

Guerrilla Warfare and the Decline of Urban Apartheid: The Shaping of a New African Middle Class and the Transformation of the African National Congress (1975-1985)

Phil Eidelberg

While a considerable amount of literature has been written about the emergence of the contemporary African middle class and its growth, particularly since the mid-1970s, not enough has been written about its impact upon the African National Congress (ANC). It is the purpose of this article to suggest how elements of this new middle class emerging in the townships away from the controls of apartheid, contributed to the reshaping of ANC policy and how, in turn, the ANC influenced the political evolution of the township middle class.

I revisit the arguments of authors such as Colin Bundy,¹ Anthony Marx² and, more recently, Roger Southall.³ These writers have traced a shift in emphasis within ANC policy of the 1970s and 1980s from nation towards class. Implicit in the interpretations of Marx and Southall, in particular, is the view that the original gulf between the ANC and the emerging independent industrial unions, comprising FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) and eventually COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) was gradually bridged — the unions became more politically militant and the ANC, more working class rather than nation-oriented.⁴ While agreeing that from 1979 the ANC did indeed change to a more class-oriented outlook, my own argument is that this class outlook was only superficially one of rapprochement with organized labor. More fundamentally, I believe it involved a much stronger identification with the aspirations of the townships and, in particular, the informal civic associations. This would both reflect and, in turn, further encourage a climate favoring the emergence, at least in the long term, of a new militant African middle class hegemony, with the relative political marginalization of organized labor.

In particular, I focus not simply on African middle class support for the ANC but, more importantly, on the role of urban guerrilla warfare, or “people’s war,” as a factor in helping transform the ANC into a movement attuned less specifically to the aspirations of organized labor than had

been the case during the previous 30 years. It was notably the ANC, among whose constituents were elements of the township middle classes, which, during the 1980s, supported urban guerrilla warfare, in contrast to the FOSATU/COSATU industrial unions. It was in fact urban guerrilla warfare, and the ANC’s emphasis on mass participation in such urban warfare, which made the post-1979 ANC increasingly more community oriented and thus by implication identified the movement with the townships. I argue that the ANC’s “community” orientation in turn gave it a social base quite different from that of the industrial unions. It was ultimately township support, including elements of the African middle classes, most notably, the civics, which would provide the ANC with its main source of strength.

The first section of this article traces the link between the decline of urban apartheid and the development of a new, more assertive, African middle class. Urban apartheid’s decline was evidenced by the growth of local township self-government, beginning with the commercial and financial concessions granted to African townships in 1975, followed by the 1977 Community Councils Act and eventually the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. It is argued that these reforms should not be seen as having been simply an effort to “co-opt” a middle class so as to use it as a bulwark against growing popular unrest. Rather, they were in fact a sign of growing loss of political control over the very class upon whose suppression apartheid had been posited.

Section two considers certain key middle class organizations and ideologies. Attention is first drawn to the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC). Focus is then placed on the parallel development of Black Consciousness, itself a radical middle-class political movement. The demise of Black Consciousness after the Soweto riots of 1976, with which it was seen to have been associated, left its members open to new political ideas. Many would join the ANC, attracted by its espousal of

guerrilla warfare. Ultimately even the more conservative NAFCOC would give its support. In turn, this infusion of middle-class elements, including the more radical civic associations helped influence the ANC's long term policies, encouraging it to identify increasingly with the interests of township middle classes and only secondarily with those of the ANC's supporters among the unorganized urban poor.

Section three describes the ANC's changing policy of guerrilla warfare during the late 1970s when apartheid began to decline. After 1979, the previous policy of external, and perforce largely rural-based guerrilla penetration, would be rapidly replaced by one of internal, largely urban insurrection, or "people's war." "People's war" would give the ANC credibility with the newly emerging radical middle-class civic associations. Conversely, involvement in township politics would influence the ANC towards an ideological outlook increasingly oriented primarily towards the township middle classes.

Intimately linked to middle class township support for the ANC was the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. Most studies see the UDF as supporting the ideals of the 1955 Freedom Charter, albeit not making such views mandatory on its membership. In section four, on the other hand, it is emphasized that the UDF did not simply popularize the Freedom Charter but in effect reinterpreted it. In contrast to the Freedom Charter's commitment to radical socioeconomic transformation, involving a frontal challenge to international capitalism, the UDF's own orientation was a more limited, political one. It was largely directed at the ANC's seizure of power at township, and ultimately at national level. By implication, this revolution would not challenge the capitalist status quo, but simply broaden the system's national political constituency, until then largely white, to include the black middle class.

Coinciding with these changes in the ANC's own identity, it will be argued in the concluding section that the ANC would identify its strategy increasingly with achieving hegemony over the urban townships, including the middle classes in particular, and only secondarily over the black population as a whole, including the ANC's own supporters among the unorganized urban poor. (In the longer run, the ANC strategy would also be encouraged by the realities of having to function within the post-1989 hegemony of international capitalism.) For their part, the larger independent industrial unions whose power bases lay in the factories rather than in the townships *per se*, would increasingly be seen largely as "external," tactical allies. This was in sharp contrast to the "internal" organic, symbiotic role which had until then been played by the previous trade union federation, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) within the traditional ANC alliance since 1955.

The Decline of Urban Apartheid and the Shaping of a New African Township Middle Class (1975-1982)

Apartheid can be defined as mid-20th century South Africa's own particular adaptation of the more conventional institution of segregation to the exigencies of maintaining control over a growing African township population, itself so in evidence by the late 1940s. Apartheid was distinguished by its system of "homelands" or "Bantustans" —

supposedly politically autonomous or independent states, each with its own apparent ethnic identity. After 1948, these were being created from the "reserves," or segregated land in the countryside, set apart earlier for Africans. In turn, all Africans, including in particular those domiciled in the townships of South Africa "proper" (outside the homelands), would automatically be obliged, at least legally, to belong to one or other of these homelands, depending on the individual's own ethnic, or "tribal" origins, or those ascribed to him or her. The policy was formalized by the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970.⁵ This was not meant to herald a massive wholesale expulsion of Africans to the Bantustans, but rather to increase controls over the townships by using the threat of possible expulsion as leverage, in exchange for political conformity. The position of urban Africans was thus intended to become one of suffering rather than one of rights.⁶ Homelands would in effect become dumping grounds not only for the unemployed but also for the politically disaffected.⁷

Apartheid thus served as a form of political and administrative control over vitally needed urban and rural labor. By subjecting the townships to Bantu Affairs Administration Boards⁸ (BAABs), as well as indirectly to the homelands, the South African state could control the township inhabitants, and the African middle class in particular, in such a way as to prevent the spread among them of any political radicalization. Notably, the activities and influence of the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP) were banned.⁹

The townships were controlled not only administratively and politically but economically as well. It was obvious that were the townships to grow economically to any significant degree, they would thereby gain political influence as well. This would mean either that they would seek to cut their political ties to the economically stagnant homelands or else seek to dominate these same homelands. Either course would of course *ipso facto* undermine the very rationale of apartheid. For this policy to succeed, of course, the growth of the African middle classes in the townships had to be discouraged as well. This involved numerous trading restrictions and, in particular, denial of meaningful access to credit. On the other hand, small scale African business in the homelands was encouraged.¹⁰ During apartheid's heyday, prior to the late 1970s, there was almost no rich "bourgeois" class in the townships. Rather, the African middle class could be more appropriately termed lower middle class or "petty bourgeois": in particular teachers, ministers of religion, nurses and civil servants, as well as clerks in private industry, small scale traders, taxi owners and independent artisans.¹¹ Much of this has been termed "bazaar capitalism."¹²

The official apartheid policy towards the township middle class appears to have begun to change from 1975. Firstly, Africans were allowed to obtain 30-year leaseholds on stands in townships.¹³ Secondly, urban Africans were now allowed to form business partnerships. Thirdly, NAFCOC was permitted to set up, in partnership with white capital, an African Bank. The bank, in turn, was authorized to establish branches in urban areas, with its head office in

the center of Johannesburg, in contravention of the Group Areas Act, which mandated urban segregation. Until then, the only source of finance for African entrepreneurs had been the state-owned Bantu Investment Corporation, set up in 1959 to assist homeland entrepreneurs. From now on township inhabitants, including township entrepreneurs, in particular, could benefit from financial backing.¹⁴ The government stipulated that the African Bank had to open a branch in the homelands for every urban branch it opened.¹⁵ Yet this did not vitiate the fact that the very measures of opening up the possibility of township economic expansion in itself posed a threat to homeland hegemony over the township population, at least in the longer run.

