

# Digging in the Gold Mine: The Mayibuye Centre Archive as a Source on the History of the South African Liberation Movement

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The history of the South African liberation movement will no doubt be a fascinating subject for researchers for many years to come. The interest which both academics and the general public have shown in the books and articles on the subject speaks for itself. Unfortunately, however, their authors often fail to refer to credible sources when describing the complicated and controversial episodes of the recent history.

In this respect the book of Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba [pseudonym] is notable. It was the first work specifically devoted to the history of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies “in exile” and therefore attracted a lot of attention. However, it can hardly satisfy those who care about historical accuracy. In the introduction the authors write that Sechaba “is himself a source.” They claim; “Much of what we have written about events in exile since the late 1970s is the result of things he did, heard and saw himself.” Moreover, they asked “the reader’s indulgence for the fact that, contrary to academic convention, there are few footnotes.”<sup>1</sup>

But apart from a serious distortion of the events of that very period, Ellis and Sechaba took for themselves an “indulgence” over the lack of footnotes concerning previous decades as well. And in those few cases, where references are provided, they are frequently unreliable. Though admitting the dubious nature of the information supplied by spies and defectors, they did not hesitate to quote an “undercover policeman” named Gerard Ludi who claimed that the Freedom Charter had been “sent to the Moscow Africa Institute for approval.”<sup>2</sup> As a staff member of that Institute I perhaps should be proud of its association with such an important historical document. Nevertheless I have to confess that the Institute had nothing to do with it: the decision to establish the Institute was taken in June 1959, exactly four years after the Freedom Charter was adopted.

Ellis and Sechaba again quote Ludi, who claimed that John (“Uncle J. B.”) Marks and Joe Slovo had been “sent

by the Party to Moscow to organize supplies for the new army.”<sup>3</sup> But Oliver Tambo, who headed the ANC External Mission, discussed supplies and training of Umkhonto cadres in Moscow in early April 1963 — before Marks and Slovo left South Africa.

Ellis and Sechaba used Tom Lodge’s (unfortunate) reference to the allegation by “Umkhonto defectors” that “dissenters” had been sent to Zimbabwe in 1967 “on a suicide mission”<sup>4</sup> to create a story about an attempt to get rid of Chris Hani. Ellis and Sechaba claim that after Hani had taken “the leading role in writing the memorandum” criticizing the ANC leadership, “the mutineers were to participate in the (Rhodesian) campaign.”<sup>5</sup> However in reality “Chris’s memorandum” was drafted almost two years later, after the failure of the operations in Zimbabwe, and the lack of concern about the fighters who had been imprisoned or were missing was one of their complaints.<sup>6</sup>

These examples (and there are others) demonstrate the necessity for any serious academic to spend time “digging” in archives. Fortunately, in spite of their limitations and difficulties, the South African academic institutions are collecting extremely valuable materials on the history of the anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa. The Archive of the Mayibuye Centre for History and Culture in South Africa occupies an outstanding place among them.

In its six years of existence as an autonomous body at the University of the Western Cape, the Centre became famous for its contribution to the process of “Mayibuye” — of returning South Africa’s history and culture to its people. It has accomplished this through the organization of conferences and exhibitions and through the production of books and videos. But its archival work is less well known.

The materials accumulated in the Mayibuye Centre Archive can be divided into three categories: collections of newspaper clippings and other materials; documents of foreign anti-apartheid and solidarity movements; and, most importantly, the documents of the ANC and the South Afri-

can Communist Party (SACP) and the personal collections of participants in the liberation struggle. In addition, the Mayibuye Centre houses oral history collections which contain hundreds of interviews, most of them transcribed and printed.

The volume of the collections requires many years and even decades of “digging in the mine,” so I have no intention whatsoever to claim a profound knowledge of them. Nevertheless, while working on my script of the history of the South African liberation movement for almost three years,<sup>7</sup> I had an opportunity to get acquainted with four collections at the Mayibuye Centre Archive: Yusuf Dadoo’s, Brian Bunting’s, ANC Lusaka and ANC London. This acquaintance, however limited, helped me to find answers to many difficult questions about modern South African history.

