War I.<sup>18</sup> Other textbooks also include a discussion of the intellectual influence of the Islamic Modernists, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, and the Arab ideologue Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.<sup>19</sup> According to a number of texts, the Arab rebirth (*ba'ith*), ultimately occurred first in Syria because of the people’s innate intelligence, their own desire to learn, the establishment of foreign-controlled schools and, most importantly, the opportunities provided by the promulgation

of the Ottoman constitution.<sup>20</sup>

The Arab narrative simultaneously served as a threat and a benefit to the new leaderships in the region. Each of the new states formed after World War I had to find a formula for growing a new branch from this nationalist tree. The Jordanian case provides an excellent study of the problems presented by having to create a history and a nationalist sentiment, given the many alternative allegiances existing in any given area. The Hashemites began to construct their own distinctive brand of state nationalism as soon as they acquired power. However, the Hashemites found it difficult to gain support for their definition of Jordan in the early years and thus confronted a real threat to their power in the 1950s, in the form of the political opposition movement, the Jordanian National Movement. When provided with the parameters of Hashemite-Jordanian nationalism, the opposition leaders parried with a return to the pan-nationalist Arab definition of the nation. Thus, the battles fought throughout the decade between the state and the opposition focused on not only who controlled the reins of political power, but also who had the right to define the national identity for the country. Ultimately, the Hashemites succeeded in establishing their own definition as the “true” one because they militarily destroyed the National Movement in 1957. The textbooks reflect this political debate; the Hashemites took on an increasingly important position in the Jordanian national landscape as they came to represent the only element protecting the country from total destruction.

### Jordanian Textbooks

In creating the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921 and the Hashemite State of Jordan in 1946, King Abdullah and his grandson Hussein, aided by the British, built roads, put in telephone lines, expanded the educational system, extended patronage to powerful tribes, and created a bureaucracy to employ the increasingly educated population. Just as importantly, they also started constructing a national narrative for the new country, in part through the publication of school textbooks. The narrative that emerged implicitly recognized the new discourse of nationalist history by providing a linear progression from the primordial origin of the Arabs to the present-day configuration of the Jordanian state. It also co-opted the vocabulary of regeneration, “modernity,” and civic responsibility that now appeared in places like India and Egypt, as described above. The underlying message of this narrative is that the new people of Jordan were beholden to the Hashemites, as the legitimate rulers of the nation, and were required to swear allegiance first and foremost to the nation enclosed by the new borders.

Internally, the new state had to contend with the fact that the area was not devoid of history; it was just devoid of a Hashemite-Jordanian one. It is here that Andrew Shryock’s analysis of the continuing and sometimes conflicting patterns of history writing in Jordan appears particularly important. While the Hashemites imposed upon the peoples living on that land a new kind of state, along with a new leadership, they could not ignore the identities already forged among the people under their rule. In particular, they had to take into account the predominantly tribal organization already existing in most areas of the country and the family allegiances that ruled over the settled areas. Shryock calls the personalized

rule of the pre-Hashemite period the “age of shaykhs” while terming the current Hashemite one as “the age of government.”<sup>21</sup> For the tribal members Shryock studied, their landmarks were not the towns or grids on a twentieth-century map, but the lands controlled by the individual tribes. Within them, “each tribe has its own territory (its *bilad* or *dura*), its own history, and its own set of genealogies that link it to the past and to the physical space it now occupies.” (40) In contrast, Shryock concludes that, “The Hashemite era, which stands in Jordan for the *modern* era, entails a different historicity: one that owes its legitimacy not to the talk of old men, but to the powerful blend of literature religiosity, dynastic ideology, and Arab nationalism that prevails in Jordan’s popular media and public schools.” (96)

The Hashemites were able to blend together the vocabulary of twentieth-century nationalism and “modernity” with the allegiances the people in this new country were accustomed to accepting. In Shryock’s words, the tribes agreed to extend their loyalty

to King Husayn and the patriarchal order on which his government is established. The etiquette of respect and exchange is the manner “sons” (the Jordanian tribes) should adopt in the presence of their “father” (the Hashemite monarch), and the observance of this etiquette turns certain historical topics and modes of expression into evidence of disrespect. (303)

The Hashemites put themselves forward as the leaders of the movement toward independence and modernization, but doing so as the sheikhs of the Jordanian tribes, as the fathers of the people. They based their legitimacy on their descent from the Prophet and their leadership in the Arab Revolt. They thus combined in their personages the attributes of both the “modern” twentieth-century leader of the state and the traditional protector of the people. This tone is carried throughout all the textbooks as the authors speak directly to the students, demanding that they extend their allegiance to the Hashemite family and thank them for the improvements they have brought to the country.