Although these reforms occurred prior to the 1976 Soweto revolt, it is probable that the revolt lent itself to the justification of further reforms, thereby serving as a powerful and dramatic catalyst. The granting of 30-year leaseholds was followed in 1978 by the granting of 99-year leaseholds. In contrast to their 30-year predecessors, the 99-year leaseholds could often be treated in practice as freeholds in the sense that they were used as security for mortgages from building societies. This reduced their would be purchasers' dependence upon the BAABs which for 30-year leases had been their sole source of loans. Moreover, whereas the 30-year leases could be cancelled if owners became unemployed for a continuous period or lost their rights of residence, no such limitations existed under the new dispensation.¹⁶ Such a reform could only further secure the position of the emerging African middle class.

This new policy of township stabilization in turn was accompanied and further consolidated by the beginnings, however modest, of township autonomy. The Community Councils Act of 1977 for the first time gave African townships a certain amount of self-government, even though they were subordinated to the white Minister of Cooperation and Development who could grant and withdraw powers at will.¹⁷ The Councils provided housing, both for migrant laborers as well as for more permanent residents, allocated trading sites and provided essential township services such as the provision of water, refuse and sewerage removal and road maintenance.¹⁸ By providing housing as well as preventing illegal occupation and building of dwelling ("squatting"), moreover, the Councils also became involved in enforcing influx control of Africans trying to migrate from the homelands into the townships.¹⁹ In fact, Community Councils, while entrusted with influx controls, did so often with reservations.²⁰ After all, they represented not only permanent residents but also migrant laborers having also been denied permanent residence under influx control and therefore domiciled in hostels. Both categories were entitled to vote in most council elections.²¹ Thus this very concept of township municipal rights, however partial and incomplete, challenged the homelands' ultimate sovereignty over urban Africans,²² and thus, implicitly, over the urban African middle class.

The powers and influence of the township middle class were further increased with the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. Community Councils were often upgraded to Town Councils and these became independent of ministerial

intervention, thereby, acquiring the same legal status as white municipalities.²³ Like white municipalities, these Town Councils, in contrast to their predecessors, could also own immovable property.²⁴ However, in contrast, ordinary township inhabitants were still deprived of such a right.²⁵

Community and Town Councils have been described as essentially supporting the apartheid *status quo* by lacking sufficient power, as well as a realistic tax base, and in general being a poor substitute for full participation in the national representative system.²⁶ Yet such criticisms beg the question: was their lack of democracy indeed tantamount to being "Bantustan governments writ small"²⁷ and "an extension of apartheid through black faces"²⁸? Like the 30-year and 99-year leases and the establishment of an African Bank, Councils served to help build up a new African middle class, the very class whose expansion apartheid had most obviously acted against. For example, getting elected as councilors was seen by African businesspeople as crucial so as to exert control over the allocation of trading sites, as well as facilitating lobbying in higher government circles for further politico-economic concessions.²⁹ Viewed in this light, the reforms of 1975-1982 were helping the growth of a new middle class, committed to eroding apartheid, albeit also without obtaining meaningful broader democratic rights for the masses. Thus, although the African middle class of the late 1970s and early 1980s has been seen as being able to "grow in both size and power within the parameters of apartheid,"³⁰ its commitment to capitalism in fact served as a spur to abolish the apartheid system. The "co-option" label was applicable rather to the homeland middle class, itself by definition committed to apartheid.

Two Roads to Political Radicalism: The National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and the Soweto Civics Association

During the 1970s and 1980s, the largest and best-known African business organization was NAFCO, whose president since 1968 was S. M. Motsuenyane.³¹ Until the mid-1980s, it would be closely linked to the Nationalist government, if only because it represented African businesspeople not only in the townships but also in the homelands. The government, in fact, appears to have treated NAFCO as the *de facto* official representative of African business interests.³² By the mid-1980s, however, NAFCO would begin seriously to affiliate itself with the ANC.

Originally known as the National African Chamber of Commerce, under government pressure the organization changed its name to NAFCO in 1969. While it still retained the name "National," it added the term "Federated," thereby implicitly recognizing that some of its constituent associations would be the homelands themselves.³³ Yet this concession was one of political expediency and in the long run, the "national" aspect would reemerge, particularly from 1975 when government policy towards the homelands began to change in the interest of economic expediency.

To NAFCO, close association with the homelands was desirable not simply to appease the government politically but in the longer run, in order to develop, and thereby dominate, the homelands economically in pursuit of NAFCO's own national ambitions. Conversely, NAFCO

opposed the homeland-oriented Bantu Investment Corporation, established in 1959, which it saw as an ally of homeland as opposed to township economic interests.³⁴ Rather than being “co-opted” by apartheid, NAFCO’s attitude towards the homelands anticipated, on a far broader scale, the government’s own changing attitude. From 1979, Pretoria would begin officially to support policies of integrating homelands into the broader national economy via so-called “development regions,” even at the risk of thereby reducing the bantustans’ political and economic autonomy.³⁵

The middle class members of an organization such as NAFCO saw themselves not simply as entrepreneurs but as community leaders. They were in a sense self-appointed representatives of the townships as a whole, and models to which the township poor could aspire.³⁶ What was evident was the “desire and necessity for the emergent capitalist stratum to mobilize the financial resources of the entire black community and to use it for its own advantage.”³⁷ Implicitly this suggests that they would oppose trade union organizations, not simply on wage issues but as potential political rivals for hegemony over the township inhabitants. From seeing themselves as township leaders, it would be only another step to seeing the township as representing the African nation itself. In the longer run, by the 1980s, this would make nationalist movements such as the ANC increasingly appealing to the African middle class.

NAFCO’s nationalist penchant reflected itself also in its concept of relations with white commercial interests. On the one hand, NAFCO businesspeople depended on white capital both for investment and for managerial skills, particularly in the financial, manufacturing and construction worlds. On the other hand, this was to be limited to African enterprises in the white central business districts. NAFCO’s members opposed unrestricted penetration of white financial investments both in the homelands and in the townships, areas in which NAFCO felt its own interests should enjoy priority. Moreover, African/white partnerships were allowed only provided Africans held a controlling, majority share. In the retail and wholesale sectors, where African business was more established and white support thus less essential, NAFCO opposed any partnerships outright, fearing the white partners’ superior managerial skills and contacts.³⁸

NAFCO’s strategy transcended its struggle against simply the economic and legal limitations of apartheid. Beyond the legal obstacles which, from 1975, were rapidly being dismantled, were the structural ones inherent in the capitalist system itself. Eager to support a nonracial, capitalist system, NAFCO, as its name implied, wanted to join the system, but on its own terms, so as to counterbalance the advantages of the white establishment in terms of capital, technical expertise and size.³⁹ In this sense, its policies would anticipate the policies of “affirmative action” and “black empowerment” condoned by the post-1994 ANC government.