One of the problems which used to cause arguments (and is still causing them) concerns the time and actual circumstances of the decision “to use violence,” to turn to an armed form of struggle against the apartheid regime. In my opinion this problem deserves special attention but even preliminary conclusions, based on the study of the Archive materials, allow a revision of previously held views. Tom Lodge, for example, claims that the SACP “resolved itself in favor of economic sabotage to precede a guerilla war” at its December 1960 conference.<sup>8</sup> The SACP’s internal Bulletin No. 2, available in the Mayibuye Centre Archive, described a more complex picture. The SACP at that time was concerned “not only with slogans, but also with tasks and methods of the struggle. We must consider when the armed counter-revolution can be effectively opposed by passive resistance.”<sup>9</sup>

The SACP Conference approved a special resolution “On forms of struggle.” It spoke about the probability of “a violent peoples [sic] struggle” against “military counter-revolution”: “While the people seek peaceful solutions to their problems at all times where such solutions exists, we would be betraying our duty to the people if we do not warn of the prospect of violent clash, and prepare the people for the use of force against armed counter-revolution.” It recognized that “the use of organized armed forces against the State, directed by the leading organizations of the people, is a part of the tactics of the revolutionary struggle, and is a necessary complement of the mass political agitation in such situations as that now developing in South Africa.”<sup>10</sup> At the same time the Conference strongly opposed “acts of violence and terror” undertaken as “individual acts of protest against society” as dangerous. These could bring “heavy retaliation by the authorities” and “serve to divide the people and to undermine the confidence of the masses in their political organisations and leaders.”<sup>11</sup>

The approach of the SACP leadership was still very cautious: “...we must remind ourselves that just as the possibility of peace can disarm us in the international field if we are not vigilant, so too illusions about the inevitability of non-violence can disarm us in the local struggle.”<sup>12</sup>

The Mayibuye Centre Archive also contains correspondence between the underground structures inside South Africa and the ANC External Mission, in particular, Oliver

Tambo, in the early 1960s. It proves the fact that even after the disaster in Rivonia “the second echelon,” that is the second High Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe, continued actively operating inside the country. Thus, the ANC in London was informed on July 1, 1964 that £1,400 sterling was needed by the ANC and Umkhonto “to help it going”: approximately £250 for the ANC families, £250 for the “MK wages, equipment etc., the balance on ANC propaganda and wages.”<sup>13</sup>

The interviews conducted by Brian and Sonia Bunting in preparation for Bunting’s political biography of Moses Kotane are a valuable source on ANC history both in the earlier period and in exile. This is first-hand information on the relationship between the ANC and the SACP leadership in exile and on the problems of reconstructing both organizations in exile and of reestablishing their international contacts.

The Archive materials suggest, for example, that the SACP was not in a hurry to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute and supported Oliver Tambo’s efforts to keep the ANC non-committal. Ellis and Sechaba wrote: “The South African Communist Party, still led by Kotane, its General Secretary, and dominated by the generation of members who, like him, had been trained in Moscow in the 1930s, strongly supported the Soviet line... As soon as the Sino-Soviet split became irrevocable, the South African Communist Party used all its influence to persuade its allies to side with Moscow.”<sup>14</sup>

Firstly, apart from Kotane, John Marks was the only person in the SACP who “had been trained in Moscow in the 1930s.” But, what is more important, the real situation was rather far from the picture painted by Ellis and Sechaba. “I recall he (SACP General Secretary Moses Kotane) addressed our cadres in Kongwa (an ANC camp opened in Tanzania in 1964) at one time,” Oliver Tambo said. “It was over the Sino-Soviet dispute that was being debated there and developed into conflicts and we were to visit the camp and he addressed himself to this question and he was saying, very correctly, that this camp was the ANC camp and everybody belonged together there...”<sup>15</sup>

Another document which also illuminates the relations between the USSR and China concerns the trip of the subsequent SACP General Secretary, Moses Mabhida, to Moscow in November 1982. The trip became public because it coincided with Leonid Brezhnev’s funeral, which Mabhida (as well as Oliver Tambo) attended. But originally the main purpose of the visit was confidential consultations with Soviet experts and officials on China. At that stage, Beijing had approached the SACP in an attempt to improve relations. Mabhida’s report was discussed at the Secretariat and then at the Politbureau of the SACP (both those organs were in Maputo those days). “G.S. (General Secretary) reported on consultations with CPSU...CPSU of the opinion that we should be cautious but should not reject the overtures [by the Chinese],” it was noted.<sup>16</sup> Hence, the document clearly shows that the Soviets did not dictate their position to South Africans and did not try to prevent the development of relations between the SACP and Communist Party of China.