At no time do the people living on the land appear as the focus of national loyalty. The subject of sentence after sentence in the textbooks is the reigning Hashemite king and the state he controlled, not the people. For example, the Bedouin origin of many of the Jordanian people is not identified as an intrinsic root of the nation, as seen in the fact that the Bedouin do not receive special recognition in this period. The citizens of the country have no faces and no names. Jordan is not, in the Hashemite lexicon, made up of a unique or united ethnicity, but rather of Arabs led by their Hashemite father-sheikhs. Thus, the Hashemites simultaneously tapped into the nationalist discourse about ethnicity, focusing on the Arab origins of the people, but guaranteed that only their presence actually united them within the borders of Jordan.

When discussing the inhabitants of the country, the textbooks divide them up into urban, rural and nomadic categories; merely providing simple recitations of their lifestyles and the type of schooling required for each group.<sup>22</sup> For example, urban residents have a decreasing appreciation for the customs and traditions existing in the villages. In the rural areas, discussion highlights the need to reconfigure education to focus on the particular concerns of agriculture. In both areas, the biggest problem is the need for more social and recrea-

tional centers to give people direction in their free time. In the Bedouin areas, subdivided into nomadic, seminomadic and settled categories, the texts stress the people’s reliance on their own laws and the problems peculiar to nomadic lifestyles. In some of the texts, the Palestinian refugees represent yet a fourth category of inhabitants, who, if God wills, will be returned to their usurped paradise. By discussing these differences, the texts create artificial boundaries *within* the nation, leaving only the Hashemite leadership as the glue. To reiterate this fact, sentences in the texts frequently start with “the Jordanian government is spending all efforts” and “the Jordanian government is very concerned” to alleviate the technical and educational deficiencies found throughout the country. In keeping with the responsibilities incumbent upon the citizens of a nation-state, the texts frequently exhort the students to work for the community as a whole via their family and school structures. Throughout the textbooks, the language is of “modernity” and the singular role of the state in providing the means for achieving this goal.

Thus, texts instruct students to look to Abdullah and Hussein as the generators of state largesse; to thank Abdullah and Hussein for protecting the rights of the Palestinians; and to profess loyalty to the Hashemite family, and by so doing simultaneously extend loyalty to the state itself. The overall message conveyed is that Jordan *is* the Hashemite family and, furthermore, that all students should express their gratitude for it. In other words, the family structure that provided a framework for the individuals of the society was re-imagined at the national level, with a generous, fatherly, figure, leading the country, sacrificing his life for his children.<sup>23</sup> In an explicit recognition of this fact, one 1964 textbook states that it is “preparing the student to be a good Arab citizen, secure in God as savior of his king and nation, proud of his traditions and the literature of his *umma*” and that the schools are “educating the student to understand that his local home is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Arab home is the Arab nation, and then the world of his family”<sup>24</sup> In this one statement, the Hashemite state acknowledged the past, the present and the future bonds of the Jordanian people, simultaneously utilizing the discourse of twentieth-century national history writing.

As for the problem posed by the larger narrative of Arab nationalist history, the Hashemites solved it just as Nasser would do in the 1950s, by designating the Jordanian state as a logical extension of that narrative. Similarly, the Hashemites proclaimed themselves the personal bridge connecting the two narratives. As the leaders of the Arab Revolt in World War I, they took on the mantle of Arab nationalist leadership, laying claim to the leadership of the whole Arab nationalism movement from that point forward. Thus, Jordan was not just a separate state but one with Hashemite rule, standing at the epicenter of a potential reunion between the divided Arab states. The inhabitants of Jordan are thus linked to the history of the Arab world via their Hashemite leadership. For example, in summing up the legacy of Abdullah, one text states:

His Majesty was, to the furthest extent, among the worldly-wise and political, so that he occupied a high position among the leaders of the Arab world and became one of the men of the hour in the Middle East. He was always trying to establish greater Arab unity, sustaining the Arabs in the shadow of [unity’s] power.<sup>25</sup>

To that end, "Amir Abdullah was famous for his political wisdom and his far-sightedness and for this he became the most distinguished of the leaders of the Arab nation, and he could take great credit for establishing the Arab League in 1945."<sup>26</sup> Not only had Abdullah admirably charted Jordan's course into independence, his position as leader of the Arab world made him the standard-bearer of Arab unity.

To give some examples of these themes, the Hashemite national narrative, as enunciated in these textbooks, follows four interrelated tracks: the Hashemites as vigilant fighters against imperialism; the Hashemites as the leading Arab nationalists in the region; the Hashemites as the sole protectors of the Palestinian people and nation; and, most importantly, the Hashemites as patron-fathers for the Jordanian people. After a discussion of pre-Jordanian Arab history, similar in subject matter to all the textbooks published elsewhere in the region, the Hashemite tale takes the students through the Hashemite-led Arab Revolt to Abdullah's battles to gain independence from the British, from the 1948 Palestine War to Hussein's consolidation of the country in the 1950s. The story ends in the early 1960s, even in the textbooks published as late as 1975. The narrative of the Hashemite family takes the student from the Arab past into the Jordanian present, with the kings as personal guides on the journey.