Ultimately, NAFCO would begin to seek closer relations with the ANC, particularly from about 1985, while distancing itself from its traditional policy of participating in community councils.⁴⁰ This, however, was not simply as

a result of pressure from recent township unrest in which the ANC was intimately involved.⁴¹ More fundamentally, as I shall subsequently argue in greater detail, this would be greatly facilitated by the ANC’s own newly emerging tolerance of neo-liberal capitalist tenets, as well as its increasing identification with the aspirations of the township middle classes.

At the same time, NAFCO’s ideological outlook was not shared by all of the township middle class. Of the organizations challenging NAFCO’s support of councils⁴² the best known and perhaps the most influential would be the so-called Committee of Ten. It was formed in 1977 and was a precursor of the Soweto Civics Association. In particular, the Committee of Ten opposed community council elections because they were not part of a more general, unitary state with the franchise open to all South African inhabitants.⁴³ According to the chairman of the Committee of Ten, Nthato Motlana, the aim was to gain a certain measure of control over Soweto with the intention of eventually using this to spearhead a nation-wide political movement.⁴⁴ This is in fact what would be happening by 1983, with the nation-wide political movement in this case being the UDF, closely associated with the ANC.

Motlana, originally a medical doctor, but also a businessperson, fully supported capitalism and, in particular, the African middle class.⁴⁵ He does not seem to have been particularly favorably disposed to the South African Communist Party (SACP) or towards left-wing intellectuals associated with the independent trade union movement.⁴⁶ At the same time, he was an anomaly. By the late 1970s he was relatively well to do, and thus hardly typical of the lower-ranking professionals and small-scale traders that characterized the African middle class at that time. If anything, in his relatively affluent circumstances, he would, in retrospect, foreshadow the new African bourgeoisie of the 1980s and, particularly, the 1990s. His links with the relatively non-business, more professionally oriented Committee of Ten suggests that it may have been his medical background rather than his business connections, which originally made him acceptable to this political organization. In turn, the Committee’s own middle class and largely professional orientation made it responsive to the main radical African ideological movement of the 1970s, Black Consciousness.⁴⁷

Black Consciousness appealed largely to the townships, rather than the countryside. Its best known organizations (before their banning in 1977), the South African Students Organization and the Black Peoples Convention, consisted especially of university students and lower-ranking professionals, including school teachers, nurses, ministers of religion and civil servants.⁴⁸ Reflecting the views of its township middle class constituency, Black Consciousness opposed homeland domination of the townships, going so far, in contrast to NAFCO, of even eschewing any contact with the homeland ruling establishment.⁴⁹ At the same time, Black Consciousness supported some form of modified capitalism, favorable to the African middle class, *pari passu* with the nationalization of white big business, notably the expropriation of large farms and the nationalization of banks and mining conglomerates.⁵⁰ Ties with organized

labor were weak and the labor arm of the movement, the Black Allied Workers Union, was relatively ineffective and marginal to the movement.⁵¹

By 1979, the Committee of Ten had evolved into the executive committee of the Soweto Civic Association. The Association had been founded at least in part to coordinate mass protest against rent increases announced by the Soweto Urban Council.⁵² Like its predecessor, the larger Soweto Civic Association, and township civics in general, it appeared to have had a largely middle class, professional and white-collar membership. It had little active support from organized labor, shack dwellers or migrant workers, which was again much on the pattern of the original Committee of Ten, but with a broader popular base among the rank and file members.⁵³ According to one source, "civics were seen as representing the 'community,' which in practice meant the stronger, more articulate and educated, less cautious township residents."⁵⁴

At the same time, the civics represented the only organized power base within the townships, outside of NAFCOC. NAFCOC appealed to a more limited audience of largely small entrepreneurs, an increasing number of whom were no longer necessarily located within the townships. The newly developing independent unions, for their part, were at a disadvantage in the sense that their membership was more heterogeneous and their places of congregation dispersed throughout South Africa, according to wherever a given place of industrial employment, whether a factory or a mine, might be. Moreover the civics, although middle class oriented, could also appeal to a broader constituency, including the poor. In contrast to the unions, whose immediate demands were perforce of interest first of all to their members, the civics appealed to broader township interests through demands such as more housing and rent control. While many of the poor were either not able or not necessarily interested to join trade unions, all of them could hope for the possibility, however uncertain, of decent housing and rent control. Furthermore, the more nationalistic demands of the civics, transcending immediate material interests, held a less tangible but therefore more universal appeal. Even later on, when the unions would become more oriented towards township and broader political issues, their trade union core identity would continue to handicap whatever relevance they might have to the broader urban masses.

Eventually, the Soweto Civic Association would abandon Black Consciousness and, like other civics, give its support to the ANC and to the legal UDF.⁵⁵ Whereas the segregationist attitude of Black Consciousness made sense, if only as a reaction to apartheid, this same attitude would cease to be functional with apartheid's steady and relatively rapid decay after 1975. To the township middle classes, the ANC potentially held certain key advantages over Black Consciousness. In contrast to Black Consciousness, the ANC, although also committed to African nationalism, encouraged contacts between Africans and whites. This was crucial for the civics, which had constantly to negotiate with the white power structure, including liberal white opposition groups.⁵⁶

Moreover, contact with whites was advantageous not only for political and commercial reasons, but also in order to obtain weapons against the Pretoria regime. The ANC had close ties, from late 1961,⁵⁷ with the Soviet Bloc, which provided weapons and military training permitting the ANC to wage guerrilla warfare. After the banning of Black Consciousness organizations in 1977, many former members of the South African Student Organization fled abroad to join the ANC's military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK). Yet the ANC's guerrilla campaign appealed not only to students but also probably to the broader township population, including elements of the middle class.⁵⁸ The Soweto Civics Association generally supported the ANC's campaign of violence, including armed warfare, if only as a desirable means of pressuring radical political reform. In particular, speaking in 1980, it approved of the ANC's recent armed sabotage of the SASOL 1 fuel-from-coal storage tanks, seeing it as an effective way to force the government to begin serious political negotiations with the ANC.⁵⁹ This article will now address the role of the ANC's policy of "armed struggle" in helping to forge ties between the townships and the ANC.

The Transformation of the ANC: The Transfer of Guerrilla Warfare to the Townships and the ANC's Alliance with the Civics

The ANC's turn to guerrilla warfare in 1961 with the founding of MK is generally viewed as a sharp break from previous ANC policy. Indeed, the move was itself a reaction to the banning of the ANC a year before. As the ANC would later point out, the anti-apartheid struggles of the 1950s had hardly been peaceful, but the violence had been unorganized and limited to riots and street fights. Armed confrontation would now become an official policy with violence organized into guerrilla warfare.⁶⁰ As mentioned above, it was also from then on that the ANC would establish strong diplomatic and military ties with the Soviet Bloc. Of at least equal significance was that, following the bannings, the entire internal organization of the ANC was destroyed with the arrest of most of its leadership at Rivonia in 1963. This left only the newly formed exile organization intact.⁶¹ Already from 1961, however, irrespective of what would happen at Rivonia, it had apparently been decided to pursue primarily a guerrilla strategy whose bases would be located outside the country and whose terrain of operations would be primarily in the South African countryside.⁶² This was also in marked contrast with the primarily internally based, urban setting for the radical ANC-aligned movements of the 1950s. Not before 1979, at the earliest, with the gradual loosening of apartheid controls, would the guerrilla warfare policy change to emphasize the townships and general urban areas.