The Archive materials help to gain insight into the problems faced by the ANC before and immediately after its Consultative Conference at Morogoro in 1969, including the methods of its preparation and conduct. The decision to convene the conference was taken by the ANC National Executive Committee on February 14, 1969. In a short time the Preparatory Committee, of which Alfred Nzo was Secretary, "received 53 documents, of which 19 were the result of discussions at meetings of units of the movement and 34 were individual contributions." More were still coming.<sup>17</sup> This was stimulated by a special "Directive on the nature of the forthcoming conference," signed by Oliver Tambo and sent to the ANC units: "The conference differs from previous consultations not only in size, which will be swelled by the vastly increased youth contingent drawn mainly from the Army and students, but also in the large-scale pre-conference discussions now taking place at all level; in all our centres...[t]he Pre-conference discussions, criticism and recommendations are therefore vital for the success of the conference."<sup>18</sup> Very precious are notes made by Yusuf Dadoo at the conference, available in his collection. Fortunately, his handwriting is rather familiar to me, undoubtedly the typed transcriptions of at least some of them would help future researchers.

The material in the Mayibuye Centre Archive helps to understand the complexity of the relationships between the ANC and the "host" African countries. It is well known that the Morogoro Conference's plans to concentrate activities inside South Africa were damaged by the change to the worse in Tanzania's attitude to the ANC. However, the events which followed are often wrongly interpreted. Ellis and Sechaba described how in 1970 "a furious Nyerere promptly ordered the ANC out of his country. The leadership decamped to Moscow, from where, after a brief sojourn, the ANC moved its headquarters to Lusaka in Zambia."<sup>19</sup> They did not explain what happened to the ANC membership and the Umkhonto cadres.

The Archive materials are much more precise: "In July 1969 our headquarters received a notice requiring that the ANC vacate its military cadre form the Kongwa Camp within a period of 14 days. The reasons given for this unprecedented notice were that our cadres in Kongwa had stayed so long that they had now become a security risk to the country (Tanzania)." If the ANC were unable to infiltrate them into South Africa (in a fortnight!) the Umkhonto soldiers would be sent to the refugee camp. "In other words this meant the liquidation of Umkhonto we Sizwe."<sup>20</sup> According to the report Umkhonto fighters were sent for "refresher courses," after which they "were able to obtain permission [to] return to Kongwa."

Indeed, though deeply offended, the ANC leadership did their best to restore friendly relations with Dar es Salaam, though some "angry men" in the ANC "demanded that we should take a 'revolutionary' step of expressing our difficulties with Tanzanian Government to the OAU and the outside world."<sup>21</sup>

However, at least one country in the "outside world" had to be involved. In a version of his report at the ANC Consultative Conference in 1985 in Kabwe (Zambia),

Oliver Tambo was more straightforward: "In 1969 as a result of complications that our movement faced in this region, we had to evacuate our army [most of it] to the Soviet Union at the very short notice."<sup>22</sup>

So, contrary to Ellis and Sechaba, there was no "decamping" of the ANC leadership to Moscow, but the bulk of the Umkhonto cadres had to be sent to the Soviet Union. As to the ANC Headquarters it could not be moved "from there" to Zambia for a simple reason that it had never been in the USSR.

A lot of documents contain evidence of versatile activity by the SACP leadership in exile. This is especially important for writing an accurate history because the degree of secrecy in the party was extremely high. Such documents as the "Report of the work of the delegation of the SACP to the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969" and the "Meeting of the [SACP] delegation, April 6, 1969" (ANC London Collection), as well as the "List of members of delegations of Communist and Workers Parties, taking part in the work of the meeting" (Yusuf Dadoo's Collection), help to illuminate the composition of the top Party leadership, the Party's political stand and its relations with the Communist parties in the Soviet Union and other countries. The very fact that the first two documents were found in the ANC collection shows the closeness of the relationship between the two organizations.