The Arab Revolt of World War I, led by Sharif Husayn and his sons, played a prominent role in all the Arab history textbooks published throughout the region prior to the independence of Jordan. Sample descriptions state, "There was in Mecca a great man (al-Sharif Husayn Pasha) and he was among the descendants of the Prophet [and] he thought that the Turks had terrorized and oppressed the Arabs and that the Arabs had a legal claim to the kingship, the caliphate and independence."<sup>27</sup> The accepted narrative then relates a few of the events of the war and Faisal's eventual conquest of Damascus in 1918.

In Jordan's own textbooks, starting in the 1950s, the Arab Revolt takes on a much more important role, not only for the Hashemite family, but also for all of Arab history. Every textbook lays out the terms of the agreement reached between Sharif Husayn and the British. In general, the texts state that the British promised Sharif Husayn control over an independent Arab kingdom at the end of the war if the revolt succeeded. Throughout the textbooks, Sharif Husayn's fight to protect and expand the rights of the Arabs is reiterated, starting with his concern as early as 1908 that Young Turk policies would turn out to be hostile to the Arabs.<sup>28</sup> By 1959, the textbooks started to focus on the idea that Sharif Husayn had made contact with and was welcomed by the Arab secret societies of Damascus when he recognized the oppression of the local Ottoman governor and the overall tyranny of the Young Turk government in Istanbul.<sup>29</sup> As "leader of the Arab rebirth," he called on the Arabs to "Come to the Jihad, Come to the Jihad."<sup>30</sup> With this call, Sharif Husayn combined allegiances to both Islam and the Arab world, tying together the Hashemite family's descent from the Prophet and their current political activities. After Jamal Pasha's execution of twenty-one Arab nationalists in Damascus, the 1959 textbook explained, "In this way, oh noble students, the Ottoman Turks were passing judgment arbitrarily against our abilities and they hung and they punished and they imprisoned [the men], but God had them and the men were righteous."<sup>31</sup> As the text-

book further states,

Sharif Husayn had three sons and they were emirs: Ali, Abdullah and Faisal shared in their father's feelings of nationalism and in his battle to free the Arab *umma* and [achieve] its unity. There is no doubt that you remember that the late Emir Faisal was the most distinguished member of the secret Young Arab Society which was established in Paris to oppose the movement to Turkify the Arabs inside the Ottoman Empire.<sup>32</sup>

In this way, the movements of Arab nationalism and Sharif Husayn's Arab Revolt merged together and formed a natural progression from the Arab Awakening of the nineteenth century to its culmination in the events of World War I, all under the agency of the Hashemite family. According to the narrative presented in these textbooks, the British government understood the exalted position Sharif Husayn held in the Arab nationalist movement and so looked to him to lead the revolt.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, while all the textbooks published throughout the Arab world make some connection between the Arab Revolt and the earlier movement of Arab nationalism, textbooks published in Jordan go even further and state that the Arab Revolt, personified in the image of Sharif Husayn, made the Hashemites the unquestioned leaders of the Arab nationalist movement. As an example, one theme recurring in the texts says that the revolt was launched to hinder the arrival of Zionism in Palestine. In a sixth-grade reader, entitled *Tarikh al-Filastin*, students were told, "in this way, the Arabs thought they were starting to come face to face with the Zionist movement...."<sup>34</sup> By 1964, the accepted text stated, "the Palestinian Arabs...answered the call of [Sharif Husayn] completely" and thus provided vital help to General Allenby as he moved toward the Holy Land because "if it were not for the Palestinians answering the cry for help from their leader [Sharif Husayn]," the British would not have been able to occupy the area.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, "The Palestinian Arabs understood that they were correct in the knowledge that the Great Arab Revolt was a revolt of Arab independence, not a local one, and they participated in it to advance equality between their Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese brothers"<sup>36</sup> By the 1970s, the textbooks went even further to claim that the Committee for Unity and Progress (CUP) government after 1908 had come under the influence of the Zionists, thus suggesting another need to launch the Arab Revolt against it.<sup>37</sup> For his work, Sharif Husayn is identified as the motivator and founder of the Arab rebirth. In fact, "his grave today [on the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem] still provokes the Arabs and Muslims to work hard to rescue the holy country from the Zionists and colonialism."<sup>38</sup>