The Portuguese decolonization of Angola and Mozambique and its replacement by pro-Soviet regimes in both countries during 1974-75 is often considered as a turning point in the ANC's policy of guerrilla warfare. For the first time, it became possible to infiltrate guerrillas into South Africa with some reasonable success. MK soon obtained the use of several training camps in Angola while it also gained its first military infiltration route into South Africa

from Mozambique through Swaziland.⁶³ From 1974 too, MK began to develop urban guerrilla cells to prepare for warfare in the towns, including the black townships, and no longer just in the countryside. These seem to have been largely in the Johannesburg area.⁶⁴ However, the ANC still saw this as largely an extension of guerrilla warfare in the countryside,⁶⁵ rather than as a fundamental shift in focus to the cities.

Likewise, although the 1976 Soweto uprising appeared to challenge MK's traditional emphasis on rural guerrilla warfare, seen largely in military terms, in fact, there was no significant attempt to change strategy for at least another two years. Rather, Soweto, like the earlier Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique, was interpreted as simply increasing the opportunities of traditional guerrilla incursions by the ANC into South Africa. Urban incursions, for their part, were meant to be short term and seen primarily in military, rather than political terms.⁶⁶ Only with the decline of apartheid during the second half of the 1970s, would the ANC's fundamental outlook begin to change.

This change in policy was first announced in 1979 in a report to the ANC National Executive Committee, the so-called "Green Book," first completed in March and then officially accepted the following August.⁶⁷ Its two most obvious innovations were first shifting guerrilla warfare from its previous focus in the countryside to an urban, particularly township orientation.⁶⁸ Secondly, guerrilla warfare was from now on to be less of a purely military concept. Rather, it would become part of a broader spectrum of insurgency, including links to legal and "semi-legal" mass political organizations.⁶⁹ Appropriately, it became known as "people's war."⁷⁰

In particular, the ANC's urban strategy would orient itself towards the newly established civic associations⁷¹ which, as already mentioned, were heavily influenced by their middle-class constituents.⁷² The civics were particularly suitable as allies since they not only formed a natural opposition to the government, but also represented the most influential grass-roots organizations within the townships. The long-term significance of this new alliance should not be underestimated. Firstly, it would mean the conversion of the civics to the ANC. Even more importantly, such an alliance would entail the ANC's transformation into a movement responsive to the civics and their daily needs and problems. Like the civics, the ANC would be involved in local township community issues. Notably, both the civics and the ANC would attack local government institutions such as township community council elections.⁷³ Ultimately, this would imply the transformation of the ANC into an organization of predominantly middle class, as opposed to multi-class, orientation — the scaling down of the ANC's institutional ties, predominantly through SACTU, with sections of organized labor. These ties, for the previous quarter of a century, had been so close as to be symbiotic, forming an organic whole within the Congress Alliance.

In its efforts to gain the allegiance of the township inhabitants, the ANC used a considerable amount of armed violence, as implied in the concept of "people's war." This approach, in turn, was condoned by the ANC's legal coun-

terpart, the UDF,⁷⁴ itself representing the local civic associations. The majority of armed attacks appear to have been in the townships and the white urban central business districts.⁷⁵ Their aim was often to show political support for causes championed by the civics. For example, sabotage of a railway line in 1980 was apparently to show support for a work stay-away campaign organized by the Soweto Civic Association as protest against rent increases. Again, in May 1982, a bomb exploded at the building housing the President's Council, in which discussions were proceeding on the proposed new constitution, which sought to establish a tricameral parliament, denying representation for Africans. The bomb explosion also coincided with public criticism of the constitutional proposals on the part of the Soweto Civic Association, coupled with warnings of impending violence. More direct tactics were also used. In the wake of elections to new black local authorities held in November 1983, there were a number of petrol bomb attacks on black local government councilors.⁷⁶

Related to the concept of "people's war" was that of "people's power." It too, like people's war, was closely identified with the civics. But whereas people's war was seen in quasi-military terms, people's power, although, like people's war often carried out with violence, related particularly to the administration of the townships. Particularly in the wake of the collapse of community councils during 1985-86, township civics and "youth organizations," acting in a similar capacity (and like the civics, affiliated to the pro-ANC UDF) often took over. These provided not only local administration but also the carrying out of civil and criminal justice through "peoples' courts." In Mamelodi Township, for example, the youth organizations were set up on each street and meted out justice, including death sentences, through disciplinary committees.⁷⁷

Although the ANC's campaign of armed urban violence was never of major, let alone decisive, military significance, its political role cannot be overestimated. People's war and people's power gave the ANC credibility in the townships because it served to link it with the civics, themselves representing a new and increasingly hegemonic African middle class. At the same time, "people's war" would serve further to distinguish the ANC's identity from that of its rivals, not only Black Consciousness⁷⁸ but also the emerging FOSATU labor movement. Among the movements advocating, via universal suffrage, the eventual replacement of white rule, the ANC's advocacy of armed struggle, however modest its proportions, would increasingly bestow upon it a distinctive claim to represent a viable alternative to the regime in power.⁷⁹ This claim to a distinctive identity and, therefore, destiny would be permanent, persisting even after the unions established an informal alliance with the ANC, with the founding of COSATU at the end of 1985.

The UDF and the Reinterpretation of the Freedom Charter: From Multi-Class to Middle-Class Hegemony

The alliance between the civics and the ANC, consolidated through people's war and people's power, would eventually realize itself through the founding of the UDF in 1983. In turn, this would entail a fundamental reinterpretation of the original Freedom Charter — the basic tenets of

the ANC's ideological outlook — in the form in which these had existed between 1955 and 1979. Whereas the 1955 Freedom Charter had represented a multi-class alliance between the black middle class and black organized labor,⁸⁰ it will be argued that by 1983, the UDF was reinterpreting the Charter in a manner more appropriate to the middle class and less to the needs of organized labor.

Although the Freedom Charter has been described as non-socialist⁸¹ and as moderate on economic issues,⁸² it in fact advocated a very radical restructuring of the South African economy at the expense of large-scale white and foreign capitalist interests.⁸³ This would have meant the nationalization of these assets which would allegedly be to the benefit of not only organized labor but also of African entrepreneurs, as it would remove competition within the domestic market from domestic and multinational corporations. In turn, nationalization would imply perforce the substantial loosening of ties between South Africa and the international capitalist economy.⁸⁴ In contrast, from the 1980s the ANC's strategy of overthrowing white rule would increasingly be posited on the support of international, and perforce also national, big capitalist interests. The aim now would be to permit the increasingly beleaguered South African national economy to "reintegrate" into the international capitalist world by means of the ANC's coming to power.

At the time of its creation, particularly during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the type of society that the Freedom Charter envisaged was hardly unique. It essentially envisaged joining the so-called "non-aligned" bloc of countries, such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Ghana.⁸⁵ All such countries maintained multi-class societies, including their native bourgeoisie. In addition, they were committed to foreign policies pursuing economic independence from the international capitalist powers, most notably the United States and Britain. This, in effect, made them sympathetic to the Soviet Bloc, while continuing to maintain non-socialist, multi-class societies.⁸⁶ This was in sharp contrast to the increasingly and predominantly middle class outlook that the ANC would begin to assume during the 1980s.