Even more fascinating are documents concerning the ANC-SACP relationship, especially the discussions which took place immediately after the Morogoro Conference at the SACP's request. In Joe Slovo's words, this was "the first formal meeting ever to take place between two organizations which walked with hands clasp[ed] together for many years." He notes "the simultaneous decision by both leaderships to chart the new way — the way of armed struggle," that is, about joint establishment of Umkhonto.<sup>23</sup>

Slovo underlined the impact of the two organizations on each other, in particular of the ANC on the SACP: "There was more than one occasion when the views, mood and arguments of ANC leaders radically influenced the formulation of Party policy and the other way as well." "...we have all been 'captured' by the ANC and it is right that this should be so. Only the vulgar or those who wish to make mischief see in our collaboration a white-anting [sic] process. They cannot understand how two political parties can work so closely together without stabbing each other in the back."<sup>24</sup> This gains added weight from the fact that Slovo was saying it not at a public rally but at a confidential meeting.

Recognizing the "many objective difficulties" which the ANC faced in Africa in those days, Slovo admitted: "...at this stage an open association between the two bodies would be exploited by our enemies at a time when we are vulnerable and when so much depends upon the courtesy of not-so-advanced friends. This is why we are not talking of the creation of any sort of public alliance." Slovo proposed, however, that the leaders of the SACP and the ANC "as two collectives" should "regularly discuss and consult on all the fundamental problems."

The second question raised by Slovo was even more complicated and controversial. He informed the ANC delegation that the SACP “also suffered from the disease of exile” and that “major difficulties have stemmed from our failure to maintain adequate contact with our members scattered in so many parts of the world.”<sup>25</sup> Slovo thought that “the almost complete isolation of individual members from the Party collective has weakened the movement as a whole” and was eager “to reestablish some form of organized contact” between the Party leadership and its members wherever they might be, ensuring at the same time, that “nothing must be done in such a way that it can be exploited by the enemy or the wedge-driver.” The SACP was ready to “be very much influenced” in its methods by the ANC’s views.<sup>26</sup>

Oliver Tambo gave his assessment of the SACP, which to a large extent is valid today as well. Underlining that the leading members of the Party were also leading members of the ANC (“And from my experience you could not have asked for more loyalty”) he explained that fact by “the special character of the SACP which in many respect is also unique. It has shown the sort of flexibility which one does not always see in other organizations claiming to be Communist. It has not stuck to narrow and orthodox ways of working. It has always paid strict regard to the realistic position during the struggle.”<sup>27</sup>

The ANC President supported the idea of “regular discussions on the common problems facing us in bringing our revolution to its successful conclusion” and expressed surprise about the difficulties the SACP leadership faced in maintaining effective contact with its members. However, he was rather cautious about the forms of those contacts: “It depends what is precisely meant...I must be frank and say that on odd occasions when the question of SACP members in the army meeting as separate groups was raised, my reaction was to express disapproval.” But he expressed his readiness to “look at the problem afresh and attempt to find some other answer.”<sup>28</sup>

After the discussion the recommendation of a small subcommittee (specially formed) was unanimously approved. The two leaderships were to maintain regular non-public contact on common problems and major policy questions and the SACP Central Committee (CC) was to appoint “two or three [SACP] members in each major centre to maintain discreet contact with the CC.” The same persons were “themselves to maintain individual contact” with all SACP members in the area.<sup>29</sup> As far as organization of the SACP units was concerned the agreement did not go very far: “Outside the army where it is possible and can be done discreetly without the sort of complications of which we are all conscious, members may meet from time to time in small groups.”<sup>30</sup>

However, practical steps in the creation of SACP organizations in various countries began after its Central Committee “augmented meeting” in 1970. The meeting in particular decided: “Where two or more members are situated in the same area, units should be created which are either in direct touch with the CC, or, where the number of units warrant it, a regional committee appointed by the

CC.”<sup>31</sup> At the same time the meeting underlined: “Experience has shown that the party can fulfil its vanguard role without ‘being at the head’ of the movement in the physical or public sense. Our leadership must rather depend on the correctness of our political line, on our ability to win non-Party comrades to supporting our line, and on our cohesiveness as an organization.”<sup>32</sup>