This narrative glosses over some of the real contradictions expressed by a Hashemite-led Arab Revolt. The center for Arab nationalist activity since the late nineteenth century had been in Damascus, and to a lesser extent Beirut and Cairo, with little interaction with the elites of Mecca. Sharif Husayn, himself, was an official of the Ottoman Empire and had little contact with the new ideologues of Arab nationalism. His position did begin to weaken within the empire as the new CUP government began to take more direct control over the provinces; as a sign of its interest in Mecca and Medina, it started to extend the Hijazi Railway toward the two cities in the early twentieth century. Despite this growing

wariness, as Mary Wilson has found, “during the years 1908-1914, Sharif Husayn was considered to be an Ottoman loyalist by Arabs beginning to think in terms of Arab interests.”<sup>39</sup> Only when Sharif Husayn started to negotiate with Henry McMahon and the revolt began did he start to consciously use the language of nationalism as a way of gaining support from the surrounding tribes.<sup>40</sup> Even though Faisal traveled to Damascus prior to World War I to meet with the Arab nationalists there, they were not initially accepted as adherents of Arab nationalism. For example, George Antonius states that when Faisal first visited Damascus he met with the leading members of the Arab nationalist groups such as Fatah. However, “it was some time before they spoke their mind openly, for Faisal was a stranger to them and he was known to favour co-operation with the Turks.”<sup>41</sup> Only with time did the members of the different groups come to trust Faisal and admit him as a member of Fatah.

Despite Sharif Husayn’s alliance with the British during the war and the pivotal role Britain played in creating the Emirate of Transjordan, the theme of the interwar years is Abdullah’s opposition to imperialism. Emir Abdullah’s position as the chief opponent of British control over the new country is constantly highlighted, although the style changes as the decades progress. The textbooks of the 1950s straightforwardly describe Abdullah’s march into Ma’an in April 1920 and his stated intention to liberate Syria from French rule. The British then accepted him as a potential leader and requested that he rule over the new Emirate of Transjordan.<sup>42</sup> By the 1960s his march had taken on a new importance. In the newer version, Abdullah’s army posed such a threat to stability in the region that the British Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, hurried to Jerusalem to forestall the possibility.<sup>43</sup> Starting with the 1969 textbook, the narrative adds a new component, stressing the fact that the people of Transjordan gave Abdullah the title of “savior of Syria,” in recognition of the importance of his act.<sup>44</sup>

After the inception of the new emirate, in all the textbooks Abdullah then took on the role of building the new country and preparing it for independence from British rule.

His Majesty Emir Abdullah attached importance to opening schools and spreading education among all levels of the society, just as he was concerned with the army, with improving the economic [situation] of the country and in organizing the administrative apparatus. Many of the Arabs of Palestine and Syria hurried to Transjordan to live under the protection of a just, democratic Arab government.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, these textbooks credit Abdullah with creating the Jordanian Army and the foundations of the state; at no time is Britain credited with anything but supplying some of the required funds. The revolts and demonstrations against the government in 1924 and 1928 are depicted as targeted only against the British, and not Abdullah, despite the fact that much more complex motivations lay behind them. For example, the tribal revolt of 1924 opposed Abdullah’s favoritism toward rival tribes while the demonstrations of 1928 targeted the oppressive regime of both the British and Abdullah. Ignoring all these facts, the texts state that Abdullah’s hard work culminated in the declaration of independence for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. According to *Tarikhna al-Hadith* of 1959,

as a result of the struggles which His Majesty had taken pains to undertake in the rebirth of the nationalist consciousness in the country, His Majesty found that after the Second World War in 1945 it was necessary that the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty be amended in order to repair and advance the country.<sup>46</sup>

The narrative always moves in a progressive fashion, always seeking to reform and improve the country by providing new “modern” institutions for the people. The democratic nature of these reforms is constantly reiterated.

Both the anti-imperialist and fatherly images of the Hashemites are carried through the discussions of the 1950s, a pivotal time for Jordanian history because the decade served as the only time that the Hashemite state felt truly threatened by domestic opposition forces. It is here, in covering this period, that the textbooks place a premium on the leadership displayed by King Hussein, the sole purveyor of services and the protector of the Jordanian people. Praise is heaped upon him for all his activities, and he even claims credit for the actions of the opposition movement, particularly when they resulted in more independence from British rule. The turning point of this narrative is 1959; as all textbooks published in that year and afterward take on the form of a hagiography of King Hussein, in commemoration of the successful destruction of the country’s political opposition movement, the Jordanian National Movement. In an indication of this new approach, the preface to 1959’s *Tarikhna al-Hadith* has already been highlighted on the first page. In addition to the many messages already discussed, this passage is a clear indictment against the attempt by the opposition movement to overthrow the regime. This exhortation appears only once, and then all further textbooks go back to merely identifying the picture of King Hussein.