ANC policy during the 1955-1979 period was marked by obvious major discontinuities taking place around 1961. In particular, these included the shift to armed struggle, with the focus outside the towns; and, to facilitate this, the establishment of close diplomatic and military links with the Soviet Union in particular. However, it can be argued that even these discontinuities were overshadowed by the Freedom Charter's decisive imprint. Notably, after 1961, the identification with Afro-Asian non-alignment, and the concomitant hostility towards American and British imperialism was maintained.⁸⁷ Given this foreign policy outlook, in existence since 1955, the more recent ties with the Soviet Union seemed only natural and to have been expected. Even the issue of guerrilla warfare was interpreted as a natural evolution of the 1950s policy. With some merit, it was argued that the Freedom Charter was revolutionary and that the ANC and its allies were carrying out this revolution in the only way possible, which was by armed struggle, given the Nationalist government's intransigent attitude.⁸⁸ It

is significant that Joe Slovo, who was appointed by the SACP in 1961 to set up the MK guerrilla organization, had himself played a key role in writing the Freedom Charter. Nelson Mandela was likewise involved in drafting the Freedom Charter,⁸⁹ and had written an authoritative commentary on the Charter shortly after its appearance.⁹⁰ He had been Slovo's ANC counterpart in helping set up MK.⁹¹ As in foreign policy and even guerrilla warfare, the ANC's internal policies after 1961 appeared to continue the path originally traced for them by the Freedom Charter and would continue to do so during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the policy of nationalization of major industries was explicitly maintained.⁹²

The ANC also continued to support the Freedom Charter's multi-class approach, albeit based on greatly reduced cadres. The working-class, particularly the trade unions, were strongly endorsed, provided that their interests did not conflict with those of national liberation, which included middle class interests as well.⁹³ Of course, the ANC and its close left-wing allies, the SACP and SACTU, were during this post-1961 period, largely skeletons of their former selves. It is generally accepted that SACTU lost much of its significance, particularly by 1964,⁹⁴ after the arrests at Rivonia. Yet this did not necessarily tilt the ANC's class composition in favor of the middle class. After all, the banning of the ANC, by condemning it to exile, deprived it not only of most of its labor support, but also of support from the middle class, many of whom would soon shift their allegiance to Black Consciousness. Only by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s would the middle class begin to return to the ANC. In contrast, SACTU's loss of labor support would be permanent since the rise of the independent unions during the 1970s provided a more appealing alternative.

The Freedom Charter's multi-class outlook began to be seriously challenged with the general change in ANC policy, symbolized by the 1979 Green Book's commitment to people's war. In its appeal to form semi-legal and legal organizations, leading to a broad national "popular front," the Green Book envisioned what would, in 1983, be known as the UDF.⁹⁵ Central to the UDF's ideology would be the encouragement of mass participation, allegedly regardless of specific socioeconomic or ideological outlook. According to the UDF's initial Declaration, adopted at its January 1983 conference, the members were expected to subscribe only to the national liberation struggle opposing white domination, and to seek a unified state based on the principles of equal suffrage for all.⁹⁶ It has often been assumed that the UDF directly supported the Freedom Charter as originally conceptualized in 1955, but did not dogmatically impose it upon prospective members.⁹⁷ Another point of view goes further, suggesting that in fact the UDF was "nonideological," avoiding controversial aims for the sake of unity and mass mobilization.⁹⁸ It can be argued, however, that this spirit of "compromise" was itself a sign of a new ideological direction away from the Freedom Charter, and thus a retreat from confrontation with white, and especially international, capitalism.

Far from simply pursuing "a fundamentally non-

ideological target of strategic unity,"⁹⁹ the UDF in reality was subscribing to a predominantly urban middle class, particularly petty bourgeois, agenda. The UDF's leadership, for example, like that of the Soweto Civics Association, and other civics, consisted mostly of professionals, white collar workers and students. Much less represented were business people (in contrast to NAFSOC) or industrial workers.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, the UDF was hardly closed to businesspeople, as indicated by the prominence of Motlana in UDF politics and subsequently by the affiliation of NAFSOC.¹⁰¹ It is true that many members of the UDF may well have professed a strong preference for socialism,¹⁰² but this must have reflected more an ideal than a realistic expectation. Indeed, none of the major independent unions comprising FOSATU ever seem to have joined the UDF. Likewise, COSATU, upon its formation in 1985, committed itself to the same policy of non-participation as its predecessor.¹⁰³ Conversely, the UDF and the civics were active particularly in the townships, rather than in the factories.¹⁰⁴

The Changing Relationship Between the ANC and Organized Labor

In tandem with the UDF's (and thus also the ANC's) growing identification with the township middle class, was the further decline of the labor wing of the ANC alliance, SACTU. SACTU had originally been founded in 1955 and almost immediately joined the ANC's newly-established Congress Alliance. Its trade union role in the alliance was to become much reduced after the move to armed struggle in 1961, which saw many of its members join MK. Yet to many of its members, the shift appeared natural.¹⁰⁵ Thus, senior regional SACTU officials became senior regional commanders. For example, Moses Mabhidia, a leading SACTU unionist, would become MK political commissar.¹⁰⁶ As one authority has emphasized, "virtually the entire leadership of SACTU *Umkhonto we Sizwe*."¹⁰⁷ After all, SACTU had from the start been heavily involved with ANC political activity including, most notably, involvement in the anti pass law campaign of 1959-1960, culminating in the Sharpeville crisis of March 1960 and the banning of the ANC.¹⁰⁸ Appropriately, the ANC would subsequently link the failure of mass strikes (presumably by SACTU in particular) to the resort to armed struggle in 1961.¹⁰⁹

Although much of SACTU's membership was arrested by 1963, in the wake of Rivonia, because of its close association with MK, its links with MK would continue, albeit mainly as a recruiting ground.¹¹⁰ The fact that SACTU from now on appeared only a "shadow" of its former self should not be seen as simply a problem for SACTU but was, after all, paradigmatic of the entire ANC alliance movement, at that time in profound crisis. Even more serious, therefore, was the fact that it would remain marginal even after 1979, when the ANC actually began rapidly to grow again. There were two reasons for this. First, and more obviously, was the growth of "independent" trade unions. These had been active since the early 1970s, but their growth was greatly encouraged in 1979, as a result of the state labor reforms (itself part of apartheid's decline) which, for the first time, granted African labor unions official recognition. And while a number of much smaller "community" unions also

emerged, whose allegiance was to the ANC and thus also to SACTU, these were greatly overshadowed by the independent trade unions, which from 1979 were organized as FOSATU. By 1985 they would be absorbed by FOSATU's successor federation, COSATU.¹¹¹ A second factor must have been the simultaneous change in ANC guerrilla policy to "people's war." People's war radically differed from its predecessor, the guerrilla strategy waged during the 1960s and 1970s. It was not a simple, military concept, centrally organized by the ANC alliance hierarchy, but involved the township community, and thus was intimately related to people's power and people's courts. As a result, the role of SACTU, itself always part of the traditionally more centralized ANC alliance, correspondingly diminished while that of the middle class-oriented civics grew.

Nor was SACTU's influence within ANC circles simply replaced by that of the FOSATU or, later, COSATU independent unions. The unions themselves were interested in influencing the ANC but not if they would have first to accept subordination. As a result, the growing influence of the township middle class was not challenged. Although, through such organizations as the UDF, the ANC had many supporters among the urban poor,¹¹² these remained without any organized leadership of their own and thus with commensurately less influence. The term "independent" in this context has usually been interpreted as referring to unions independent of interference from state and white unions.¹¹³ In fact, to the unions, the term connoted also independence from ANC and SACTU control. This position was made clear in the by now well known speech of FOSATU's general secretary, Joe Foster, in 1982, at the federation's second congress. Foster's argument was that although the new unions should indeed get involved in wider politics, they should do so while maintaining their organizational autonomy. A mass popular organization such as the ANC was to be treated with circumspection. The ANC, while part of the popular struggle against the Nationalist government, was avoiding confronting capitalism, both because it represented classes outside of the interests of organized labor and because it sought to appease the major Western powers.¹¹⁴ Two and a half years later, in late 1984, the independent unions would finally join the UDF, civics and youth organizations, in mass demonstrations against the government. In contrast to SACTU, however, the unions did so not as close allies, let alone subordinates, marching in step with the townships and the ANC, but largely because they felt they were strong enough to participate out of choice and thus retain their autonomy and freedom of action.¹¹⁵

Although, soon after its founding COSATU recognized the ANC's leadership in the liberation struggle,¹¹⁶ their relationship remained informal. Nor was the alliance between COSATU and the ANC completely tangible or stable, if only because the ANC, in contrast to COSATU, would still be banned for the next five years, while the UDF and the civics were then being crushed by the first state of emergency, enacted in July 1985. Even after their alliance became official as a result of the ANC's unbanning in 1991, it remained a loose, external alliance between two different organizations, each with its own separate history. In con-

trast, SACTU had, in 1955, immediately after its founding, joined an alliance led by what was, in comparison, a much older and more established ANC. This gave the ANC primacy in the alliance and made both organizations, in effect parts of an all-encompassing whole, the Congress Alliance.