It was hardly accidental that such steps had been taken after Moses Kotane, the SACP General Secretary, stopped being active after a stroke suffered at the end of 1968. This very question was rather controversial in the SACP. Kotane, who headed the Party for several decades, definitely expressed some hesitation. Chris Hani, in an interview with Sonia Bunting in May 1974 (recorded in the GDR, when he was preparing for a clandestine mission into South Africa), said: “After coming out of [Botswana] prison I made a serious attempt to organize party life. I saw Moses [Kotane] was keen on preserving the cohesion of the national liberation movement. He realized there were enemies and he felt the party should never give them the excuse to destroy the good working relations between the two organizations. Because of his credentials he felt that he himself was representing the Party in the ANC and that therefore there is no need for the party itself. In a way he succeeded, he achieved the respect of OR [Oliver Tambo] and indirectly OR’s recognition of the Party is mirrored in Moses. But Moses went too far.”<sup>33</sup>

A similar opinion was expressed by Joe Slovo. He thought that in exile Kotane continued with the tactical approach to the relationship between the Party and the ANC, which he expressed earlier, resisting the public emergence of the SACP inside South Africa: “...the sort of desire not to embarrass the ANC under very difficult conditions, it is true, but at the same time this overriding desire to maintain the cohesion and unity of the national movement, his conduct in furtherance of that approach, furtherance of that tactic objectively speaking presented, at that period, a very big danger to the historical survival of the Party.” Inside South Africa, even before the Communist party emerged publicly, it had (up to mid-1960s) “organized collectives” both “at the top and down below.” In exile the situation was very different, and Kotane’s opposition to “the creation of organized party units in the difficult conditions of Africa... created a danger of the disappearance of the party as an organized political entity altogether.”<sup>34</sup>

However, Kotane’s position was appreciated by Oliver Tambo: “...there were many party people (in exile in Africa) who felt that the Party should be organized as much outside and they should function as a Party does.... He [Kotane] would not have seen the need, I didn’t see the need... We were all trying to get back to the country, we had to place ourselves in countries like Tanzania and Zambia and we have done so as ANC.”<sup>35</sup>

Judging by Oliver Tambo’s words, initially he was still worried about the new moves of the SACP leadership: “...first on the organization of the Party I receive this with a quite of reserve [sic] because I had to think in a new way, a new form of reference. I must learn to identify the people which I hated to have to do...” Nevertheless he added: “It’s

quite possible, quite possible that this was inevitable and we musn't look at the situation just for the immediate things, which had to be sacrificed in order to achieve long term objectives and in sacrificing we minimize the damage as best as we can...I say we had to start thinking in terms of ANC and party and one had stopped thinking in these terms for a whole decade. As I was saying for more than one and [a] half decades one had not thought in terms of Party and ANC although these were very different. But it was such a pleasant thing not to have to make this distinction, that I still have not taken to thinking in these terms."<sup>36</sup>

The documents, reflecting the underground activities of the ANC and SACP in South Africa and "forward areas," such as financial transactions (through Canada!) to "C. Timbisili" (Chris Hani) in Maseru (Yusuf Dadoo's Collection) and messages of Ahmed Thimol to London (ANC London Collection) deserve the special attention of researchers too.

The letter from Robben Island Prison about the differences that occurred within the High Organ there was made public by Professor André Odendaal and now is well known to historians of the South African liberation movement.<sup>37</sup> However, the Mayibuye Centre Archive contains other materials which substantially widen our knowledge about the militant spirit of the ANC leadership in prison. "We are still very solid here," wrote Nelson Mandela. "In RIP [Robben Island Prison] we are sharply divided on what actions should be taken inside the country (prison) by our members: some think that time come [sic] to act as politicians so as to improve the conditions. Some are thinking of open defiance of authorities. My own view is that all possible means of negotiation have been used and that therefore open defiance is the only way out. I personally favour this attitude, but the majority of colleagues think we should be more conscious [cautious]. The matter is still being discussed."<sup>38</sup>

Mandela was evidently worried by the actions of the "dissidents" [the "Gang of Eight"] and supported the ANC leadership's stand: "I am very impressed by Oliver's action and others. Does Oliver think I should write to Tennyson Makiwane; would this have a reuniting effect. The letter would ask Tennyson to rejoin the group and would be sent to him via Oliver."<sup>39</sup> Thus, Mandela was ready to make a personal attempt to bring "dissidents" back, but to do it through Tambo and not sideline him.