To offset the potential power of the Jordanian National Movement and to stake a stronger claim for national legitimacy in the country, the textbooks excessively praise King Hussein’s style of government. According to the textbooks published throughout the 1960s and 1970s, King Hussein led a constitutional monarchy unifying the Palestinian and Jordanian people, ignoring the fact that parliament was actually suspended or ineffectual for many of the years these texts were being published. The narrative follows Hussein as he ascended the throne in 1953 and immediately set out to visit every village in the country. He then traveled throughout the region to meet with his fellow Arab leaders in the cause of Arab political and economic unity. He won the hearts of all the people in the country and the region when he ousted John Bagot Glubb as leader of the Jordanian Arab Army on 1 March 1956, and by so doing, Arabizing the nation’s military. This is the only time Glubb’s name is ever revealed in the texts; his importance lies merely in his departure, not in his work for the country. Along this same line, the textbooks credit King Hussein with signing the Arab Solidarity Pact with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in January 1957 and in abrogating the 1947 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. In fact, King Hussein attacked the national government for the pact and worked against it by trying to affiliate Jordan with the U.S. Eisenhower Doctrine instead. Despite this discrepancy, the narrative allows King Hussein to take credit for Jordanian independence from foreign entanglements.

King Hussein confronted a military coup attempt in

April 1957 and the subsequent failure of the Egyptians and the Syrians to fulfill their promise of aid. These events could not be ignored in the narrative and so appear as yet another opportunity for King Hussein to protect the people and fight against Western imperialism.

Among the distressing things that occurred after [the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in March] was not what the Arabs wanted. Civil strife broke out in Jordan, which was ended quickly, and there occurred a problem in the understanding between Jordan and Egypt and Syria as a result of foreign efforts among them. Egypt and Syria did not pay their installments, according to the Arab Solidarity Agreement, and this act cut into the soul of Jordan<sup>47</sup>

No mention is made of the fact that King Hussein then turned to the United States for help in destroying the National Movement. The U.S. immediately sent ten million dollars to the King and moved a battleship into the Eastern Mediterranean to protect his throne. The Jordanian army and government spent the summer of 1957 rounding up and putting on trial those members of the movement who remained in the country.

King Hussein also bestowed his largesse on the social, educational, and economic fields of the country. Each textbook provides a list of these accomplishments. For example, in 1971, the *Al-Tarikh al-Arabi al-Hadith wa al-Mu'asir* text states that, "His Majesty King Hussein...opened hundreds of schools for boys and girls, in all the villages. In some of the cities, like Amman, Irbid, Jerusalem, Nablus and other places there were tens of schools and in these schools, tens of thousands of students, boys and girls"<sup>48</sup> He also helped in time of famine and drought by advancing aid and tax remissions to farmers. Throughout this process, "the palaces of Hussein and the presidential palace are open to all the citizens who want to present thanks or a proposal."<sup>49</sup> The economic situation of the country improved when King Hussein opened new companies such as those for cement and phosphates. Through all this, King Hussein knew that he held the "hearts of the people."<sup>50</sup>

In facilitating the theme that "Our Arab Army is a brave pillar of the independence of our country,"<sup>51</sup> King Hussein enlarged and expanded the army to include a new air force. In the 1964 textbook, pictures of "His Majesty, commander of the army, inspecting the Royal Jordanian planes," of "anti-aircraft artillery guns," and of "persons of the heroic Jordanian Arab Army marching in their review, with power and respect," emphasize the important defensive and national role King Hussein and his army play in the country.<sup>52</sup>

The themes of anti-imperialism and the patron-father king are further augmented by discussions of the Hashemite role in the Palestinian issue. The overarching theme, already enunciated during the discussions of the Arab Revolt, was that the Hashemites stood as the strongest, and often the sole protectors of the Palestinian people. This pattern continues under Abdullah and Hussein. For example, the textbooks credit Abdullah with leading the interwar and post-World War II movement to protect the area from Zionism and colonialism.

The Palestinian Arabs could not ignore the services King Abdullah had offered to the Arabs of Palestine in

their struggle which continued for thirty years against the British and the Zionists. [Abdullah] used his country as a center for sending weapons, supplies and volunteers for the Arab struggles in Palestine, especially during the Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936.<sup>53</sup>

In a clear omission, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, is only mentioned for the first time in 1969's *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, and only then among a list of Palestinian officials who had to flee the country during the 1936-1939 Palestinian Revolt. He is accorded no other respect, and his role as a political leader in Palestine is never mentioned because of the rivalry between the Hashemites and the Husaynis, intertwined with the rivalry between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis. This omission fits the pattern in all the textbooks of neglecting to mention political figures who posed a threat to the Hashemite leadership. In contrast, in a number of books on Palestine the exploits of numerous "heroes" are detailed; none of these men are well-known political or national figures. They represent regular people fighting on behalf of their Arab-Palestinian nation and thus do not represent a real threat to the Hashemites.