Moreover, in contrast to the ANC's continuing policy of armed struggle, even while it was negotiating with the West for an orderly transference of power, COSATU would continue the independent unions' traditional policy of eschewing any resort to arms.¹¹⁷ To the unions, after all, accepting participation in the armed struggle would have meant subordinating themselves to ANC policy, as had SACTU before them. Avoiding people's war was the logical corollary to Foster's 1982 caveat against involvement in community struggles without maintaining a separate organizational base.¹¹⁸ This organizational divergence, however, could only help, especially in the long run, to reinforce the ANC's growing identity of interests with its middle class constituents. The hegemony of the middle class would emerge at the expense of organized labor, and also at the expense, ultimately, of the ANC's own supporters among the unorganized urban poor.

Whereas the Freedom Charter had explicitly challenged international capital through its program of nationalization, the ANC, by the beginning of the 1980s, was already pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the capitalist West, parallel with the lessening of SACTU's influence. In 1981, ANC president, Oliver Tambo assured leaders of United States corporations and banks that their presence in an ANC-ruled state would be welcome. Similar talks with representatives of British capital were held during this period.¹¹⁹ Already at the ANC's Second National Consultative Conference in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, it had been communicated to the delegates that South African business interests were eager to initiate informal contacts. Contacts actually began to take place three months later in Lusaka. By this time comprehensive sanctions had in fact been imposed by the United States, in reaction to the South African government's imposition of a state of emergency to counter the growing labor and township unrest. Simultaneously, secret negotiations began with the South African government itself.¹²⁰ The ANC's growing rapprochement with international and domestic big business coincided with the Soviet Union's demise and the further consolidation of the neo-liberal Pax Americana. Perhaps this was not an un-mixed blessing to the interests of the ANC's new township middle class constituencies, since their interests and the interests of big capital might not always coincide. But these were longer-term problems, to be bequeathed to the new South Africa. In the meantime, the end of white rule would permit the continued and accelerated expansion of the new African middle class. The gap between the ANC and the independent unions could only widen.¹²¹

Notes

I would like to thank Karen Harris for her most helpful and incisive suggestions in the preparation of this article.

¹ C. Bundy, "Around Which Corner?: Revolutionary Theory and Contemporary South Africa," *Transformation*, 8 (1989), pp. 8-12.

² A. Marx, *Lessons of Struggle, South African Internal Opposition 1960-*

1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

³ R. Southall, *Imperialism or Solidarity? International Labour and South African Trade Unions* (Rondebosch: UCT Press, 1995).

⁴ Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, pp. 187-188, 224, 226, 231, 241; Southall, *Imperialism or Solidarity?*, pp. 221, 223-225, 227-229, 235, 238, 302.

⁵ M. Horrell (ed.), *Race Relations as Regulated by Law in South Africa, 1948-1979* (Johannesburg: S. A. Institute of Race Relations, 1982), pp. 17-18.

⁶ P. Eidelberg, "South African Apartheid: The Homeland-Township Nexus, 1948-1986," *South African Historical Journal* 36 (May, 1997), p. 90.

⁷ On this last point, see H. Giliomee, "The Changing Political Functions of the Homelands," in H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (eds.), *Up Against the Fences: Poverty, Passes and Privilege in South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1985), p. 50.

⁸ These had been preceded in 1971 by district labor bureaux, themselves previously in existence since 1952.

⁹ J. Lazar, "Conformity and Conflict: Afrikaner Nationalist Politics in South Africa, 1948-1961," (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1987), pp. 343-344; D. Posel, *The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 36-38, 264, 270.

¹⁰ R. Southall, "African Capitalism in Contemporary South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 7,1 (Oct., 1980), pp. 38, 46; P. Hudson and M. Sarakinsky, "Class Interests and Politics: The Case of the African Bourgeoisie," in South African Research Svc. (ed.), *South African Review*, 3 (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986), p. 172; C. Charney, "Janus in Blackface? The African Petite Bourgeoisie in South Africa," *Con-Text*, 1 (1988), pp. 19, 27.

¹¹ Southall, "African Capitalism," p. 38; M. Sarakinsky, "The Ideology and Politics of African Capitalists," *Africa Perspective*, New Series, 1, 3 & 4 (1987), p. 43; Charney, "Janus in Blackface?," *Con-Text*, 1 (1987), pp. 19, 27.

¹² B. Nzimande, "Class, National Oppression and the African Petty Bourgeoisie: The Case of the African Traders," in R. Cohen, Y. Muthien, A. Zegeye (eds.), *Repression and Resistance: Insider Accounts of Apartheid* (London: Hans Zell, 1990), pp. 196-197, 203.

¹³ A concession which had been discontinued seven years earlier at a time when the government had been pursuing the previous policy of *tightening* apartheid.

¹⁴ Hudson and Sarakinsky, "Class Interests," pp. 171-174; Southall, "African Capitalism," pp. 44-45, 52, 55-56.

¹⁵ Southall, "African Capitalism," pp. 55-56.

¹⁶ Horrell (ed.), *Race Relations*, pp. 44-46; P. Morris, *A History of Black Housing in South Africa* (Johannesburg: S.A. Foundation, 1981).

¹⁷ S. Bekker and R. Humphries, *From Control to Confusion: The Changing Role of Administration Boards in South Africa, 1971-1983* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1985), pp. 99 and 112; D. Atkinson, *Local Government Restructuring: White Municipal Initiatives, 1985-1988* (Grahamstown: Rhodes University, I.S.E.R., 1984), p. 17. On the legislation itself, see South Africa. Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower* (Pretoria: Govt. Printer, 1979), 3:310-319, 4:422-429.

¹⁸ Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, pp. 99-100; J. Brewer, *After Soweto, An Unfinished Journey* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 243.

¹⁹ S. Bekker and R. Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, pp. 99-100, 102, 109-110, 115-116.

²⁰ D. Atkinson, *The Search for Power and Legitimacy in Black Urban Areas: The Role of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa* (Grahamstown: Rhodes University, I.S.E.R., 1984), pp. 25 and 30; Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, pp. 116, 233-234.

²¹ Atkinson, *Search for Power*, p. 2; Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, pp. 99, 103.

²² Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, pp. 43, 81, 96, 116-117, 169.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 90, 99, 112, 116; Atkinson, *Local Government*, p. 17; Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 235-237.

²⁴ Atkinson, *Search for Power*, pp. 4-5, 31; Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, pp. 102, 114.

²⁵ Brewer, *After Soweto*, p. 236.

²⁶ W. Cobbett, "'Orderly Urbanisation': Continuity and Change in Influx

Control," *South African Labor Bulletin*, 11:8 (1986), 108; P. Maylam, "The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa," *African Affairs*, 89, 354 (1990), pp.70-73,79.

²⁷ Maylam, "Rise and Decline," p.83.

²⁸ Cobbett, "Orderly Urbanisation," p.108.

²⁹ Hudson and Sarakinsky, "Class Interests," pp. 176, 178; J. Seekings, "The Origins of Political Mobilization in PWV Townships, 1980-1984," in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds.), *Popular Struggles in South Africa* (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1988), pp. 60-63, 75; Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, p. 87.