The relations which existed between the top leaders of the ANC and the SACP are well seen from Nelson Mandela's letter, sent (or rather, smuggled out by Mac Maharaj) to Yusuf Dadoo: "I think much of the days to come, the problem of adjustment, picking up old threads. It is mainly in this regard that I never really live on this island. My thoughts are ever travelling up and down the country most of the time and the Oxford Atlas, in spite of its old age, having acquired it in 1963, is one of my greatest companions. In the process I have come to know the world and my country far better than when I was free.

"But the purpose of this letter is not talk about correspondence, past memories or atlases, but to tell you that I don't forget September 5 — Dadoo's birthday — and to

wish you many happy returns; to let you know that we think of you with far more pride that words can express...we hope that you, 2 Reggies [Oliver Reginald Tambo and Reginald September] and Tony's Pa ['Rusty' Bernstein] are keeping together like quadruplets..." No doubt, Mandela meant the major components of the liberation movement, represented by these personalities. "I look forward to seeing you some day. I never forget ties of a personal nature which link you and I which may help cement the fond memories of 3 decades..."<sup>40</sup>

Another document concerning Yusuf Dadoo is very moving. It is a draft letter (apparently uncompleted) to his friends in South Africa, written on the eve of his death. Referring to rumors, spread by "police circles" that "The great coolie *vrek* [is dying]" Dadoo wrote; "These small minds taunt our people with the question of my dying, in particular the Indian people... But this should nor worry you unduly. None of us is immortal, but the cause for which we live and fight for is..."<sup>41</sup>

It will not be an exaggeration to say that an accurate history of the ANC cannot be written without knowledge of the documents of the ANC National Executive Committee and the National Working Committee. For example, the NEC meeting in January 1978 was devoted to "a complete review of every aspect and department of the movement" and decided in particular to elect Regional Political Committees, as a step towards expanding democracy in the ANC in exile. They had a task to ensure that "all members of the organization are integrated in functioning branches, and that members are actively involved in the work of the movement."<sup>42</sup>

The Archive, and particularly the ANC Lusaka Collection, is invaluable also for a proper understanding of the ANC's approaches to the political settlement in South Africa. It contains minutes of most of the meetings when these complicated and often-controversial issues were discussed. Thus, a memorandum prepared in 1987 clearly indicated that the ANC rank and file were worried and demanded an explanation from the leadership: "What is the ANC's policy with regard to negotiations? Is the leadership prepared to enter into negotiations? What has the ANC achieved in the talks with [US Secretary of State] Shultz? What are our aims and objectives in these and other such future talk?"<sup>43</sup> Hence, the decision of the ANC NEC to draft a public statement on the issue and to organize briefings for the membership, as well as for the Mass Democratic Movement, Front Line and other African States as well as socialist countries.<sup>44</sup> Many materials naturally concern the ANC's international ties, including its relations with the Front Line states, the difficulties which it faced not only in the late 1960s, as it was shown above, but, for instance, in the late 1980s as well. When, in 1988, the appeal for amnesty for the ANC members imprisoned in Botswana was rejected, Chris Hani, who himself had served a prison sentence there in 1967-1968, suggested raising with the Botswana authorities the implications of their actions. He proposed to send a delegation there "to let them know that it could embarrass them if we told the world about what happens to us in some of these African states for fighting for freedom in South

Africa, the main task of the delegation must be to secure the release of our comrades."<sup>45</sup>

The documents explain in detail the ANC leadership's approach to "withdrawal" from Angola following the agreement on the political settlement in South-Western Africa. A special NEC delegation headed by Joe Modise spent some time in Angola in December 1988, meeting the ANC cadres in ten different places of that country. It reported: "The thrust of briefing was that racists want to use our presence in Angola as an excuse. Comrades understood...the Soviet instructors were also briefed and they expressed willingness to continue serving ANC."<sup>46</sup>