During the 1948 War, the Jordanian Army, without mention of its leadership under John Bagot Glubb, succeeded in protecting East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Then, because of the praise and respect accorded to King Abdullah by the Palestinians, they voted, "entirely of their own accord," to unite the West Bank with the East Bank of the Jordan River in 1950.<sup>54</sup> This analysis neglects to discuss the fact that the Palestinians were suspicious of Abdullah because of rumors of his collusion with Jewish leaders during the mandate period. It also ignores the fact that the decision to unite the two banks was manipulated by Abdullah from beginning to end and that the Palestinian leadership ultimately agreed to it because it had no other alternative. King Abdullah's assassination in Jerusalem in 1951 is mentioned in every textbook; however, the perpetrator of the crime, a Palestinian, is never identified, either by name or nationality. Abdullah is simply declared a martyr to the Arab cause as a result of his death.

Throughout King Hussein's reign, the textbooks explicitly merge the Hashemite role as protectors of the Palestinian people and the Hashemite leadership position in the Arab nationalist movement. In essence, he is ready to sacrifice his life in order to return Palestine to the Palestinians.

The goal which all the Arabs were striving for was the return of Palestine, and our beloved King Hussein dedicated the greatest part of his thoughts and concerns to this goal and he knew, under the protection of God, with his wisdom and well-known sagacity, that the one route to return the stolen part of Palestine was through power, and so he began to strengthen the Jordanian Arab Army.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, sufficient power would only be achieved through the unity of the Arabs, an act that King Hussein continually tried to accomplish. "His Majesty is still drawing up clever plans to achieve the Arab unity which all the Arabs seek. We have pride in the exalted role in which His Majesty has established in mending the relationships between the Arab nations and in uniting the forces to facilitate complete Arab unity."<sup>56</sup> In uniting with Iraq, albeit briefly, in 1957, he further proved his credentials as an Arab leader.

Over time, merely protecting the Palestinians was not enough for the Hashemites, however. It is here where the whole concept of mapping comes into play; the Hashemites delineated not only the boundaries of the state of Jordan, but also eventually incorporated all of Palestine within it as well. Boundary lines and maps are particularly important in the Jordanian case because it is a state that clearly came before the nation, and when that nation was defined, it was devoid of people outside of the Hashemite leadership. "Arabs" lived in Jordan, but Jordan itself did not have an otherwise unique ethnicity or culture. Following the narrative presented by the Jordanian textbooks, the definition of a Jordanian was any Arab living inside its borders and professing allegiance to the Hashemite family. These two definitions excluded the Israelis who "usurped" the land, yet included all the Palestinians living between the Mediterranean and the Saudi border.

The maps that appear in the Jordanian textbooks accept without question the British-drawn lines east of the Jordan River, and then, to use the Hashemite's own term, "usurp" Palestine as well. By the 1960s, in fact, Hashemite Jordan's identity physically expanded to include not only the East and West Banks, but also the parts of Palestine now controlled by Egypt and Israel. As early as 1956, maps captioned "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" include the East Bank and West Bank, with no clear distinction between these areas and Israel and the Gaza Strip. The implied message was that Jordan covered all the area of East Jordan and Palestine, irrespective of Palestinian, Egyptian or Israeli claims to parts of that land. A more explicit statement, appearing in an undated but clearly post-1958 textbook, defines the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by saying it "is located between the northern Syrian regions and the Gulf of Aqaba, on the Red Sea to the south, and is connected to the east with the Republic of Iraq and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it reaches west to the Mediterranean."<sup>57</sup> That part lying between the West Bank and the Mediterranean is then identified as the part stolen by foreigners. Lists of tourist sites in the Kingdom follow a similar pattern in that the texts never delineate a difference between the sites on the East and West Banks or in Israel and the Gaza Strip. Again, the implication is that Jordan can rightfully claim as its birthright not only the Umayyad history of the desert castles and the natural beauty of Ajlun, but also the Holy Sites of Jerusalem and Bethlehem and the ports of Gaza and Jaffa. Only in 1965 is the term West Bank used to distinguish that region from the East Bank although the whole area still remains under Hashemite rule.<sup>58</sup>

This study of Jordanian textbooks extends only to 1975, but Shryock finds a similar tale in the 1990 text, *Notes on the Modern History of the Arabs*. In it, the narrative of Hashemite-Jordan has not changed substantially. Tribal revolts are missing, King Abdullah's assassin is not identified, and the principal characters of the text are Hashemite family members.<sup>59</sup> "This monarchical history, I saw as I read on, is a thing of policies and programs, each of them forward-looking, democratic, and successful. The 'Jordanian and Palestinian people' are portrayed in the text as a body of Arabs and Muslims whom the king protects." (305) As seen in the earlier textbooks, the history of the different tribes is still neglected as "The conclusion the student is meant to draw from this text is rather obvious: the *modern* history of the Arabs has nothing to do with tribes, nothing to do with subnational loyalties, nothing

to do with political identities that are not inclusively Arab or Muslim." (305) Thus, the Hashemite narrative has now been fixed over time.