³⁰ Hudson and Sarakinsky, *Class Interests*, p. 182; see also *ibid.*, pp. 171 and 180.

³¹ Sarakinsky, "Ideology and Politics," pp. 45-46; Z. Pallo Jordan, "The African Petty Bourgeoisie: A Case Study of NAFCOC 1964-1984," (Paper prepared for the ANC Economists' Unit Weekend Workshop Seminar, Lusaka, 1984), 1; Southall, "African Capitalism," p. 48.

³² Southall, "African Capitalism," pp. 49, 51, 64, 67-68; Jordan, "African Petty Bourgeoisie," p. 13.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³⁴ Jordan, "African Petty Bourgeoisie," pp. 10-11; Southall, "African Capitalism," pp. 51 and 61.

³⁵ D. Glaser, "A Periodisation of South Africa's Industrialisation Dispersal Policies," in R. Tomlinson and M. Addleson (eds.), *Regional Restructuring under Apartheid: Urban and Regional Policies in Contemporary South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), pp. 37-44; W. Cobbett, D. Glaser, D. Hindson and M. Swilling, "A Critical Analysis of the South African State's Reform Strategies in the 1980s," in P. Frankel, N. Pines and M. Swilling (eds.), *State, Resistance and Change in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1988), pp. 27-28; Giliomee, "Changing Political Functions," pp. 52-53; D. Hindson, *Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), pp. 89, 96, 99.

³⁶ Sarakinsky, "Ideology and Politics," pp. 51-53; Southall, "African Capitalism," p. 63.

³⁷ Southall, "African Capitalism," p. 63.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.51 and 62; Sarakinsky, "Ideology and Politics," pp. 47-48; Jordan, "African Petty Bourgeoisie," pp. 13-14; Charney, "Janus in Black-face?," p. 29; see also University of the Witwatersrand, Africana Collection. Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Nthato Motlana, July 8, 1980, p. 2.

³⁹ Nzimande, "Class, National Oppression," p. 203; Southall, "African Capitalism," p. 54.

⁴⁰ Nzimande, "Class, National Oppression," pp. 173-174, 190-193, 208; Sarakinsky, "Ideology and Politics," p. 54.

⁴¹ Nzimande, "Class, National Oppression," pp. 190-191, 203-205.

⁴² On this support, see e.g. Hudson and Sarakinsky, "Class Interests," p. 176; Sarakinsky, "Ideology and Politics," pp. 49, 56.

⁴³ J. Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 229-230, 244.

⁴⁴ Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Nthato Motlana, March 1, 1979, pp. 7-8; *ibid.*, June, 26, 1987, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 242, 266.

⁴⁶ Thus he allegedly viewed Eddie Webster as a "communist": Karis/Gerhart Collection, Interview with Nthato Motlana, July 17, 1985, p. 2. In contrast, Motlana's son, a student at the University of the Witwatersrand, shared Webster's views while critical of the views of his own father: *ibid.*, July 8, 1980. Motlana also is reported to have approved of the Algerian revolutionary movement's (the F.L.N.'s) recommendation that the Algerian communist party "disband and have its members join the F.L.N. as individuals": *ibid.*, June 25, 1987.

⁴⁷ Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 242, 247. On the links with Black Consciousness, see also J. Seekings, "Why was Soweto Different? Urban Development, Township Politics and the Political Economy of Soweto, 1977-1984," paper delivered at the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, May 2, 1988, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁸ Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, pp. 70, 73, 75, 155, 240; J. Seekings, "The Origins of the UDF: 1977-1982," paper delivered at the Africa Seminar, University of Cape Town, February 1993, p. 3; Charney, "Janus in Black-face?," pp. 34-35; Brewer, *After Soweto*, p. 251.

⁴⁹ R. Fattou, Jr., *Black Consciousness in South Africa: The Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White Supremacy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 139, 144.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 143; D. Hirschmann, "The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1 (1990), p. 7; T. Karis and G. Gerhart, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990*, Vol. 5: *Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 1997), pp.150-151; "'The Mafikeng Manifesto.' Statement on Economic Policy Debated at a Symposium of the Black People's Convention, May 31, 1976," in Karis and Gerhart (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5, p. 549.

⁵¹ Fattou, *Black Consciousness*, pp. 123-124; Hirschmann, "Black Consciousness Movement," pp. 17-18, 21; Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, pp. 57-59; Brewer, *After Soweto*, p. 251.

⁵² J. Seekings, "Political Mobilisation in the Black Townships of the Transvaal," in Frankel, Pines and Swilling (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 209; Karis/Gerhart Collection, Interview with Nthato Motlana, June 26, 1987, p. 8; Seekings, "Why was Soweto Different?," p. 5.

⁵³ Seekings, "Why was Soweto Different?," pp. 5-6; Idem, "Civic Organizations in South African Townships," in G. Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.), *South African Review*, 6 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992), pp. 226-231; Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 247-248, 251.

⁵⁴ Seekings, "Civic Organizations," p. 229.

⁵⁵ Seekings, "Why was Soweto Different?," pp.8-9.

⁵⁶ Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 245-248, 262-263; N. Dizeko, "The Origins and Development of the South African Student's Movement (SASM): 1968-1976," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18,1 (March, 1991), pp. 59-60.

⁵⁷ V. Shubin, "The Soviet Union/Russian Federation's Relations with South Africa, with Special Reference to the Period since 1980," *African Affairs*, 95, 378 (Jan., 1996), p. 5; see also N. Mandela's own role in this, during early 1962: "Statement During the Rivonia Trial, by Nelson R. Mandela, April 20, 1964," in Karis and Carter (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964*, Vol. 3; T. Karis and G. Gerhart, *Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 792.

⁵⁸ J. Brewer, "Black Protest in South Africa's Crisis: A Comment on Legassick," *African Affairs*, 85, 339 (April, 1986), p. 290.

⁵⁹ Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Nthato Motlana, July 8, 1980, pp. 1-3; Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 265-266, 271, 286, 411-412, 426.

⁶⁰ "Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution," A Political Report Adopted by the Consultative Conference of the A.N.C. at the Morogoro Conference, Tanzania, May, 1969, in A. La Guma (ed.), *Apartheid: A Collection of Writings on South African Racism by South Africans* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 181, 185, 187-188.

⁶¹ T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1983), p. 297; R. Fattou Jr., "The African National Congress of South Africa: The Limitations of a Revolutionary Strategy," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 18, 3 (1984), p. 599.

⁶² "Strategy and Tactics," p. 187; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, August 12-16, 1989, pp. 960, 963; Bundy, "Around which Corner?," p. 5.

⁶³ Karis and Gerhart, *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5, pp. 55, 279; T. Lodge, "The African National Congress in South Africa, 1976-1983: Guerrilla War and Armed Propaganda," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 3, 1 and 2 (October, 1983/ April, 1984), pp. 161, 164; D. Kempton, *Soviet Strategy towards Southern Africa: The National Liberation Movement Connection* (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 175; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, p. 998.

⁶⁴ Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, pp. 964-966; Fattou, *Black Consciousness*, p. 141; Lodge, "African National Congress in South Africa," pp. 164-165; Idem, *Black Politics*, pp. 339, 341.

⁶⁵ Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, p. 966.

⁶⁶ H. Barrell, "The Turn to the Masses: The African National Congress' Strategic Review of 1978-1979," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18, 1 (March, 1992), pp. 72, 74-76, 79; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, pp. 966-968, 970.

⁶⁷ "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission (the 'Green Book') to the ANC National Executive Committee, Parts One and Two with Two Annexures, August, 1979," in Karis and Gerhart (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5, p. 720; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, p. 977.

⁶⁸ Barrell, "Turn to the Masses," pp. 88-89; Idem, "Conscripts to their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976-1986," (Oxford,

D.Phil., 1993), p. 203.