Having received the Archive materials, the Mayibuye Centre staff (both permanent and visiting archivists) have already done much work in their selection and filing. Moreover, catalogues have been compiled for most of them. But this is just the beginning of the mammoth job ahead. As time passes there will be fewer and fewer participants or scholars (a combination would be the best) who can actually attribute documents (many of them bear neither title nor signature), or who can read the handwriting of the deceased leaders and activists. Even more enormous is the task of studying the documents and of putting them in a proper historical context. The documents contain many personal details, not to mention unchecked information and even rumors about both living and deceased persons. Thus, another problem which the Mayibuye Centre faces is to develop a proper protocol for the Archive — establishing rules which would be favorable to researchers, on the one hand, but prevent the abuse of the information, on the other.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile* (London: James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 6-7. According to Garth Strachan's review of this book in *African Communist*, p. 129, second quarter 1992, pp. 47-49, Sechaba's real name is Kenneth Mandla.
- <sup>2</sup> Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, p. 27.
- <sup>3</sup> Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, p. 33.
- <sup>4</sup> Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (Johannesburg, 1985), p. 300.
- <sup>5</sup> Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, p. 47.
- <sup>6</sup> Discussion with Chris Hani, Moscow, April 26, 1992. See also Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1997), pp. 28-30, 34.
- <sup>7</sup> Vladimir Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow* (Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books, 1999).
- <sup>8</sup> Lodge, *Black Politics*, p. 234.
- <sup>9</sup> *SACP Bulletin*, No. 2 (s.a.e.l.), pp. 11-12, ANC London Collection, Mayibuye Center Historical Papers Archive (MCHP).
- <sup>10</sup> *SACP Bulletin*, No. 2, p. 15.
- <sup>11</sup> *SACP Bulletin*, No. 2.
- <sup>12</sup> *SACP Bulletin*, No. 2, p. 32.
- <sup>13</sup> Unsigned letter of July 1, 1964, ANC London Collection, MCHP.
- <sup>14</sup> Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, p. 45.
- <sup>15</sup> Interview with O. Tambo, typed October 1973, Brian Bunting's Collection, MCHP.
- <sup>16</sup> Minutes of P. B. Meeting held on February 17, 1983 in Maputo, 2, Yusuf Dadoo's Collection, MCHP.
- <sup>17</sup> Report of the preparatory [committee] on the pre-conference discussion, 1, ANC London Collection, MCHP.
- <sup>18</sup> African National Congress (S.A.) Directive on the nature of the forthcoming conference, March 1969, ANC London Collection, MCHP.

<sup>19</sup> Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, p. 59.

<sup>20</sup> The report of the Secretariat covering the last two years [1971], p. 5, ANC Lusaka Collection, MCHP.

<sup>21</sup> The report of the Secretariat covering the last two years [1971], p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> African National Conference, National Consultative Conference. June 1985. Presidential Statement to the Conference, 19, ANC Lusaka Collection, MCHP.

<sup>23</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 1, Yusuf Dadoo's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>24</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 7.

<sup>27</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 9.

<sup>29</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 12.

<sup>30</sup> Notes of the discussions between a delegation from the C.C. of the S.A.C.P. and the N.E.C., p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Meeting of the SACP Central Committee, 1970, p. 13, ANC London Collection, MCHP.

<sup>32</sup> Meeting of the SACP Central Committee, 1970, pp. 14-15.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Chris Hani, Berlin, May 27, 1974, Brian Bunting's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Joe Slovo, typed October 1973, Brian Bunting's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with Oliver Tambo, typed October 1973, Brian Bunting's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Oliver Tambo.

<sup>37</sup> This refers to "Memorandum on ANC 'discord' smuggled out of Robben Island, 1975?," in Karis and Gerhart (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge*, vol. 5, pp. 406-411.

<sup>38</sup> Nelson Mandela's letter to Oliver Tambo, Yusuf Dadoo's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>39</sup> Nelson Mandela's letter to Oliver Tambo.

<sup>40</sup> Nelson Mandela's letter to Mota [Yusuf Dadoo], November 1, 1975, ANC London Collection, MCHP.

<sup>41</sup> Yusuf Dadoo's letter to his friends in South Africa, Yusuf Dadoo's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>42</sup> Report to members on recent NEC meeting held in Lusaka February 25-28, 1978, p. 8, Yusuf Dadoo's Collection, MCHP.

<sup>43</sup> Memorandum to the NWC on membership questions that need our attention, p. 1, ANC Lusaka Collection, MCHP.

<sup>44</sup> Decisions of the National Executive Committee Meeting October 5-9, 1987, pp. 1-2, ANC Lusaka Collection, MCHP.

<sup>45</sup> Minutes of the NWC Meeting June 7, 1988, p. 9, ANC Lusaka Collection, MCHP.

<sup>46</sup> Minutes of the Special Meeting of NWC held December 21, 1988, p. 3, ANC Lusaka Collection, MCHP.