### Conclusion

As Homi Bhabha has theorized, "Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind's eye. Such an image of the nation—or narration—might seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west."<sup>60</sup> The Jordanian textbook example shows how very true this quote can be. It is the Hashemite "mind's eye" that provides the filter for reconfiguring the relationships existing within the new state.<sup>61</sup> Confronted with the need to legitimize their own leadership over this new country, the Hashemites wove a national narrative that incorporated the vocabulary of twentieth-century nationalism and the traditional allegiances recognizable to Jordan's inhabitants, but always within the framework of their own familial history. In this process, the Hashemites rediscovered the Arab classical period, defined the need to reform the "nation" as it faced increasing threats in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and delineated the boundaries of the national discourse, all in the "traditions of political thought and literary language" of the Western nations. The unique contribution the Hashemites make to this new national narrative form is to present their own personal history as synonymous with the national history—both Jordanian and Arab. While earlier historical figures such as Muhammad Ali play prominent roles in the Arab narrative, by the twentieth century, the only actors the Hashemite kings recognize are themselves. As the Hashemites are the only players in this tale, they appear as larger-than-life embodiments of what it means to be a Jordanian and, secondarily, an Arab. Thus, their activities serve as the point of origin for the Jordanian nation. It is then their "impossibly romantic" sacrifices on behalf of the "nation" that ultimately brings together the people now living within the boundaries of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and, by extension, the larger Arab nation.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Yahya Tahir al-Hijawi, Sadi Murad al-Khayat, and Adnan Lutfi Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith* (Nablus: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1959), 4.

<sup>2</sup> Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Writers in Politics: A Re-engagement with Issues of Literature and Society* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 28.

<sup>3</sup> Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith, "The Politics of the Textbook," in *The Politics of the Textbook*, ed. Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith (London: Routledge, 1991), 2.

<sup>4</sup> Apple and Christian-Smith, "Politics," 3.

<sup>5</sup> The textbooks under study include forty-seven history, literature, and civics textbooks, published between 1950 and 1975 throughout the Fertile Crescent. They were used in elementary and secondary school levels in the Emirate of Transjordan, the Palestine Mandate, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. All were obtained from the Museum of Textbooks in Salt, Jordan, and the Truman Library at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in the summer of 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Shryock, *Nationalism and Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 321.

<sup>7</sup> Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Study of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 71.

<sup>8</sup> Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 73.

<sup>9</sup> Partha Chatterjee, "The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories," in *The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 1999), 77-78. In the interest of space, the remaining citations for this book do not appear as footnotes. The relevant page numbers appear in parentheses within the text.

<sup>10</sup> Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 62.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Suleiman, "The Role of Education in Domestic and Inter-Arab Integration," *The Politics of Arab Integration*, ed. Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salamé, vol. 4 (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 80.

<sup>12</sup> Suleiman, "Role of Education," 81.

<sup>13</sup> Hoda A. Hegazy, "Values and Attitudes Expressed in Egyptian Primary School Readers: A Comparative Study of the Pre-1952 and the 1970 Readers" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1980), 118.

<sup>14</sup> Gabriel Piterberg, "The Tropes of Stagnation and Awakening in Nationalist Historical Consciousness: The Egyptian Case," in *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, ed. James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 58.

<sup>15</sup> Suleiman, "Role of Education," 81.

<sup>16</sup> Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work*, 78.

<sup>17</sup> See Muhammad al-Qaymari, Abbas al-Kurd and Abd al-Muhaysin Ja bir, *Tarikh al-Arab: Min al-'Abd al-Uthmani bata al-Waqf al-Hadhr* (Amman: Matb'at Dar al-Aytam al-Islamiyah al-Sina'yah bi al-Quds, 1959), 46.

<sup>18</sup> Muhammad Aza Druza, *Durus al-Tarikh al-Arabi min Aqdam al-Azmanah ila Alan* (Damascus: al-Maktabah al-Wataniyah al-'Arabiyyah bi Haifa, 1934), 322, 330-331, and 337.

<sup>19</sup> Abd al-Ra'uf Hamza and Hussein Yusif al-Habab, *Yaqtha al-Arab* (Jerusalem: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, n.d.), 54-55.

<sup>20</sup> Druza, *Durus al-Tarikh*, 330-331.