⁶⁹ Bundy, "Around which Corner?," pp. 6-7; Karis and Gerhart, *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5, pp. 302-304; "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission," pp. 729-730, 733-734; T. Lodge, "'Mayihlome! Let Us Go to War': From Nkomati to Kabwe, The African National Congress, January, 1984-June, 1985," in *South African Review*, 3, p. 230.

⁷⁰ "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission," pp. 724-725.

⁷¹ Barrell, "Turn to the Masses," p. 88; Idem, "Conscripts to their Age," pp. 219-220, 274; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, p. 979; "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission (the 'Green Book') to the ANC National Executive Committee," Parts One to Six with Fourteen Annexures, typescript, 98 pp., August, 1979, Part Four, pp. 20-21 & Annexure F, 1. I am much indebted to Tom Karis for having made this typescript available to me.

⁷² See also J. Seekings, "Quiescence and the Transition to Confrontation: South African Townships, 1978-1984," (Oxford, D. Phil., 1990), pp. 168, 171, 174-176, 288, 290, 296-297.

⁷³ Barrell, "Conscripts to Their Age," pp. 203-204, 213-214, 219-220; Idem, "The Outlawed South African Liberation Movements," in S. Johnson (ed.), *South Africa: No Turning Back* (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 59, 61.

⁷⁴ Brewer, *After Soweto*, pp. 286, 426.

⁷⁵ T. Lodge, "The African National Congress: Kabwe and After," *International Affairs Bulletin*, 10, 2 (1986), pp. 67, 10; Idem, "African National Congress in South Africa," pp. 157-158.

⁷⁶ Lodge, "African National Congress in South Africa," p. 169; Idem, *Black Politics*, p. 340; Barrell, "Conscripts to their Age," pp. 349, 351-353; Brewer, *After Soweto*, p. 426.

⁷⁷ T. Lodge, "The United Democratic Front: Leadership and Ideology," in J. Brewer (ed.), *Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight* (Bergville: Southern Book Publishers, 1989), pp. 220-226; J. Seekings, "What was the United Democratic Front?," in D. O'Meara (ed.), *The Politics of Change in Southern Africa*; Canadian Research Consortium on Southern Africa, Collected Seminar Papers, Vol. 1 (Montreal, 1995), pp. 59-60.

⁷⁸ Barrell, "Conscripts to their Age," p. 468.

⁷⁹ J. Seekings, "Township Resistance in the 1980s," in M. Swilling, R. Humphreys, K. Shubane (eds.), *Apartheid City in Transition* (Cape Town: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), p. 301.

⁸⁰ See on this, "'Freedom Charter,' Adopted by the Congress of the People, June 26, 1955," in Karis and Carter (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 3, pp. 206-207; N. Mandela, "In our Lifetime," in Karis and Carter (eds.), *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 3, pp. 247, 249; Charney, "Janus in Blackface?," pp. 19, 24-25.

⁸¹ Fatton, "African National Congress," pp. 596-597, 603, 607.

⁸² Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, p. 36.

⁸³ "'Freedom Charter,'" p. 206; Mandela, "In Our Lifetime," p. 247; P. Hudson, "The Freedom Charter and the Theory of National Democratic Revolution," *Transformation*, 1 (1986), pp. 24, 32-33.

⁸⁴ P. Hudson, "Images of the Future and Strategies in the Present: The Freedom Charter and the South African Left," in Frankel, Pines and Swilling, op. cit., pp. 263-267, 270; Idem, "Freedom Charter," pp. 20, 29.

⁸⁵ B. Bunting, *Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary* (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1975), pp. 206-211, 221; Bundy, "Around which Corner?," pp. 2-3. On Ghana, see, in particular, W. S. Thomson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 102-103, 177-183, 259.

⁸⁶ On Soviet policy towards such countries, see Hudson, "Freedom Charter," pp. 6-7, 14-20, 24; Idem, "Images of the Future," pp. 263-267.

⁸⁷ South African Communist Party (SACP), *The Road to South African Freedom* (London: Ellis Bowles, 1981), pp. 9, 11, 13, 17, 26-27, 42-44; "Strategy and Tactics," p. 191.

⁸⁸ "Strategy and Tactics," pp. 181, 184-188; SACP, *Road to South African Freedom*, pp. 44-46; "The Freedom Charter," An Analysis of the Freedom Charter, the Revolutionary Program of the African National Congress, as Presented at the Morogoro Conference, Tanzania, May, 1969, in La Guma (ed.), *Apartheid*, pp. 231-233; Lodge, "African National Congress in South Africa," pp. 162-163.

⁸⁹ Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, p. 60.

⁹⁰ Mandela, "In Our Lifetime," pp. 245-250.

⁹¹ Hudson, "Images of the Future," p. 275; R. Fine and D. Davis, *Beyond*

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⁹² SACP, *Road to South African Freedom*, pp. 44-45, 48; "'Freedom Charter,' An Analysis," p. 235.

⁹³ "Strategy and Tactics," pp. 181, 198, 203; "Statement During the Rivonia Trial," p. 787; Bundy, "Around which Corner?," pp. 3-4, 9, 11, 12.

⁹⁴ Southall, *Imperialism or Solidarity?*, pp. 19, 54; Karis and Gerhart, pp. 196-197.

⁹⁵ "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission," pp. 730-731, 734; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, pp. 987-988; Barrell, *MK*, pp. 40, 50-51; Idem, "Turn to the Masses," pp. 83, 85-86, 91.

⁹⁶ "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission," pp. 728, 730-731; Karis/Gerhart Collection. Interview with Joe Slovo, pp. 974-975, 979; Barrell, "Turn to the Masses," p. 86; Seekings, "What was the United Democratic Front?," pp. 52-53.

⁹⁷ Mac Maharaj, "UDF: An Historical Development," (interview), *Sechaba* (March, 1984), p. 17; T. Lodge, "Introduction," in S. Gastrow, *Who's Who in South African Politics*, Vol. 1 (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1985), pp. 16, 25; Idem, "United Democratic Front," pp. 210-213; Seekings, "Township Resistance in the 1980s," p. 292; Idem, "'Trailing Behind the Masses,': The United Democratic Front and Township Politics in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Region, 1983-1984," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18, 1 (March, 1992), pp. 94, 112.

⁹⁸ Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, pp. 135, 137-138, 146-147.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁰⁰ Lodge, "United Democratic Front," pp. 207-210; Seekings, "Trailing Behind the Masses," p. 111; Brewer, *After Soweto*, p. 290; Charney, "Janus in Blackface?," pp. 37-38.

¹⁰¹ Gastrow, *Who's Who*, Vol. 1, p. 205; Lodge, "United Democratic Front," p. 214; Idem, "Introduction," in Gastrow, op. cit., Vol. 2 (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1987), pp. xxiii, xxx; Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, pp. 126-127.

¹⁰² Lodge, "United Democratic Front," p. 220; Idem, "Introduction," in Gastrow, *Who's Who*, Vol. 2, p. xxiii; Marx, *Lessons of Struggle*, p. 224.

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¹⁰⁸ Southall, *Imperialism or Solidarity?*, p. 54; Lambert, "Political Unionism," p. 450.

¹⁰⁹ "Strategy and Tactics," pp. 181, 185.

¹¹⁰ S. Friedman, *Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers In Trade Unions, 1970-1984* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), p. 32; Lambert, "Political Unionism," pp. 462-463; Barrell, *MK*, pp. 15-16; Fine and Davis, *Beyond Apartheid*, pp. 238-239; Southall, *Imperialism or Solidarity?*, pp. 54, 219.

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¹¹² Lodge, "United Democratic Front," p. 227.

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¹¹⁷ Barrell, *Conscripts to Their Age*, pp. 409-410.

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