<sup>21</sup> Terms taken from Shryock, *Nationalism and Genealogical Imagination*, 65. The rest of the citations from this book will appear in parentheses within the text.

<sup>22</sup> For examples of all the statements in this paragraph, see Saif al-Din Zaid al-Kaylani and Abbas Ahmad al-Kurd, *Al-Mujtama' al-Urduni* (Amman: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1964), 6-12.

<sup>23</sup> See al-Kaylani and al-Kurd, *Al-Mujtama' al-Urduni*, 14-15, for a description of the family as the basic structure making up human society.

<sup>24</sup> Al-Kaylani and al-Kurd, *Al-Mujtama' al-Urduni*, 83.

<sup>25</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 108.

<sup>26</sup> Husni Aiyish, Watfa al-Jabi and Yusif Jum'ah, *Al-Tarikh al-Arabi al-Hadith wa al-Mu'asir* (Amman: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1971), 92. This text is a sixth-grade reader.

<sup>27</sup> Druza, *Durus al-Tarikh*, 337-38.

<sup>28</sup> *Al-Qathiyab al-Filistiniyah*, by Thuqan al-Hindawi, Third Secondary Level (Amman: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1964), 21.

<sup>29</sup> See Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 69-71, and Aiyish, al-Jabi, and Jum'ah, *Al-Tarikh al-Arabi*, 68-69, as examples.

<sup>30</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 71.

<sup>31</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 70-71.

<sup>32</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 75.

<sup>33</sup> See Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 76.

<sup>34</sup> Mustafa Murad al-Dabagh, *Tarikh al-Filastin* (Amman: Matb'at al-Istiqlal, 1956), 72. This sixth-grade reader was commissioned by Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah.

<sup>35</sup> Al-Hindawi, *Al-Qathiyab al-Filistiniyah*, 26.

<sup>36</sup> Al-Hindawi, *Al-Qathiyab al-Filistiniyah*, 27.

<sup>37</sup> Aiyish, al-Jabi, and Jum'ah, *Al-Tarikh*, 65.

<sup>38</sup> Said al-Dura', Abdul-Rahim Mur'ib, Sadiq Uda, and Abdul-Bari al-Sheikh Dura', *Tarikh al-Arabi al-Hadith* (Amman: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1969), 128. This is a text for the third secondary level.

<sup>39</sup> Mary C. Wilson, "The Hashemites, The Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeve S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 209.

<sup>40</sup> Wilson, "Hashemites," 214.

<sup>41</sup> George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia: JB. Lippincott, 1939), 152.

<sup>42</sup> See al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 106-107.

<sup>43</sup> Al-Dura', Mur'ib, Uda, and Dura', *Tarikh al-Arabi*, 146.

<sup>44</sup> See Al-Dura', Mur'ib, Uda, and Dura', *Tarikh al-Arabi*, 147.

<sup>45</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 108.

<sup>46</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 109.

<sup>47</sup> Said Dura', Abdul-Rahim Mur'ib, Sadiq Uda, and Abd al-Bari al-Sheikh Dura', *Al-Tarikh al-Arabi al-Hadith* (Amman: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa

al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1975), 175.

<sup>48</sup> Aiyish, al-Jabi, and Jum'ah, *Al-Tarikh*, 98.

<sup>49</sup> Aiyish, al-Jabi, and Jum'ah, *Al-Tarikh*, 100.

<sup>50</sup> See Dura', Mur'ib, Uda, and Dura', *Tarikh al-Arabi*, 174.

<sup>51</sup> Al-Kaylani and al-Kurd, *Al-Mujtama' al-Urduni*, 133.

<sup>52</sup> Al-Kaylani and al-Kurd, *Al-Mujtama' al-Urduni*, 137-139.

<sup>53</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 109.

<sup>54</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 110.

<sup>55</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 113.

<sup>56</sup> Al-Hijawi, al-Khayat, and Uthman, *Tarikhna al-Hadith*, 114.

<sup>57</sup> Wasfi Ghahnawi, Said Dura', Said al-Sabagh, and Husni Fariz, *Al-Watan al-Arabi* (Amman: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, n.d.), 23. This is a text for the fourth elementary level.

<sup>58</sup> Akram Said al-Alami, *Watanuna al-Arabi al-Kabir* (Jerusalem: Wizarat al-Tarbiyah wa al-Talim al-Urduniyah, 1965), 30. This is a text for the fifth elementary level.

<sup>59</sup> Shryock, *Nationalism and Genealogical Imagination*, 304 and 305. Further citations for this book appear in parentheses in the text.

<sup>60</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, "Introduction: Narrating the Nation," in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 1.

<sup>61</sup> I am grateful to Gregory Starrett for reading a draft of this paper and recommending that I rewrite my conclusion to include a better analysis of the lessons the Jordanian textbooks provide for the writing of a national narrative.